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Uncanny Autochthons: The Bamileke Facing Ethnic Territorialization in Cameroon
Anschaire Aveved
The Bamileke in contemporary Cameroon are known by the services of the 
General Delegation for National Security  as one of the approximately 200 ethnic groups 
that have been assigned a registration number, and they must like all citizens formally 
identify their ethnic group  at the time of national identification. Unlike most 
Cameroonians who identify with a primary language, the Bamileke usually identify  with 
a chieftaincy or a village of origin, which may  not always correspond with a distinctive 
language. This situation has led the police to hold a map of chieftaincies during 
registration in order to assist the self-identification of those whose declared place of 
origin is located in the former Bamileke Region. While this operation reveals the extent 
to which the Bamileke ethnonym corresponds to a linguistic umbrella term and sets apart 
the Bamileke as an ethnic group in state records, it also highlights the general 
assumption that one can match every registered ethnic group with a discrete region of 
the country’s territory. The structure that grounds this assumption is referred to as ethnic 
territorialization in this dissertation and is critically examined from the vantage point of 
ethnographic exhibition, identification with homelands, political competition, and 
colonial history.
The legibility  and traceability  of both ethnic identity and putative home villages 
that come with national identification in Cameroon contrast distinctly with the generally 
repressed character of ethnicity in national politics and state institutions that have the 
representation of the nation as one of their main objectives. This was the case in the 
early 1990s when the newly created National Museum of Yaoundé had to confront the 
imbalances and contradictions that  would result  from an effort to put the “synthesis of 
Cameroonian cultures” on display. It was also the case in 1996 when the newly amended 
constitution included a provision for the rights of indigenous populations and limited 
candidacy  for each of its ten regional council presidencies to “an indigenous person”. In 
both cases, the Bamileke have been described in the literature as the major concern for 
lawmakers. In the first case, the predominance of ethnographic materials from the West 
Region was perceived as a threat to both the visibility of other ethnic groups and the 
cherished principle of regional balance which ensures the enrollment of state 
representatives on the basis of ethnic quotas. In the second case, the protection of 
indigenous people was understood as a means developed by the ruling party, identified 
as the Beti, to undermine Bamileke interests in regions other than their own. 
Given the ambiguous character of ethnicity in Cameroon, this dissertation resists 
the temptation to reduce the apparently recent institutionalization of indigenous rights in 
Cameroon to a matter of the current international increase in claims to “belonging” or 
autochthony, or to a strategy developed by the ruling party in order to fragment the 
current political opposition. Rather, this dissertation draws lessons from an ethnography 
of the failure of the government in Yaoundé to give an ethnic description of the nation at 
the National Museum and the relative success of a non-governmental institution, known 
as The Road to Chiefdoms, that created a museum in the former Bamileke Region with 
the same goal. Accordingly, this dissertation suggests that the apparently contradictory 
outcome of these two initiatives both results from a political fiction that territorializes 
identity  ethnically and makes use of chieftainship and land tenure as its cornerstone. 
More importantly, this dissertation examines the ways in which the Bamileke actively 
engage, partake in, and question state politics as both indigenous people or autochthons 
and gradual opponents of the principle of autochthony. It  further highlights the reasons 
why any debate on either regional balance or autochthony  in Cameroon must include the 
matters of chieftainship and land tenure as institutions whereby the Cameroonian state 
seeks to portray  itself as a supra-ethnic political entity  that incarnates a non-ethnic 
Nation to come and avoids being reduced to only one of the many ethnic groups 
officially assumed to be at its foundation.
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CHAPTER ONE: UNCANNY AUTOCHTHONS
I came across Francesco Pompeo’s 1999 article on the National Museum of 
Yaoundé in 2006 when I was studying the development of community museums in 
Mankon and Bandjoun. In those days, a great deal of my research involved probing the 
meanings and the scope of the notion of community, and assessing how the idea of 
community  could be located within the broader project that gave birth to the 
museumization of chiefly treasures housed in the chiefly  compounds of various 
chieftaincies in the West and North-West regions of Cameroon. Eventually my  interest  in 
the idea of community  grew more important than my thoughts about African art, which 
itself gradually  took the form of a category of art rather than an index of art made in 
Africa; especially when I realized that Francesco Pompeo brought to light a tremendous 
contextual paradox; in fact two interlocking paradoxes. The first paradox was explicitly 
identified, and impressively discussed by the article: How was one to represent the 
nation without projecting it  as a set of discreet and comparable ethnic groups. The 
second paradox projects the first onto Pompeo’s own intellectual gesture of researching 
and writing on an ethnic group in the context of urgent and repressed ethnic competition.
Any attempt at representing the “synthesis of Cameroonian cultures,” in 
Pompeo’s words, “had to face the artistic primacy of the Grassfields and the hostility  of 
groups from the center regions” (Pompeo, 1999, p.820). In this manner, the idea of 
synthesis is not only forcibly based on a number of identifiable groups, but also implies 
a certain ethnic cartography of the country. The Grassfields, alternatively called the 
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Grassland of Cameroon, comprise the two regions in which I were studying community 
museums. These are the West Region and the North-West Region. The two regions taken 
together were formerly part of the German Kamerun Grasland, which did not refer to a 
single administrative block, but to the basic topography  of the area. While it  cannot be 
denied that the term ultimately  took on an ethnic connotation, it did so gradually and so 
toward the end of German colonization. This ethnic connotation has been reemphasized 
sporadically  ever since at various stages of Cameroon’s recent political history, and has 
become the most  prominent feature of the Grassland or Grassfields. A remarkable aspect 
of this gradually recognized ethnic feature of the Grassland is that it does not stress a 
discrete language group. Neither the term Bamileke, which has been used in 
contraposition to Bamoun by the French to describe the people inhabiting the section of 
the Grassland that  fell within the claims of France after the First World War, nor the term 
Graffi, which is a creolized version of the term grassfields and designates the people of 
the Grassland in contraposition to the coastal area of the then Southern British 
Cameroons, have at their basis a single language group that is recognized as such. 
Instead, in both cases one finds a conglomerate of older and new polities, as much as 
diverse linguistic groups.
On the other hand the evocation of “center regions” in Pompeo’s phrasing also 
goes beyond a reference to the administrative Centre Region where Yaoundé is located. 
As in the plural term Grassfields, the pluralization of the noun in this case refers to an 
idealized ethnic map of the country rather than administrative regions. In this way 
Pompeo, I would suggest, considers the Centre and the South regions as the land of the 
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Beti. Of course, one needs to be accustomed to this idealized map if one is to make sense 
the national concept that is at stake in the National Museum project. I myself was aware 
of this cartography at the time; it was the manner in which I had to face it that was new. I 
would be reminded of this fact later, during the defense of my MA thesis on the 
development of community museums in the Grassland, when I was asked how it had 
been possible for me, coming from Mokolo, in the Far-North Region, to carry out field 
research in the Grassfields. My point at  this level is neither to give a historical 
background nor to challenge the ethnic cartography or the idealized ethnic map revealed 
by the National Museum project, but  to indicate that it is necessary to take its existence 
into account in order to understand Pompeo’s paradoxes. 
In Pompeo’s view, the paradox of national representation in Cameroon follows 
from an historically entangled ethnic antagonism between the Beti of the South and 
Centre regions and the Bamileke of the Grassfields. In his article four sources of friction 
between the two groups can be identified. The first is an invidious comparison of the 
available collections of ethnographic artifacts on either side. As a result of which the 
Bamileke are assumed to be ‘ethnographically’ more visible than the Beti. Second, the 
National museum, the newly reassigned former home of the French High Commissioner 
and former presidential palace, is a highly charged political symbol and is located in the 
putative homeland of the Beti. Third, the contemporary political opposition in the 
country  is framed as that of Bamileke opposition to the ruling party, identified with the 
person of Paul Biya, a Beti with a political origin in the South Region. Fourth, this 
opposition, in a surreptitious fashion, ethnically reproduces an older opposition between, 
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in Pompeo’s words, “those who ruled, and who are still ruling the ‘neocolonial’ state, 
and those who, on the contrary, have opposed it by supporting total independence from 
France” (1999, p.822). On the subject of the neocolonial state and the ethnic identity  of 
those who have ruled the country since independence while continuing to collaborate 
with the former colonial power, we must add Pompeo’s implicit conflation of the Beti 
with the Fulani, often confused with the Haoussa in everyday speech, the erroneously 
presumed ethnic group of Ahmadou Ahidjo, the previous president. In Pompeo’s 
narrative altogether, the Bamileke are presented as the ethnic champion of national 
liberation and political independence of the postcolonial state, independently of internal 
cleavages and regardless of the limitations of ethnic identification. 
Nevertheless, Pompeo’s suspicions and theories gained firmer ground for me 
upon reading Madeleine Ndobo’s article on private and public museums in Cameroon, 
and Germain Loumpet’s personal accounts as the head of the National Museum project 
throughout the 1990s (Ndobo, 1996; Loumpet, 2004). Loumpet discusses the paradox of 
national representation in the language of the potential overrepresentation of the 
Grassfields. I dwell on this issue in Chapter 4, where I examine and compare carefully 
ethnographic display  in both the National Museum of Yaoundé and the recently 
established private Musée des Civilisations. The latter has been the subject of meticulous 
investigation during my research. Ndobo on the other hand, whose article was based on a 
historical review of failed National Museum projects in Cameroon since the early years 
of post-independence, argued that in view of the political stalemates in Yaoundé it would 
be best to develop regional museums instead. In her view, Cameroon’s regions are 
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already somehow ethnically more stable due to the existence of dominant ethnic groups. 
However, with Loumpet and Ndobo’s confirmation of speculative ethnography at the 
center of the National Museum project, each of the four threads of Pompeo’s paradox 
required my ultimate attention, but there was one underlying suggestion common to all 
that that would make such an effort possible.
I would not  have been able to measure the complexity of the question asked later 
by the jury of the thesis on community museums at the Catholic University  of Central 
Africa had I no prior knowledge of this first paradox: the paradox of representing the 
nation ethnically. As we have seen, such a representation brings with it a whole series of 
other issues, namely ethnographic collections, ethnic homelands, political competition, 
and political legitimacy. Yet there was more to Pompeo’s concerns. There was an anxiety 
that appeared to be the ground for a different paradox: the paradox of an ethnographic 
investigation that  would not take into account the paradox of national representation. It 
all seemed as if I had needed the eyes of a foreigner, one who could not be claimed by 
the field of representation, in order to become aware of the consequences and obstacles 
of ethnographic inquiry  in such a context. It was the same question that became critical 
for Pompeo’s interpretation of underground ethnic conflicts inside the bureaucracy in 
Cameroon. “Upon my  first  contact with this universe,” he argues, “I could already notice 
a few latent conflicts. I was asked many times why I chose to study the West Region and 
I would often take note of hostility against the Bamileke, which was then reflected upon 
me...” (1999, p.816). This guilt by association, in my view, is the basis of the second 
paradox and is different  from that of political representation of ethnic groups. It is the 
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paradox of belonging, which follows from an effort of avoiding to make of ethnography 
the instrument for classifying and building hierarchies in a radical way. 
I do not intend to question Pompeo’s interpretation of ethnic tensions in 
Cameroon, especially when the main topic of his article was to discuss his personal 
involvement in the governmental project at the time he was conducting fieldwork in the 
country  in the 1990s. On the contrary, I take Pompeo’s accounts as testimony to a 
context of ethnic polarization in which studying, or simply  writing about an ethnic group 
cannot be taken lightly; and in which belonging to an ethnic group  is being the subject of 
unexpected fields of demands and tensions that require, more than a distant intellectual 
posture, an effort to recognize something I would like to describe at this stage as the 
ambiguous character of the means by which reality  is rendered into language. Indeed the 
spectacle of ethnic conflicts brought to us by  Pompeo’s 1999 article cannot be simply 
taken as if it was the testament of a moment in the history of the country, or more 
specifically as a sheer image of the museum initiative in the background. It carries with 
it the fears, aspirations, and bewilderment not only of the Pompeo who articulates it, but 
of the Pompeo who anticipates it. In other words, truth is not in the spectacle alone but 
also on the side of the spectator. Accordingly, I had to suppress Pompeo’s extreme 
polarization of ethnic issues in Cameroon, a state of affair he owed his unfortunate 
involvement in the capital’s bureaucracy, in order to make room for a more structural 
understanding of the various stakes behind ethnic identification. Such was the initial 
motivation of my current exploration of the development of The Road to Chiefdoms, the 
program that established the Musée des Civilisations, the nowadays ethnographic twin of 
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the initial and defunct  National Museum design in Yaoundé. The flip  side of this 
suggestion is that my own accounts should not escape my reader’s scrutiny any more 
than my own.
The Road to Chiefdoms is a non-governmental program of heritage protection in 
the West Region of Cameroon. Its location in Dschang, the heart of the former colonial 
administrative Bamileke Region, was only a minor reason behind my interest in its own 
museum project. This was not the case, however, with its multivalent connections to the 
failed National Museum project in Yaoundé. I came across The Road to Chiefdoms well 
after I gained knowledge of the stalemate over national representation in Yaoundé during 
my earlier field research on community  museums in the West and North-West Regions. 
The striking feature of The Road to Chiefdoms made me think of its museum institution 
as something in-between the community museums of Mankon and Bandjoun and the 
National Museum of Yaoundé. On the one hand, The Road to Chiefdoms was formally 
intended to protect Bamileke ethnographic collections locally by helping chieftaincies in 
the West Region in improving their galleries. On the other hand, it was meant to build a 
center for the interpretation of those collections. Moreover, while the project was 
initially set to focus on those chieftaincies only, I discovered during preliminary  field 
research in 2009 that it would extend its exhibition scheme and take over the challenge 
of representing the synthesis of Cameroonian “cultures,” the initial idea of the National 
Museum of Yaoundé. Thus, I thought, The Road to Chiefdoms would bring Dschang, the 
former capital city  of colonial Bamileke Region, into symmetry  with Yaoundé, the 
current capital city of Cameroon, located in the Beti area. Once again, I was presented 
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with Pompeo’s four modes of antagonism: ethnographic artifacts, tribal homelands, 
political competition and state legitimacy.
As noted above, the paradox of representing the nation in an ethnographic 
framework must be considered in the light of a social context in which ethnographic 
objects have been imbued with the capacity  to capture existing ethnic tensions in the 
society under consideration. The Road to Chiefdoms would have deserved greater 
scrutiny  on my part if its museum project had maintained its focus on Bamileke 
chieftaincies alone. In which case it would not have been very much different from the 
two community  museums established in the West Region by  the Italian NGO Centro 
Orientamento Educativo (COE). The rationale of COE’s initiative was to make of the 
treasures housed in chiefly compounds not merely  ethnographic collections but also art 
accessible to the students of the Institut de Formation Artistique, an art school that the 
NGO and the Catholic Church established in Mbalmayo in the mid-1990s. They did so 
in order to fill a gap in the study of art history, by  making the Cameroon Grassland a 
centerpiece of the study of African Art. On the contrary, the idea of representing the 
“cultures” of Cameroon, which The Road to Chiefdoms shared with the National 
Museum of Yaoundé forced it into the paradox of national representation brought to light 
by Francesco Pompeo.
Accordingly, I wanted to ask whether The Road to Chiefdoms could be 
considered as a response to the political stalemate in Yaoundé; and in which case, 
whether it  could be said to echo Ndobo’s call for ethno-regional museums, or to simply 
relocate the entire national museum project? In the face of a positive response to such a 
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question, who would undertake the effort and who would pay  for it? Was it  the response 
of the Government, or was it  instead the particular response of the Bamileke 
chieftaincies involved in The Road to Chiefdoms? How are we thus to make sense of the 
continuity  between government and chieftainship? On the other hand, what do we do 
with the consistent ambition to represent the cultures of the nation? Also, what could be 
the predicament that made representing the nation, no matter its means, more feasible in 
Dschang than in Yaoundé? Moreover, could The Road to Chiefdoms testify a Bamileke 
consciousness at  large of the stalemate of national representation in Yaoundé and be said 
to stand for a Bamileke response to it? Why would the Bamileke feel responsible for the 
heritage of Bamileke chieftaincies, not to mention that of the entire nation? To put it 
otherwise, how shall we explain the need to represent the cultures of Cameroon while 
yet protecting Bamileke ethnographic objects in a Region assumed to be the Region of 
the Bamileke? After all, what does it mean to be Bamileke, and how shall we understand 
the hostility  Francesco Pompeo became indirectly  the object of? In the end, does this 
series of questions, which highlight divergent interests in material culture, territory, 
government, and political mobilization, allow us to consider issues of national 
representation in Cameroon exclusively from the vantage point of cultural difference or 
discourse analysis alone? Does it  allow us to consider the matters of either culture or 
ethnicity separately from the matters of policy making and politics at large?
Uncanny autochthon is the name that  I deliberately  give to Pompeo’s 
metaphorical re-inscription of the Bamileke in the National Museum project. I hasten to 
point out at the outset that the status of the Bamileke as autochthons in Cameroon might 
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have appeared uncannily  to Pompeo, but  this is not the interpretation that can be drawn 
from the spectacle he brings to us in his article. On the contrary that is my 
understanding; if not the truth on my side of the same spectacle, at least  something that 
the spectacle made relatable. What about it? I have indicated above that truth is also on 
the side of the spectator. Indeed, to understand what I mean by this, I will have to 
explore the inconspicuous metaphors of the Bamileke in Pompeo’s paradox of national 
representation. To this end, I must argue that Pompeo’s inscription of the Bamileke in a 
national scheme is not unique. It is commonplace in the contemporary debate over ethnic 
regionalism, which will be clearly discussed in Chapter 5. Francesco Pompeo’s 
discussion of the status of the Bamileke in Cameroon is a distant echo of an article 
published in 1960 by Lieutenant-colonel Jean Lamberton who, at the peak of the 
counterinsurgency of the late 1950s, placed the Bamileke at the center stage of the newly 
independent Cameroon. The third chapter of this dissertation makes of Lamberton’s 
writings a key element for understanding ongoing discussions on ethnicity and power in 
Cameroon. The reason for this referral is that Lamberton’s own inscription encompasses 
the history of state formation and the spasmodic ethnic tensions internal to the 
government of Cameroon since the end of the Second World War. Today it shapes 
ongoing debates over democratization, multiparty politics, decentralization, indigeneity, 
cultural associations, and ethnographic exhibitions. I consider these inscriptions as 
metaphors first  because the concept of ethnicity  that they mobilize requires a form of 
reading capable enough to address the particular demands which a given subject is faced 
10
with. Second, it is my understanding that, as metaphors, their meaning shall be 
constricted within the confines of suggestions, with language as their means and effect. 
By suggestion I mean the elucidation, in all likelihood, of broader sets of 
regulations and distributions that condition a person’s reading and description of a 
situation, as much as situations already rendered into spectacle by means of language. 
Moreover, this idea of suggestion entails the effort required for a subject to take and 
change position and make his or hers the disguised truth of primary  elucidations. This 
particular understanding of suggestion is crucial because the value of the notion of 
culture in the two museum projects explored cannot be understood in their own right 
without taking into account the various and often contradictory  uses and dismissals of 
ethnic categories and tribal identity such as the Bamileke and the Beti. Indeed I see the 
relevance of a historical background to both the stalemate at the National Museum and 
the development of The Road to Chiefdoms as a form of suggestion. A historical 
narrative does not explain the meaning of ethnicity in either situation, but it provides 
articulations for broader networks of circulation of ethnic markers. These markers 
become meaningful only  insofar as they  allow people to articulate their subjectivities in 
and through networks of benefits and self-objectivation. Jacques Lacan’s elaborations on 
the uncertainties of being that articulate sexual desire and are better revealed in 
economies of excessively  formalized subjectivities, certainly  are the major intuition 
behind my notion of suggestion. We ought to reckon first that his elaborations entirely 
inform his project of rereading both Saussure’s structural linguistics and Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory on the question of value and, by the term suggestion, we must 
11
consider not concepts and already  ascertained values only  but specific situations that 
engage particular subjectivities, or questions of being, and particular challenges, 
insecurities, anxieties, aspirations, and anticipations. It is from this perspective that I 
consider Lacan’s motto: “If the symptom is a metaphor, stating it as such is no longer 
one.” (Lacan, 1957, p.80)
This approach through suggestion is intended to deviate from the dominant 
approach in the study  of ethnicity in Africa, where the consideration of ethnic issues 
have remained mired in the conundrum of primordial attachments set up by Clifford 
Geertz in the 1960s. I do not intend to build a conceptual framework that aims at 
accounting for the dilemmas of museum institutions in Cameroon. On the contrary, I 
would like to explore the ways in which those institutions and what is said about them 
summon a particular attention on my part. While the second chapter of this dissertation 
discusses the ways in which we can trace deeper anxieties in the backdrop of debates 
over essentialism versus constructivism–debates in which a specific relation or non-
relation has been conceived of between culture and politics in the postcolonial state–I 
would like to state at  the outset that the debate internal to the National Museum project 
in Yaoundé could have been legitimately addressed as a primordial controversy, as 
Clifford Geertz himself would have put it in his early  discussions of culture in the newly 
decolonized states of Asia and Africa (Geertz, 1973). The second chapter explores the 
predicament of Geertz’s effort to provide a framework within to think of a postcolonial 
state such as Cameroon. For now, the National Museum of Yaoundé, in due respect to 
the stalemate of national representation, would have been considered by Geertz as a 
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“parapolitical institution,” an institution in which “primordial ties” would have become a 
hindrance to the emergence of genuine “civil politics.” A genuine civil politics is 
therefore understood as one in which ethnic markers no longer hold a crucial role in 
defining the stakes of an institution. Nonetheless, identifying Pompeo’s fourfold debate 
in Cameroon as a primordial controversy  runs the risk of forcing his understanding of 
the National Museum project in Yaoundé, and thereby  our understanding of The Road to 
Chiefdoms museum, into an absolute and teleological order of political identification, 
more than it would allow us to understand why and how the so-called “primordial ties” 
have found a particular configuration in the formalization of either institution. In other 
words, an emphasis on the incongruity  of ethnicity does not amount to the identification 
of the demands that have made of its evocation and formalization a requirement for a 
discourse on national representation.
Geertz’s diagnosis in the late 1960s rests upon the suggestion that the demands 
that undergird those primordial ties in general, without regard to any particular 
circumstances, are transhistorical and political ones, while the ties themselves are 
historical and cultural. As such, analyzing them implies addressing them separately  from 
the demands that sustain them, which then makes room for the study of culture 
separately  from politics. Accordingly, Geertz’s reading entails an incontrovertible 
rendition of the demands formulated in the problematic bestowal of a specific value to 
ethnicity. It is the assumption that civil politics implies the dismissal of claims based on 
ethnicity. What would be the case then, it can be asked, when the distinction between 
culture and politics is ascertained to be located at the heart of the notion of “civil 
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politics” itself, and articulated from there? My understanding is that intellectual efforts 
in Africa, since the 1960s, have been made in the direction of dismissing the notion of 
primordial ties, while yet recycling the underlying dichotomy between transhistorical 
and historical processes, with culture and politics maintaining their antagonistic polarity. 
What I would like to suggest instead, behind the idea of a metaphorical inscription of 
ethnicity and the regulations and distributions to which their elucidation leads, is the 
notion of ethnic territorialization. This notion, as I show it in the second chapter, takes 
over Mahmood Mamdani’s groundbreaking depiction of the political inscription of the 
notion of culture in Africa during the colonial period in a system of regulations wherein 
the idea of culture could be said to be politicized at the outset (Mamdani, 1996). 
However, I do not claim the theoretical necessity  of a depoliticized culture, no 
matter what is thereby identified. In other words, the notion of ethnic territorialization 
that I suggest does not see the politicized character of culture the predicament for any 
separation of culture from politics. Indeed, this separation can be seen not only in 
Mamdani’s call for the detribalization of civil society in his discussion of the 
institutional legacy  of the colonial state in Africa (1996), but also in his later efforts to 
disentangle market-based identities from political identities in his assessment of the 
causes of the deadly  outbreak of ethnic strife in Rwanda in 1994 (2001). Moreover, 
while there is room to mitigate the agency of the colonized in the configuration of the 
colonial status quo of ethnically segregated territories, since the task of colonizing was 
self-identified as a foreign project, such a mitigation not only becomes untenable in a 
postcolonial era where the former colonized has claimed power over their own destiny. 
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Moreover holding onto the continuity  of the colonial project may negate current 
articulations of ethnicity  that cannot find their intelligibility in distant manipulations, as 
the case might appear in the National Museum of Yaoundé. I do not unequivocally  argue 
that a continuity cannot be identified from one historical moment to another, but I do 
believe that such continuities are structural and that attention should be paid not  to their 
self-sustenance, independently of their mobilization within a register of intervention, be 
it simply literary, but on their appropriation by the most divergent agencies which may 
find in them a tool of their own. Finally, while the idea of territorialization may refer to 
the actual undifferentiated territory  of the abstract state, which might be seen as the 
spatial summation of as many ethnic homelands as possible, I would like to see in it  a 
particular relation to both land as a premise and the state as an independent secondary 
institution, especially inasmuch as the idea of nation promoted by the latter is concerned 
(Chapter 7). Thus, the notion of ethnic territorialization here requires unraveling the 
various threads of the demands that sustain not only distinctions such as between culture 
and politics, historical and transhistorical processes, but also the resilience of said ties, 
that of ethnicity as much as those of chieftaincy and family  in places such as a museum 
exhibition.
More to the notion of ethnic territorialization, behind which we can anticipate the 
theater of autochthony, the idea of the uncanny is meant to set the Bamileke in a new 
context. I have indicated that  the most distant background to the metaphorical re-
inscription of the Bamileke in a state-sponsored project can be found in the 
counterinsurgency of the early days of independence. The first context was broadly 
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defined by the counterinsurgency, and more specifically  by its second phase, in which it 
moved from the Sanaga-Maritime to the Bamileke Region, which had merged with the 
Bamoun Region as part of an effort to reshuffle the ethnically demarcated administrative 
boundaries at  independence. The third chapter of this dissertation probes the scope of 
Lamberton’s engagement with the ethnically  territorialized State of Cameroon, and the 
ways in which it set a precedent to a series of issues that would resurface later in the 
post-independence era under the controversy known as the “Bamileke problem.” With 
this, I intend to show that Lamberton, following a long colonial tradition, tended to 
exceptionalize the Bamileke to the point where they could be seen both as an ethnic 
group uncommon in West Africa, and as a somewhat troublesome ethnic minority in 
Cameroon. Certainly, the context this time is instead defined by the end of the one-party 
rule system and the reassessment of ethnic membership  consequent  to the incursion of 
freedom of association. On what grounds then does the qualification of the Bamileke as 
uncanny autochthons lie?
While the reappearance of ethnic territorialization in the 1990s is conditioned by 
this broad context in which political competition gives to ethnicity  a new leeway as a 
mode of self-identification in the public space, the notion of uncanny autochthon is 
meant to bring to light a state of affair specific to the Bamileke, which seems transparent 
in the polarizing debate over the subsequent constitutionalization of indigenous rights 
and the creation of regional councils headed by  an indigenous person. With minor 
exceptions, this polarization has tended to oppose Bamileke with non-Bamileke 
intellectuals, with minor clashes between politicians themselves. The Bamileke 
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intelligentsia has preeminently seen in the new constitution an explicit measure directed 
against Bamileke political ambitions in the country. For this to be the case at such a large 
scale there is a need for a point of articulation other than the mere distribution or 
representation of the country’s population into as many ethnic groups as can be 
identified. Indeed the representation of the country as a sum of more than two ethnic 
groups appears to stand in the way of this polarization.
Many reasons had been advanced and analyzed by scholars and, as can be seen at 
the end of the third chapter, most of these reasons take over elements of ethnic 
territorialization discussed by Jean Lamberton in his 1960 article. The most important 
reason altogether is the assumed overwhelmingly superior Bamileke economic power in 
the country, and its recognized hold on the landed property nationwide. However the 
idea of uncanniness does not reside in this conspicuous fact. Another reason advanced by 
Lamberton is the gradual and imposing dispersion of the Bamileke beyond the perimeter 
of the formerly designated Bamileke Region. This dispersion is not a recent one only. 
The French anthropologist Jean-Pierre Warnier has gone so far as to locate it on the 
coastland before European occupation although the Bamileke designation did not exist 
as such, especially during the Transatlantic slave trade. The outcome of such dispersion 
is that the Bamileke today are assumed to be predominantly  settled beyond what is 
ethnographically  identified as their homeland. Thus insisting on ethnic homelands in the 
political arena not only  might be intended to remind the Bamileke of this one single 
aspect of the country’s history, but also in virtue of more recent dynamics, especially 
during the postcolonial period, it is a way by which the Bamileke are made responsible 
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for the ill-fate of other regions. The postcolonial dynamics which I intend to highlight in 
this way came onto the political scene by means of an intellectual debate consecutive to 
the shift of power from Ahmadou Ahidjo to Paul Biya in 1982. 
In 1987, the Beti scholar Hubert Mono Ndjana made the suggestion that a couple 
of books published by Bamileke intellectuals were mustering the Bamileke into 
believing that they  were under some sort of North-South conspiracy meant to hold their 
economic power in check by  preventing them from accessing political power. The 
endeavor of those Bamileke writers, according to Mono Ndjana, was to make the 
Bamileke appear as the victims of their own zeal and the subject of contempt when they 
deserved acknowledgement and merits instead. By North-South one shall read the larger 
network of belonging that stands behind the two names: Ahmadou Ahidjo for the North, 
and Paul Biya for the South. The resignation of Ahmadou Ahidjo, and his alleged 
predilection for Paul Biya as his replacement, could only reinforce the idea that the 
political status quo in Cameroon since independence obeyed a scheme that was in the 
hands of some macro-ethnic power that could thus be dramatically read and named the 
North-South axis. My conversations during fieldwork with Etienne Sonkin, the former 
mayor of Dschang, and Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, the Cameroonian philosopher, and 
director of the Yaoundé-based Editions Terroirs, whose premises I used during the first 
part of my field research, would confirm that suspicion. Yet, among the books that were 
identified by Hubert Mono Ndjana was Jean-Louis Dongmo’s Le dynamisme Bamileke 
(Bamileke Dynamism), a book based on an earlier state doctoral thesis in geography and 
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published in 1981 in two separate volumes by the Cameroon Government publishing 
house CEPER.
Indeed a linear reading of Jean-Louis Dongmo’s thesis certainly  makes room for 
Mono Ndjana’s interpretation. The title of the book itself might be misleading in that 
direction. A parallel could be drawn later with Jean Lamberton’s own article, but it 
suffices for now to say that by writing on the dynamism of one ethnic group among 
many, as the rationale of an assumed pluri-ethnic state goes, it is possible that the reader 
might be led to assume, whether intended by the author or not, that the Bamileke are, if 
not the most  dynamic ethnic group, at least one of the most  dynamic in Cameroon. 
Moreover if the title is justly suggestive, the core of the dissertation probes this state of 
affairs by grounding this dynamism in the many tentative explanations which were first 
explored by the French colonial administration, then later extended by French scholars 
interested in the Bamileke after independence. We will see that  the fate of Jean 
Lamberton, among so many voices, could only be explained by  means of his 
participation, as a military leader, in the suppression of Cameroonian rebellion in the late 
1950s and early 1960s; this, because his analysis of the situation in Cameroon was no 
more than the compilation of ongoing ethnographic and sociological studies on the 
Bamileke existing at the time of rebellion. Apart from the assumption that Bamileke 
power in Cameroon could be grounded in Bamileke culture–the dominant theme still 
today–and in the quasi-edge that German and French colonial enterprises gave to the 
Bamileke thanks to their forced or voluntary servitude on labor-plantations, Jean-Louis 
Dongmo, in his book, insists on the organized effort of the Bamileke to first conquer 
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their homeland and then ‘colonize’, in his words, non-occupied regions inside the 
country. 
The distance that I personally  required to read Jean-Louis Dongmo did not come 
through the mere exercise of caution. Indeed I could already locate Dongmo’s voice in a 
French scholarly tradition at a loss with research in its former colonies that would first 
sterilize the ethnic predicament of its colonial archives. This tradition is quite legible in 
the writings of Paul Pelissier, then Professor at the University  of Parix X, who wrote the 
preface to Jean-Louis Dongmo’s book. For Pelissier, the complexity  of the science that 
led to Dongmo’s dissertation did not lie just in handling the ambivalent character of 
“Bamileke society”–“faithfulness to ancestral values and openness to 
progress” (Dongmo, 1981, p.5)–but in the very  position of the researcher who had to 
deal with this ambivalence internally; that is, by virtue of the researcher being a 
Bamileke. There was never a question whether this internality could be a way out of the 
closure that  not only limited the scope and the relevance of Dongmo’s investigation 
implicitly, but also paired his voice as a researcher to a supra-individual subject positions 
out of his control. A lot can be said about this tradition. Jean Pierre Warnier’s 1993 essay 
on the Bamileke economic ethos, titled L’esprit d’entreprise au Cameroun (The Spirit of 
Entrepreneurship  in Cameroon), and Jean-François Bayart’s 1996 The Illusion of 
Cultural Identity, despite their outward rejection of culturalism, can still be located 
within this tradition. But the formalization of this line of thought was, from the 
beginning, not my concern. Rather, I was on the side of the reader, who was thus 
compelled to locate himself or herself somewhere in this sort of geography of 
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subjectivities. The question I asked was: Could I, as a Mafa and non-Bamileke, really 
find a standpoint that would not credit Mono Ndjana’s reading of Jean-Louis Dongmo?
I was not unlike Mono Ndjana when I had to process the series of legal and 
political entanglements that followed the literary revelation that was to crystallize the so-
called Bamileke problem in the late 1980s and early  1990s in Cameroon. It would be a 
matter of mere surmising to state that one can draw a line of continuity between these 
events and the formalization of the rights of indigenous populations within the 
constitution of 1996, but it  would be too shortsighted to think that this legal regime of 
protection had nothing to do with this earlier development of speculative ethnography. 
Pompeo’s paradoxes only provide a minor gateway  into this historical trajectory. Indeed, 
I revel at  the idea that I myself can find something funny with the term “uncanny 
autochthons” that I give to the appearance of the Bamileke in the National Museum 
project. I should add that, were it not  for the humor of it I would have been led to 
repudiate the idea that it is a metaphor capable of endowing subjectivities with the 
means to find some sort  of articulation in language. The humor behind my contraption 
was this: If I concede to Jean-Louis Dongmo, and the similarly self-professed Bamileke 
intellectuals who might be led to contrive the same historicism that can be found in Le 
dynamisme Bamileke, postulating a historical line of conquest and colonization that has 
for departure one’s ethnic homeland and for an endpoint the ethnic homeland of others, 
on what ground would I refute the desire for those others to cling to their homelands, 
notwithstanding by the simple means of a legal framework, the one that has been 
constitutionally  inscribed as the protection of the rights of indigenous populations? How 
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am I, as a member of an ethnic group other than the Bamileke, and with a supposed 
ethnic homeland in Cameroon different from that of the Bamileke, not to follow in the 
steps of Mono Ndjana, the Beti, who might have thus found a reason to voice a 
safeguard against being colonized by a nearby ethnic group? Here the idea of uncanny 
autochthon is on the way to find its fullest articulation. 
There is one more element to take into account along with the fact stated above: 
That the expansion of the Bamileke beyond their putative ethnic homeland has made it 
possible to argue that the bulk of Bamileke might be located somewhere else in 
Cameroon today than in the former Bamileke Region. Indeed, the protection of the rights 
of “indigenous populations” so adumbrated in the constitution, no matter how shaky its 
foundation has predominantly found adversaries among the Bamileke as we will see in 
Chapter 5. Accordingly, Bamileke scholars, other than Jean-Louis Dongmo, like 
Sindjoun Pokam and Shanda Tonmé have been outspoken in their recognition of the 
protection of said indigenous populations as an anti-Bamileke legal instrument. Now 
let’s turn back to our non-Bamileke hypothesis in the face of Dongmo’s theoretical line 
of conquest and colonization. What we see is a section of the country’s population that is 
on the brink of either misrecognizing itself as indigenous or denying itself this status by 
the mere fact of refusing its relevance for other ethnic groups. In other words, in the 
realm of a Bamileke struggle against the protection of the rights of indigenous 
populations, it  may become improper to talk about the status of the Bamileke as an 
ethnic group which has been “faithful to ancestral values,” and which has fully 
conquered its ethnic homeland first. Let’s not hasten to believe that Mono Ndjana’s 
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reading–or possibly mine–was necessarily  the frame of mind behind Dongmo’s Le 
dynamisme Bamileke, nor should we fail to assume that the voice of a few Bamileke 
scholars should be generalized. This is, in my view, the relevance of locating these 
ethnic issues within the realm of metaphor instead of that of historical analysis, by 
means of which we would expect the immediate translation of a state of facts into words. 
With metaphors we shall expect instead subjectivities articulated by means of a specific 
medium, be it a museum like the case present itself here.
During my 2010-2012 fieldwork in Cameroon, I came across Bamileke voices 
that seemed to be aware of the ambivalence and the likely consequences of these ethnic 
categories, especially when they are used within registers of speech that are deaf to the 
nonsensicality  of their own predicament. Antoine Socpa, an anthropologist whose work I 
came to know thanks to my interest in Peter Geschiere’s studies on belonging in 
Cameroon and whom I met personally during my fieldwork, is the subject of my attempt 
at rereading Clifford Geertz in Chapter 2. Before that, Emmanuel Ghomsi, a Bamileke 
historian, wrote an introduction to an anthology  of Bamileke chieftaincies in Cameroon 
in 2010 that I came across in the same year. The book, entitled Rois et Royaumes 
Bamileke (Bamileke Kings and Kingdoms) is a photographic journey into current 
Bamileke chieftaincies with sections of the book reserved for the narration, by the chief 
or a chieftaincy official, of the origins and symbols of the chieftaincy. It was published 
by Haman Mana, the director of a newspaper company, who self-avowedly feels some 
connection with those chieftaincies because his mother is Bamileke. In the introductory 
text, Ghomsi warns the reader against the drive among Bamileke city-dwellers to “export 
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traditional institutions” from the former Bamileke Region to their new Region of 
settlement. Like Ghomsi, Socpa pointed out during my conversation with him the 
increasingly  challenging character of Bamileke urban associations in Cameroon which, 
in his own words, seem to “deterritorialize the chieftaincy.” This subject will come up 
again in Chapter 5. The case in point now is Jean-Louis Dongmo’s assessment of the 
frame of mind attributed to him by Hubert Mono Ndjana.
My meeting, in October 2011, with Jean-Louis Dongmo at his residence in 
Yaoundé was primarily  motivated by my desire to confront him with Hubert Mono 
Ndjana’s suggestions. Jean-Louis Dongmo is a respectable geographer who has had a 
laudable administrative career having held high positions at three different universities in 
Cameroon, including one position as rector, namely at the University of Dschang, where 
I spent five months with The Road to Chiefdoms. He is now retired and lives in 
Yaoundé. While holding these positions nevertheless, Dongmo remained practically 
silent during the heated years that had brought his writings into the public attention. Why 
did he not participate, I was wondering, in the discussion that opposed Hubert  Mono 
Ndjana to Sindjoun Pokam? Was it because these two were philosophers, and that the 
debate was framed as a philosophical one? Indeed the framework in which the debate 
found its articulation could lead to such a reading. 
Mono Ndjana had found in the writings of Jean-Louis Dongmo (1981), Victor 
Kamga (1985), and Kengne Pokam (1986) the germ of Bamileke ethnofascism: the 
Bamileke desire to conquer, as an ethnic group, political power in addition to an existing 
24
economic power. In Chapter 8, I examine the ways in which this economic power 
appears to be irremediably  understood and explored by Bamileke and non-Bamileke 
scholars alike as a power due to ethnicity. On the opposite side, Sindjoun Pokam 
contrived the notion of monofascism to play  on the association between the name of 
Mono Ndjana and the underlying predicament that it is Mono Ndjana’s opinion that there 
is only one ethnic group  suitable for government in the country. One shall suppose here 
the group  to which Mono Ndjana belongs, and the group that he is thereby defending–
this means the Beti. Jean-Louis Dongmo’s response to his silence was simply that 
participating in the debate would have led him onto grounds that were foreign to the 
context of his research in the 1970s. What was that context and how are we to read 
Dongmo today? Are we to dismiss the relevance of his work in the current concatenation 
of issues pertaining to the ethnographic representation of the Bamileke, the consideration 
of some part of the West Region as the Bamileke ethnic homeland, the appearance of the 
Bamileke in political competition, and the reassessment of their place in the national 
liberation movement?
It was fairly easy to read Jean-Louis Dongmo’s disappointment during our 
conversation. The conversation was held in a very  lively atmosphere in his living room. I 
never considered the presence of his wife in the corner as an obstacle, either for him to 
deal with these ethnic issues, or for me to bring them up. The proof of this atmosphere 
came later when I was on my way back home. As I was accompanied by Mr. Dongmo, 
Madame, his wife showed up suddenly when I was already trying to catch a taxi. She 
was, as if spellbound by the desire to give me some hard evidence of her husband’s 
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motivations, eager to gratify me with a copy of her husband’s thesis, in addition to a 
short poetry book that he had published around the same time. His disappointment, 
however, followed from the apparently total displacement of the context of the critical 
appraisal of his work. Indeed, I have indicated that the dissertation itself was a state 
doctoral thesis, which means that the State of Cameroon had funded the research, and 
that it had been carried out on a broad scale. Dongmo did not limit his demographic 
survey to Cameroon: He carried it out on a regional level as well; most tellingly in 
Gabon where he had found a huge community of Bamileke. Briefly, Dongmo wanted to 
understand why it was that the Bamileke, despite being manifestly  at the margin of 
political power, unlike other dominant ethnic groups in various African countries, such 
as the Kikuyu in Kenya, succeeded in holding on to the economy of Cameroon? He was 
to find an answer to this question by  exploring the “mastery,” in his words, over 
agricultural lands and urban spaces: the two themes that constitute the two volumes of 
his book. He came up with the idea that the Bamileke have succeeded in acquiring such 
mastery over agricultural lands in their ethnic homelands, and mastery over urban spaces 
both in their ethnic homelands and everywhere else, thanks to their cultural disposition 
and the historical circumstances that made it possible.
However, the real disappointment for him could only be stated in the manner of 
an illustration that he brought up at the end of our conversation, and which we should 
consider in light of the 1996 constitutional amendments that established the rights of 
minorities and indigenous populations. I would like to leave the discussion of the 
Cameroon policy  of regional equilibrium for a later chapter on the manifold appearance 
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of chieftainship (Chapter 5). For now, the personal story of Jean-Louis Dongmo was 
meant to summon this policy in the guise of a joke and to focus my attention on one of 
its shortcomings, more appropriately  one of its nonsenses. The episode was about his 
decision to make one of his daughters apply  for the Centre Universitaire des Sciences de 
la Santé (CUSS), the former school of medicine which is now called the Centre 
Hospitalier Universitaire (CHU). He might have deemed it important in the 1990s to go 
to the CHU in person to deposit his daughter’s application. Upon arrival he realized that 
the applications were organized into ten piles, one for each region. He readily imagined 
the dubious rationale of this distribution, and he tried to challenge it by  putting his 
daughter’s application in one of the smallest piles. Stupefied, the official receiving the 
applications asked him if he was not from the West. “Yes, I am,” he replied. “So why 
don’t you leave your application with the pile of the West?” the official asked. “Are you 
afraid there are too many people in the lot? Don’t be delusional, what you see on the 
table is nothing much. Look at those boxes there. They are all filled with applications 
from the West.” Hearing this story, I couldn’t help but imagine as an uproarious 
burlesque. The register of joke in which the principle of regional equilibrium has found 
its inscription here is indicative of the relative distance one of its subjects takes to laugh 
it up; and it is quite enough to prove its existence and its force, which I explore further in 
Chapter 5. I came out of my conversation with Jean-Louis Dongmo with the conviction 
that, beside the register of suggestion, I should make room for dramatization in my 
assessment, not only  of the literature on ethnicity in Cameroon, but also of the archival 
material on populations that I collected over the three months I spent in Yaoundé looking 
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into the National Archives and the documentation center of the Ministry of Scientific 
Research in Yaoundé. The traces of my interviews and conversations on the national 
museum project in Yaoundé and the development of The Road to Chiefdoms in Dschang 
also found a new inspiration.
Departing thus from a polemics over the position of the Cameroon Grassland in 
the nation, my exploration of the meanings of ethnography, tribal homelands, political 
competition, and historical legitimacy examines two kinds of demands, and the 
aspirations and constraints that formalize them. First, we have the demands and 
aspirations that condense into the apparently unprecedented meaning that the 
ethnographic artifacts from the West Region have come to bear in Cameroon. Second, 
we have the demands that sustain the significance of objects on display in a museum 
institution such as in the National Museum of Yaoundé and the Musée des Civilisations 
in Dschang. My emphasis on suggestion seeks to unravel those demands in a way that 
stresses both their emergent constituents and the subject positions that they  help 
articulate. Thus, the appearance of the Bamileke as uncanny autochthons in Cameroon 
entails the recognition the institutional basis of ethnicity in the country before linking it 
to larger trends and influences, notably the fear of excessive mobility  which is seen by 
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2001) to characterize an era of globalization and belonging. 
Such an institutional foundation is nothing other than the intractable ethnic 
territorialization that has been inadequately addressed as the result of national 
ideological shift the early 1990s alone (Chapter 2). 
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Instead of manipulation, the term ethnic territorialization is meant to provide an 
anterior, more diffuse foundation, to ethnic claims, and to highlight the structure within 
which one’s relation to land and state power is articulated every  time ethnicity is at 
stake. On the other hand, and most importantly, looking into the Bamileke as 
autochthons also calls for an analysis of the ambiguities and paradoxes that determine 
their subject position within the political institutions of Cameroon. The Bamileke, as an 
uncanny  autochthon, is thus located within a series of territorial and group  identities, 
understood from the position of state institutions instead of a world-historical 
perspective in which ethnic groups hold the key to their analyses (Chapter 3). In this 
way, my own position as the subject of ethnic territorialization in Cameroon requires to 
be articulated so that I can see myself as the possible subject of this categorization. This 
articulation is fundamental insofar as being or not being Bamileke is not a matter of 
contingency  alone, but also of the demands identifiable within this ethnic 
territorialization. By  demands I mean to emphasize the existence of networks of trust 
and circulation in which the question of being, and the dichotomies to which it leads, is 
once meaningful, porous, and reversible. I would like to locate those demands in the 
character of chieftainship, the land ordinances of 1974, and the constitution of 1996. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 each addresses them all, with an emphasis on one or two of those 
institutions. 
While I stated above that the theatricalization of identities within an institution 
such as a museum should be taken as a metaphor, it is not just a metaphor when it  is 
identifiable as a demand, which can only  be that of a subject; and by this I do not mean 
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an individual. This is what I hope to demonstrate by bringing the Museum of 
Civilizations of The Road to Chiefdoms into conversation with the National Museum of 
Yaoundé (Chapter 4). Finally  it is my belief that current efforts aimed at exploring the 
many facets of chieftainship in the so-called pluri-ethnic countries of Africa should not 
be exclusively  driven toward reconstituting the past be it under the banner of state 
formation, or power and discursive formation. On the contrary, the lopsided effort to 
frame chieftainship within an unstable political situation should be taken together with 
the apparent detachment and aspiration that foreground such heterogenous institutions as 
The Road to Chiefdoms, whose self-professed primary  objective is to promote cultural 
tourism. While Chapter 4 gives us a sense of this last ramification, I have taken a 
moment to reflect in Chapter 6, in order to meditate on two kinds of nascent political 
radicalism in Cameroon, which both have at their center the institution of chieftainship: 
one predicated on indigeneity and the other on an idea of democracy.
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CHAPTER TWO: BELONGING AND ETHNOGRAPHIC DISAFFECTION
Over the past two and a half decades, the notion of belonging has become the 
overarching concept used to explore the resilience and expansion of identity-related 
issues worldwide. More broadly, it is the foremost conceptual gesture that  aims at 
theorizing the political force of ethnicity. Extensive research, mostly  done in Africa, 
emphasizes the global context in which the concept found its inscription. A crucial 
aspect of this global inscription is the suggestion that, when expressed in the language of 
belonging, ethnicity is theoretically too flexible and practically intractable, except by 
means of a general understanding global phenomena. Better, the notion of belonging 
translates the pervasive character of ethnic markers and the dilemma that their 
tractability poses to the formalization of culture as group identity. In Cameroon, where 
most African anthropological texts on belonging have found their empirical foundation, 
the study of culture has increasingly receded. However, this tendency does not imply 
that the predicament of culture, despite being set at the margin of political analysis, has 
become irrelevant. Against the odds, the tremendous proliferation of cultural 
associations since the late 1980s, and the subsequent expansion of cultural festivals and 
ethnographic museums in the country bear witness to the obverse situation. One of the 
unintended consequences of this change in theoretical focus has been either to subsume 
those new developments under the categories that determine the scrutiny of belonging, 
or to simply drive them out of anthropological inquiry. On the other hand, contrary to the 
intimation of self-fashionable ethnicity, the lingering normative power of cultural 
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differentiation is not driven out of the very study of belonging. Rather the theoretical 
indecision that follows from the pervasive character of belonging makes normative 
difference more powerful than before. Recent ethnographic elaboration on the Bamileke 
in Cameroon is the most telling example on this account. 
While the literature on the Bamileke sets them at the background of most 
struggles over belonging in the country, the demands that determine this trend have been 
mitigated under the pretense that claims to belonging are generally the symptom of an 
obsessive and diffuse drive toward the exclusion of ethnic others from the benefits of 
state power, all fueled by  late partisan proselytism and emotional incontinence. The big 
challenge in matters of cultural analysis in this context  is no longer the conflation of 
group identity with culture. Now, it  is first the reconciliation of theoretical revision with 
the permanence of its object: The move from culture to belonging on one hand, and 
identification of/to group identity as its relatively foundation. Then comes the 
requirement of interrogating the demands that condition, not only  the shift in 
perspective, but above all the readability  of either culture and belonging. If postcolonial 
criticism has revealed the extent to which the concept of culture is double-edged and cast 
between description and normalization, especially  when it applies to group identities that 
are unquestionably  the outcome of colonial administration, its flip side has been to 
mitigate the resilient demands that sustain the lingering hermeneutic value of cultural 
explanation. Such is the ongoing scrutiny of ethnicity in Cameroon under the banner of 
belonging. 
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While most discussions see in ethnicity the drive of an exclusionary discourse 
aiming at ethnic adversaries, the anticipation and control over old and new structures of 
opportunity–which are the very  springboard of exclusion–are set in the scary shadow of 
a global increase in mobility and capital flows. In the present chapter, I will examine the 
intellectual trajectories that have recently shaped debates on ethnicity in Cameroon, and 
explore the ways in which cultural analysis is summoned in the discussion of ethnicity in 
the country, as well as how it can become the very instrument for unveiling and 
shattering its own structural basis, be it  articulated in terms of difference and similarity, 
lack and excess, or guilt and pride, etc. My use of the term cultural analysis, and its 
theoretical basis will be clarified gradually.
The resilience and expansion of identity politics
The constriction of ethnic issues in Africa within the polarized opposition of 
primordialists and constructivists since the fall of the one-party rule system has made it 
nearly impossible to reassess the context  of early  endeavors by scholars such as Clifford 
Geertz who, in anticipating nascent political formations in the newly  decolonized world, 
set up the threshold of their visibility in cultural terms. Indeed Geertz, in the 1960s, 
found such a threshold in the notion of “primordial attachments,” a notion borrowed 
from Edward Shils, which extends Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between community 
bonds and societal agreements. However, the notion of primordial attachments, or 
primordial ties as both figure in the writings of Geertz, had already become conceptually 
worn under the scrutiny  of European behavioral sociology during the Second World War, 
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notably in the sociologists’ attempt to dig out the bond that characterized apparently 
immediate social relations found in small communities. Geertz was to put the term to a 
different use later. Accordingly, the term primordial attachment  became central to the 
framing of ethnic issues in the postcolonial world, which was then deemed to be at  an 
early stage of its development into more complex, or rather more industrialized state 
formations. 
For Geertz, any debate over language, religion, or anything ethnic in the “New 
States” could be construed as a “primordial issue” or a “parapolitical 
controversy” (Geertz, 1973, p.274). Three decades later, Fred Hendricks summarized the 
debate in terms that would take ethnicity  to be conceived of as either inherent or 
peripheral to state formation, and must accordingly be either recognized or dismissed 
(Hendricks, 2005, p.715). This rendition does, however, elide the fact  that this stricture 
inaugurates in the post-colony of early  1990s a political hermeneutics that was not 
unknown to Geertz at the time he was elaborating on integrative revolution in the New 
States. It was a hermeneutics that Geertz did not see as other than the vicious remnant of 
the political backwash in those societies he deemed modern. At least until the rise of 
postcolonial criticism, Geertz, not unlike most African nationalists of the time, believed 
that his idea of modern societies–those that foreclose primordial attachments–was the 
unconditional destiny of the newly decolonized state formations. Nonetheless, 
primordial issues, as Geertz referred to them, could not be reduced to a question of 
whether the “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on” (p.259) could be seen as 
either normal or pathological political stakes. 
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Beside the territorial basis of those ethnic conflicts, Geertz had an other concern, 
which was somewhat akin to an ethical stumbling-block. The problem was that he, he 
tells us–coming from a country  that had “failed to resolve its own most troublesome 
primordial problem” (p.310)–could consider with “either indifference or contempt” the 
“government immobilism” that often resulted from “attempts to reconcile divergent 
primordial groups” in the postcolonial states. Geertz was even more inclined to allow 
such immobilism than to explore the actualities of the three other options that were given 
to his cognizance: “Balkanization, Herrenvolk fanaticism, or the forcible suppression of 
ethnic assertion by  a leviathan state” (p.310). It is clear that Geertz’s idea at that time 
was that primordial issues in the United States of America were not different from 
primordial issues in the New States, no matter the different historical trajectory  and 
situation. Nonetheless, it can be said that  what would be retrospectively framed in North 
America as “identity politics,” and later discussed within the ideal of multiculturalism–a 
turn that Geertz significantly conceded to Charles Taylor (Geertz, 2000)–bears the traces 
of state concerns that could hardly be ascribed to the newly decolonized world. 
Moreover, either identity politics or multiculturalism cannot unconditionally stand for an 
extrapolation of ethnic issues in the postcolonial world, unless the colonial antecedent is 
reassessed from the vantage point of a necessary political integration.
Making sense of the political force of ethnicity in postcolonial Cameroon
The Cameroonian anthropologist Antoine Socpa could not afford the luxury of 
Geertz’s distant gaze when he had to assess the ways in which nascent party politics in 
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the early  1990s could be held accountable for ethnic tensions among the Bamileke and 
Beti in Cameroon. In a movement reminiscent of the fear behind Geertz’s reduction of 
“primordial ties” to a perverse residual ground for “civil politics” (1973, p.277), Socpa 
buried his own worries in a sophisticated dichotomy borrowed from John Lonsdale. 
Socpa was not unaware of Geertz’s 1960s writings, particularly since nearby  Nigeria was 
one of the New States whose primordial issues, namely  “tribalism,” were considered. On 
the contrary, with the failure to “modernize,” and thanks to the incidental stricture of 
primordialism against its forced alternative, Socpa dismissed Geertz on the grounds that 
he, like Pierre L. van den Berghe, naturalized ethnicity  in Africa (Socpa, 2003, p.8). 
Nevertheless, a thorough review of continued literary endeavor to elaborate on culture 
and politics would not fail to realize that the existing literature on belonging hardly 
succeeds in silencing, or at least, avoids falling into Geertz’s ethical conundrum on 
primordial attachments, no matter the general shift of focus from nation-building to 
democratic reform. 
John Lonsdale’s opposition of “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism,” on 
which Socpa ultimately  relied, does not escape scrutiny. The first is a virtue, Lonsdale 
argues, that conditions self-esteem, and must be distinguished from the “lack of 
principles characterizing the ‘political tribalism‘ of groups in their struggle over public 
resources” (1996, p.99). At worst, by  mobilizing the language of “instinct” to 
characterize the permanence of ethnic feeling against its elitist  instrumentalization 
(1996, p.100), Lonsdale takes a theoretical leap back from Geertz’s delineation of 
primordial attachment as “immediacy” and “givens” (Geertz, 1973, p.259; 277). Owing 
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to Lonsdale’s distinction, nonetheless, Socpa brushes off the sheer possibility that  party 
politics, the very party  politics organized around the concept of legitimacy and focused 
on elections only, could be the impulse of the same ethnic tensions that shaped social 
relations in Yaoundé, the capital city  of Cameroon, at the inception of freedom of 
association the early  1990s. Of course, the terms of reference in Socpa’s analysis are not 
between ethnicity  and party politics, but between ethnicity and democracy, even though 
democracy  is seen as a state of affairs not existing yet, thus called for only. All things 
considered, no matter how the idea of democracy is related to party  politics in his 
writings, Socpa’s concerns lie elsewhere. The concluding remarks of his brilliantly 
detailed description of these events are somewhat a confession that  tellingly captures the 
nature of ethnographic disaffection in the face of commonplace speculative ethnography 
in Cameroon today. 
On the last page of his double monographic study of conflicts among the 
Bamileke and the Beti in the South, and among the Kotoko and the Suwa (so-called Arab 
people) in the North of Cameroon, Socpa confesses that his “intention was not to ground 
[his] study  in ethnic categories such as Bamileke, Beti, autochthonous, allochthonous, 
foreign, etc., but [these terms] turned out to be unavoidable throughout the main stages 
of [his] research.” Moreover, without giving an explicit reason, Socpa goes on to argue 
that, “In spite of their force and their preponderance in speech and daily  practice, the 
challenge is to avoid being enthralled by them.” (2003, p.305) The distance between the 
immediacy of primordial ties and the enthralling power of ethnic categories is perhaps 
only the distance between two theoretical moments in the history  of ethnicity in 
37
postcolonial Africa. In this case, it is certainly the distance between confidence and 
helplessness. Accordingly, the ethical character of either cultural or ethnic analysis must 
be sought in the position of the analyst. While state repression, according to scholars 
such as Nyamnjoh, Mbembe, and Geschiere, can be said to have characterized the 
integrative years of postcolonial Cameroon (1960 to 1990), it is imprudent to dismiss the 
other three possibilities outlined by Geertz as the very background to Socpa’s doubts on 
ethnic categories, nor to constrict these doubts within Geertz’ fourfold alternatives.
The undercurrents of theoretical revision
Although less repentant, Socpa’s confession reproduces and recontextualizes 
Geertz’s annoyance with the restraining power of some kind of “primordial problem” at 
home in the face of ethnic conflicts in the New States. Geertz, in his 1973 collection of 
essays, did not specifically  name or discuss the primordial problem which, in the United 
States, provided the lens for his assessment of primordial issues in the newly 
decolonized world. On the other hand, the reason for which ethnic categories in Socpa’s 
view can become enthralling does not appear clearly  in his thesis. As I argued above, the 
reproduction of Geertz’s conundrum is primarily of an ethical character, with somehow 
the same spectacle of group identity: First thought of as a given in the literature on 
African politics, then increasingly  understood and examined as a recent historical 
construct. Neither approach succeeds however to articulate this ethical conundrum to the 
currency of ethnic categories. Accordingly, the “fatigue” induced by intellectual attempts 
to “deconstruct” or “debunk” claims to primordial or to authentic identifications, 
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recently  described by Peter Geschiere (2009, p.29), not  only demonstrates the extent in 
which this ethical element is gradually eschewed, but it also attests to the necessity of 
relating current intellectual endeavors to earlier ones. 
Geertz’s admission of a primordial problem back home as the background to his 
assessment of ethnic issues in the New States is unparalleled in Socpa’s assessment of 
ethnic tensions in Yaoundé and Kousseri. Although Socpa, at  the end of his thesis, voices 
the “difficulty  to transcend autochthony discourse in scientific analysis” (2003, p.305), 
he does not explain in which way  he could be subject of enthrallment. On the contrary, 
he seems to attain the impossible position of the distant gaze, by hardly  letting us know 
in which way he was held back in his assessment of ethnic tensions among the Bamileke 
and Beti in Yaoundé, or among the Kotoko and the Suwa in Kousseri. Moreover, despite 
his rejection of ethnic claims to land, the assumption that Yaoundé can be considered the 
homeland of the Beti, and Kousseri the homeland of the Kotoko, bolsters his hypothesis 
that the ruling party in Cameroon treats ethnic issues impartially. 
In addition to repentance, there is another difference between the ethical 
positions of Geertz and Socpa. I have argued that, by framing primordial ties as a form 
of social relation that has been overcome by civil politics, Geertz places his confidence 
in modernization, as the predicament of this transformation. However the signifier of 
modernization was given from outside the context of considering primordial attachments 
in the New States. In his view, Modern societies could be sold to the New States as a 
formative and ideal mirror. Therefore, adding to the aura of naturalness characteristic of 
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the ubiquitous postcolonial theories on primordial attachments, there was this underlying 
spatialization, linearization, and specularization of becoming: summarized by the 
inscription of ethnicity as primordial tie, and endowed with the power to enable cultural 
analysis to overcome, at least theoretically, the enthralling power of ethnic categories. It 
is not excessive to envision from this vantage point the emotional value of the theoretical 
focus on nation-building and the joint development of a one-party  rule system in 
postcolonial Cameroon. Seen as such, the theoretical revision of the 1990s in matters of 
ethnic studies can be said to consecrate the fall of the ideological undercurrent of early 
postcolonial struggle against identity-based claims in official discourse. Accordingly, 
current efforts to grasp the same claims under the banner of belonging cannot escape the 
same scrutiny. 
On the “global conjuncture of belonging”
Debates over ethnic issues in 1990s Cameroon generated various themes such as 
“identity-related withdrawal,” “identity constructs,” “primary loyalty,” “politics of 
belonging,” “autochthony” and so on. The ways in which these themes collide or 
intersect with one another can hardly  be ascribed to a single issue, or to a single strand of 
thought engaging the way in which ethnicity should be conceived of or even dealt with, 
especially when it is taken away from the immediate context of its first formulation or 
codification. It was only recently that Peter Geschiere subsumed them all under the 
category of belonging. Put this way, the processes that made those notions relevant in 
Cameroon could be mitigated to give precedence to global processes: in which case to 
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extreme mobility  and Post-Cold War political and economic reforms that proved 
incontrovertible in the postcolonial world. From this point of view, nonetheless, 
globalization is not only  turned into the primary focus of research on ethnicity, but it is 
called for ironically, like modernization by Geertz, to account for the particularities of 
ethnic claims in every situation, and to provide a broader contextual background for the 
comparison of places as distant, and unrelated as Cameroon and the Netherlands. 
Of course, all those themes are somewhat related, at least insofar as each 
attempts to capture the tremendous rise of ethnic claims in the Cameroonian press, and 
ongoing ethnic issues, such as the Anglophone-Francophone divide or the 
constitutionalization of the rights of controversial indigenous populations in 1996. If it 
were not for the sake of crediting Tania Murray Li’s idea of the “global conjuncture of 
belonging,” (Geschiere, 2009, p.6) to emphasize his own depiction of “autochthony and 
belonging” as the “flip  side” of “capitalism and mobility” (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 
2000), Geschiere’s extrapolation of ethnic issues in Cameroon could have been a 
thorough review of the contradictions that characterize ongoing state reforms in the 
country; contradictions which are adequately understandable as post-integrative 
“primordial” tendencies, insofar as they revive in a new light those issues framed as 
primordial by Geertz nearly three decades earlier at  a time when “integration” was the 
slogan. 
Not only are democratization and decentralization sagaciously described by 
Geschiere as running counter to the earlier focus on nation-building, but they are also 
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understood to mobilize, in a new fashion, institutions that qualify postcolonial 
citizenship nefariously. They do so by vivifying issues that were once thought to have 
been overcome by the previous repressive state structure. However, Geschiere’s failure 
to address these processes from the vantage point of post-integrative tendencies, and his 
reticence to interrogate their consistency, must be attributed to the incapacitating power 
of the notion of autochthony, which he uses loosely as the twin term of belonging, with 
the ultimate conclusion that it is “an empty notion in practice” (2009, p.28). Thus it is 
not a deliberate attempt on Geschiere’s part to not anchor the notion of belonging in 
earlier endeavors that framed the cultural challenge and aspirations of postcolonial 
states, as Geertz envisioned them. Accordingly, in a nod to Geertz’s hesitant conversion 
to the fashion of multiculturalism, Geschiere, in one early footnote to The Perils of 
Belonging, underlines the post-Cold War near disappearance of a crucial component of 
earlier conceptualizations of primordial attachments. If, in the 1960s, Geertz had 
surmised the tension between “cosmopolitanism” and “parochialism” in the New States, 
his views might have changed or might have been qualified later with the near 
generalization of parochialism concurrent to the fall of the Berlin Wall and to the 
prescriptive exhaustion of modernity (2000, p.246). On the backdrop of this historical 
revision and the attendant collapse of the safety valve of civil politics, the notion of 
belonging–the term autochthony in particular–must be restored to the specific context of 
its emergence in Cameroon if one is not to yield to the overly  abrasive aura of the term 
globalization.
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Beneath the elusiveness of belonging
Peter Geschiere’s conclusion that belonging has turned ethnicity into an elusive 
and empty  category (2009, p.28) entails two denegations which, I would argue, 
contribute to the enthralling power of the ethnic categories conjured up by Antoine 
Socpa. I have stated above that Socpa, in his assessment of ethnic tensions among the 
Bamileke and the Beti in Yaoundé, and among the Kotoko and the Suwa in Kousseri, 
assumes without discussion that each of the two antagonistic ethnic groups can 
legitimately be identified as either an autochthonous or an allochthonous group. The big 
question is not whether this assumption can be grounded on any  historical antecedent. 
The question is: What are the grounds of this assumption and why have they been 
ignored in the accusation of the ruling party, supposed to have incoherently established 
the principle of autochthony, and favored the Beti as autochthons in one case, and the 
Suwa as allochthons in another?
Accordingly, the underlying reference to soil, which is understated by Geschiere, 
may  prove more useful for framing postcolonial ethnic issues in Cameroon, as much as 
in neighboring Nigeria, than the notion of identity politics. This reference to soil is the 
very element dismissed by Geertz in favor of concerns over civil politics. Indeed the 
notion of identity politics is predominantly informed by  the specific historical trajectory 
of North America, where tribal ties are conceived of independently  from territorial 
claims, both legally and anthropologically  (Morgan, 1985), and has remained a marginal 
issue insofar as identity politics is concerned. Consequently, the leverage of North 
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American solution to identity issues would require more than focusing on ethnicity 
alone. It is worth introducing here the imbroglio that would have resulted had Geschiere 
used the English version of the constitution of Cameroon, which translates the French 
expression “populations autochtones” into “indigenous populations” in English. It can 
be argued that  Cameroon alone was not the background to Geschiere’s concept of 
autochthony. Yet “indigeneity” would have been the closest English equivalent to 
“autochtonie” if the particular case of Cameroon is to be considered. After all, what does 
the notion of “indigenous populations” mean in Cameroon? It would be presumptuous to 
assume that there is a clear-cut definition whereas the the Constitution and the legal 
system in Cameroon have remained silent on the subject. I would even argue that the 
absence of a definition, more than a definition itself, has shaped the discussion of 
belonging in the country. Moreover, the aforementioned appearance of the Bamileke as 
uncanny  autochthons in the exhibition scheme of the National Museum of Yaoundé 
could not have been put as such, had the 1996 constitutional guarantees to the rights of 
“indigenous populations” been clarified. 
Apart from territorial claims, the second denegation entailed in Geschiere’s 
dismissal of autochthony pertains to the emergent valuations of ethnicity itself. The case 
brought to our attention by Socpa is illuminating in this regard. Besides explaining the 
popular success of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in the West and Littoral regions, 
then provinces, by the predominance of a Bamileke population, Socpa presented, then 
gradually lost sight of the fact that the impetus behind the use of ethnic networks and 
ethnic homelands as strategical stakes for political mobilization was provided by  the 
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SDF. It was only  afterward, he argued, that the Cameroon People’s Democratic Party 
(CPDM), the ruling party, realized that it could not win otherwise. The major stake in 
this case is not whether ethnicity is more legitimate on one or the other side, but how to 
explain its popular basis, and its margin of success in party politics. The retrospective 
drive to instantiate the rise of either belonging or autochthony as one of the political 
maneuvers developed by the ruling party is not Socpa’s alone. This drive has become an 
established blindness in the study of ethnicity in Cameroon. Accordingly, by becoming 
the repositary of this establishment, Socpa forgets to explore the significance of the so-
called “informal means such as ‘associations of originaires’ of one or another village or 
region, friendship networks, ethnic stigmatization, and door-to-door enrollment” (2003, 
p.297) that helped explain the breakthrough of the SDF during the early days of multi-
party politics.
On the dialectical relationship between culture and politics
The extent to which Geschiere’s tentative use of the term autochthony qualifies 
issues that had been teleologically inscribed on the agenda of modernization by Geertz 
cannot be measured without an assessment of the sudden shift from integration concerns 
to democracy talks in the early 1990s, and the concomitant collapse of the ethical 
support of the ideal of modernity. Of course, if both autochthony and primordial 
attachment are a matter of belonging, then we need to know what the supplement is, and 
how it comes about. I have already indicated above that for Geschiere, the appeal of 
autochthony follows from the emphasis on soil. However, because autochthony, in 
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Geschiere’s view, is too fluid and inconsistent a notion, one cannot consider the 
privileged relation to soil that it promises too seriously. Nonetheless, the ethnic element, 
which is assumed to be the other variable of this privilege, remains somewhat intact. In 
this way, the gradual change in Maka funeral rites in eastern Cameroon, for instance, can 
be historically studied by discarding their current doubling as “rituals of 
belonging” (2009, p.171).
Must it be then that discussing autochthony  unconditionally means separating 
territorial issues from ethnic issues? I am doubtful that this is the case, either for 
Geschiere, who links autochthony and soil (2009, p.213), or for Geertz, for whom the 
removal of European rule virtually meant the breeding of separatist movements in all the 
New States (1973, p.237). Indeed, the appearance of the postcolonial state as a 
crossroads of protean micro-nationalisms, based on an incurably  hesitant notion of 
culture (1973, p.240), was the very idea that haunted Geertz’s theorization of primordial 
issues. This situation did not lead him to reassess the premise of nationalism in Europe, 
but to anticipate the modalities of its advent in the New States. It  is thus imprudent to 
assume that the global treatment of autochthony  does not awaken the same appraisal. 
Accordingly, if the agenda of democratization and decentralization ushered in 
autochthony, as Geschiere states, seeing in it the hallmark of post-integrative tendencies 
does not necessary imply that the integrative years, with the fears and teleologies that 
shaped them, are part of a bygone era. It is in this regard that the peculiar rendition of 
autochthony as a form of perversion of citizenship by  Bayart  (1996), Mbembe (2001), 
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and Geschiere (2009) must be relativized, unless the normative basis of citizenship  is 
similarly scrutinized. 
The most persistent insight regarding this scrutiny since the mid-1990s has come 
from Mahmood Mamdani with his discussion of the ambivalent relationship in the 
postcolonial state between the dubious and always programmatic position of national 
citizenship on one hand, and the apparently  unquestionable position of ethnic 
membership on the other. Unlike most scholars who have tapped into this distinction to 
dismiss belonging on the grounds of manipulation, or to favor it in search of genuine 
political alternatives to autocratic regimes, Mamdani has chosen, against the grain, to see 
in the two poles the mirroring ramifications of one single political formation that 
developed out of colonial rule, and that was maintained after decolonization. Otherwise 
said, whereas for the most part  autochthony is seen to stand in for either a post-one-party 
rule political trend, or even an earlier postcolonial development, Mamdani has insistently 
seen in the appeal to soil the undercurrent of a Janus-faced juridical segregation that was 
developed under colonial rule. Certainly, colonial rule distinguished legally  between 
native and foreign population, but  most importantly it separated and hierarchized the 
domain of civil politics and the domain of custom, by  dividing and maintaining the latter 
into as many ethnic and territorial compartments as required for the sustenance of alien 
rule. The notion of domain is here grounded on a differential relation to both territory 
and ethnicity. Consequently, the resulting relationship between ethnicity and nationality 
cannot be understood in a linear fashion as Geertz understood them in the 1960s, for it 
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would require the preliminary erasure of the territorial predicament of the colonial 
“native question” (Mamdani, 1996). 
Additionally, the territorial foundation of ethnicity  that came with colonial rule 
has turned ethnic membership  into some sort of disavowed and horrific double of 
national citizenship: A disavowal that insidiously led Socpa to dub it “ethnic 
citizenship” (2003, p.305). Because of the enrichment of the antique notion of tribe as a 
kin-based political system with territorial segregation in the African colonial context 
(Mamdani, 2012), ethnic membership theoretically became undistinguishable or 
opposable to national citizenship, except  for the sake of the evolutionary  scheme which 
can be read in Marx’s genesis of the state form as an independent form in German 
Ideology. This ethno-territorial characterization of tribes in Africa has nonetheless put 
Mamdani in Geertz’s shoes. Ethnic territorialization is the background to Mamdani’s 
idea of politicized culture under colonial rule, doubly racialized and tribalized 
(Mamdani, 2001). The question unanswered by Mamdani, who also argues against the 
consideration of ethnicity as a primordial attachment (2001), is whether culture should 
be conceived of separately from politics as Geertz’s idea of primordial attachment does.
Beyond the conundrum of primordial attachments
Geertz’s unconditional commitment to cultural description and translation has led 
him to bury one of the most challenging articulations of the notion of culture born out of 
the national liberation movements. Revisiting the traces of an intellectual effort meant to 
grasp the cultural contours of emergent political formations in the postcolonial world, 
48
especially in Cameroon, has thus far taken place at  the margins of Geertz’s core 
postcolonial revision of the idea of culture–no longer understood as “cults and 
customs”–rather as “structures of meaning” that are distinguishable from politics (1973, 
p.312). This measure was first necessary  to underline the territorial background of ethnic 
issues in Cameroon. On the other hand, it imposed itself because of the tendency, 
ironically left in the shadow of an emphasis on the constructed character of ethnicity, to 
instantiate empirical diversity  in the form of a pending political threat in some countries 
whereas it is seen as an advantage in others. (Mamdani, 1989) If this tendency could be 
easily understood as a means to prevent any form of ethical retreat from the cultural 
justification of the colonial project, its persistence after decolonization remains obscure. 
The “very success of the independence movements,” Geertz argued, tended to 
“obscure the frailty  and narrowness of the cultural foundations” upon which national 
liberation movements rested. In his view, this outcome can be explained by “the notion 
that anticolonialism and collective redefinition are the same thing” (1973, p. 239). It may 
turn out to be bad faith not to grant any descriptive concession to the ensuing suggestion 
that “Most Tamils, Karens, Brahmins, Malays, Sikhs, Ibos, Muslims, Chinese, Nilotes, 
Bengalis, or Ashantis found it a good deal easier to grasp the idea that they  were not 
Englishmen than that they were Indians, Burmese, Malayans, Ghanaians, Pakistanis, 
Nigerians, or Sudanese.” (p.239) However, taking for granted that any of the terms of 
this triangulation can be invariably seen as a matter of cultural creed is forcing oneself 
into believing that as political formations, they can exist only  insofar as they are based 
on an indefectible or distinctive “cultural foundation.” It also means discarding the very 
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idea recognized by Geertz in his discussion of ideology as a “cultural system” that, when 
operating as such, identities are capable of answering people’s anxieties and aspirations 
(1973, p.197). Geertz would not have welcome either implications given his critique of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “infernal culture machine,” which “annuls history, reduces 
sentiment to a shadow of the intellect, and replaces the particular minds of particular 
savages in particular jungles with the Savage Mind immanent in us all” (p.355). The 
altogether cognitivist  resonance of Geertz’s notion of culture, inasmuch as it is related to 
politics, should not lead us away from the suggestion that anti-colonial movements 
lacked a firm cultural foundation. 
Accordingly, one can still ask, half a century after the success of those 
movements, what such a foundation could have been. A late-born answer is the least 
effective response to what  I have already mentioned earlier as Geertz’s conundrum 
regarding primordial attachments. During the time he was discussing the stages of the 
national liberation movements, it could not be said that Geertz was not in conversation 
with Fanon’s endeavor to articulate the notion of culture to anti-colonial struggle (1973, 
p.240). Fanon’s concomitant concession to and dismissal of culture as the foundation of 
national consciousness cannot be easily grasped without setting aside a merely  empirical 
approach to the notion of culture. It was clear to Fanon that the experience of the 
“colonized intellectuals” in the metropoles had led them to the reactionary appropriation 
of the empirical approach to culture, with a view to distancing themselves from the 
metropoles and instantiating themselves as the undeniable representatives of colonial 
peoples. 
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In Fanon’s view, the colonized intellectual’s reactionary impulse, no matter how 
effective it  was for access to political consciousness, could not endure in the long run if 
the intellectuals did not join popular struggles in the colonies, since theirs was a rather 
too romantic and even suicidal view of the “actual situation” in which those territories 
and their inhabitants found themselves (Fanon, 1968). It was from such a vantage point 
that Fanon, in an altogether teleological move, framed culture in a double articulation as 
an instrument both for self-consciousness in difference, and conscious self-creation in 
resemblance, which would be put ultimately at  the service of the “politicization of the 
masses” and “national liberation” (1968, p.163). If there is any foundation to consider in 
such a cultural venture the least  one would fail to identify is political motivation. In the 
end what should be asked is not what the cultural foundation of political mobilization is, 
but how culture is understood to be at play, and what its articulations are in speech and 
in deed. This notion of culture does not entail any  preliminary  consensus over its 
determinate contents, but the orientations it should be given. In this way, ethnicity like 
tribe, be it  staked on descent, race, kinship, language, religion, or even homeland, may 
be raised to the threshold of self-consciousness, without the latter exhausting the field of 
difference that grounds it. Geertz’s conundrum on primordial ties and the attendant 
expectations are thus not the end of cultural analysis but a demand for analysis. 
The ethnographic stumbling-block
I have thus far examined Antoine Socpa’s assessment of ethnic tensions in 
postcolonial Cameroon in relation to the impasses, both theoretical and ethical, of 
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Geertz’s personal efforts to “find general cultural conceptions displayed in particular 
social contexts” (1973, p.312). To this end, I suggested that the rise of belonging to the 
position of dominant conceptual framework in the study of ethnicity does not do away 
with the relatively permanent object of focus that undergirds the exploration of ethnicity 
in the postcolonial states since the 1960s: i.e. group identity  and the claims that follow 
from it. On the contrary, there have been divergent responses to ethnic claims, whether 
they  are seen as the sign of political immaturity, the residue of some pre-industrial 
political behavior, or the permanent background to political action, be it biological or 
historical. I have also stated that Socpa’s discussion of belonging, despite his ambiguous 
rejection of ethnic claims to land, fails to indicate what  would be the appropriate 
response. Nonetheless, his ultimate confession on the unwelcome but incontrovertible 
use of ethnic categories is indication enough for deeper concerns about the value of his 
own inquiry. 
Such was the case because, beside partisan manipulation, Socpa personally 
identified two other grounds for ethnic conflict which would have required an approach 
different from the mere focus on the contrasted treatment of autochthony by the ruling 
party. On the one hand, the “moral” force of “ancestral homelands” is indubitably seen 
by Socpa to be at work in the ethnic claims of both the Beti and Kotoko in Yaoundé and 
Kousseri. On the other hand, it is the “new wealth” of the Suwa that is at stake. In either 
case some kind of historicization but of settlement, lineage and occupation, and access to 
new forms of wealth–one shall say  with Yusufu Bala Usman (2005)–would have led to 
the scrutiny  of ethnic claims and their foundation beyond mere appearance to the 
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temporality of law, value, and voice; all aspects that are denied when politics is framed 
in the language of “legitimacy” and “complexion,” as Geertz thought of it  (1973, p.317). 
The relevance of this temporality lies in the need to give oneself some sort of safety 
valve in the face of the radicalism that seeks to annul difference, and appears to have 
caused Socpa’s fear of ethnic enthrallment. While the emergence of the loaded text of 
Bamileke ethnographic predominance in the heart of the National Museum project in 
Yaoundé is one gateway into the articulation of law, history, and value in Cameroon, it is 
worth seeing in Socpa’s relative silence on this issue not only an ethical reach beyond 
the existing literature on the position of the Bamileke as an ethnic group in Cameroon, 
but also a genuine concern about the post-integrative tendencies of the Cameroonian 
state, even when he does not explore it sufficiently. In point of fact, the situation of the 
Bamileke in Yaoundé, as well as in the overall southern Region of Cameroon, if not the 
entire country, is not very different from the situation of the Suwa in the northern city of 
Kousseri. Moreover, it can be said that the literature on the Bamileke over the past half a 
century has been engaged with the same question (See Dongmo 1983, Warnier 1993). 
Ironically  the last reinstatement of this Bamileke question has come unwittingly 
from the pen of Jean-François Bayart in his outspoken attempt “to undermine identity-
related nonsense by outlining an anti-cultural examination of the relationships between 
culture and politics” (2005, p.xii). Bayart’s anecdotal suggestion that the “economic 
ethos” of the Bamileke is “praised or feared in Cameroon” (p.2)–following Jean-Pierre 
Warnier’s core argument on the subject–, not only  has more to say about the peculiar 
ground upon which “culturalism” is dismissed, but it  also has a history that sets them in 
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a long tradition that goes back to the Second World War efforts to demarcate 
administrative constituencies ethnically and contain political dissidence in the country 
(Kamé, 2008). Even though the major text that has informed scholarly debates on this 
issue ever since, both abroad and inside Cameroon, is Lieutenant-Colonel Jean 
Lamberton’s 1960 essay on the Bamileke during the Union des Populations du 
Cameroun rebellion in the Bamileke Division, it would be shortsighted to see in it a 
French intellectual tradition alone, or to see in this ethnic polarization the thread of some 
ongoing dissidence that can be traced back to colonial times.
Francesco Pompeo’s intuition on ethnic conflicts internal to the Cameroonian 
officialdom also finds its inspiration in the intellectual tradition of speculative 
ethnography, which conflates ethnicity  and administratively demarcated constituencies, 
and make them appear independent and anterior to state politics. Accordingly, I would 
like to argue that, in such circumstances, no ethnography can fail to appear devoid of 
teleology, whether they deliberately bring two ethnic groups into comparison or merely 
focus on the peculiarities of one group. To understand the scope of this kind of 
assessement, one needs to ask: What if the subjects of ethnography could claim the 
project and knowledge of the ethnographer for themselves? What are the conditions that 
would allow such a claim to come to the fore? Would it not be the point where, whether 
reflecting, grasping, articulating, or describing a relatively permanent practice, a typical 
pattern of behavior, a critical element for group  identity, or a given historical 
development–be it political, economic, or semiotical–the ethnographer’s endeavors are 
returned to him/her; as if through a mirror that sets him/her in a peculiar position? Is it 
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not the position, not only of being viewed, but also of becoming the subject of a 
demand? It is such a demand that, I would like to suggest, can be addressed only through 
a particular form of analysis.
The predicament of cultural analysis
The cultural analysis required, I believe, to address the crystallization of ethnicity 
in Cameroon is to be found in the body of practices akin to psychoanalysis in its 
treatment of “psychic formations.” Central to psychoanalytic theory is not the restitution 
of truth, but the conviction that if psychic formations require reading it is not  so much 
because the conflicts for which they  are a sort  of semiotic compromise must be 
ascertained by the subject, but because reading them entails and determines treatment. 
Otherwise said, it is the inability for the subject to make sense of those conflicts that is at 
stake in the traumatic constitution of his symptoms; whereby he/she comes to speak until 
he enters the register of language. In Jacques Lacan’s view this conviction is 
fundamental, because the conflicts are themselves the product  of a continuous reading 
practice, even anterior to language learning. Moreover, this view holds that every 
reading is not only susceptible to such conflicts, but such conflicts must be rendered as 
language or else be suppressed once language has become the dominant structure within 
which reading is exercised (1953b). 
There is also room for a comparison between psychoanalytic theory and 
anthropology for the sake of the nearly unquestioned continuum between culture and 
family. In this regard, the critique of the normativity  of the Oedipal structure that  took 
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shape gradually  with the development of psychoanalytic theory, must be paralleled to the 
critique of cultural determinism that developed within anthropology. Such is the case 
with the contested “naturalness” of the family on the one hand, and the “immediacy” or 
“givens” of “primordial attachments” on the other, especially “as culture is inevitably 
involved in such matters,” would argue Geertz (1973, p.259). One can say that the 
critique of psychoanalysis rose against the “naturalness” of the family, or else against 
familialism. Whereas the critique of anthropology was first due to its colonial 
background and gradually rose against culturalism, but not  such that one would say it 
was against the “naturalness” of culture, where both family and culture understood as 
existing social relations. In point of fact, it is the very cathexis to culture in general or 
even merely  to group identity  that, I believe, must be re-instituted within the critique of 
anthropology. 
Psychoanalytic theory has taught us that to re-examine the cathexis to the oedipal 
structure one does not need an axiomatic distinction between individual and society, nor 
culture, but a linguistic practice grounded in open conversation, and staked on the 
displacement of otherwise self-consciously handicapping cathexes or imaginary relations 
to specific objects (Lacan 1953a). A historicity-oriented criticism of culturalism fails to 
do so, because it is directed less towards addressing particular demands for analysis than 
towards describing the genesis of cultural formations. Part of the reason the 
“naturalness” of culture in anthropology is addressed differently, compared to the 
naturalness of the oedipal structure, is due to the distinction between nature and culture, 
which itself was quintessential for the rise of anthropological inquiry  to the position of 
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an authoritative discipline; while the distinction was tellingly second to psychoanalytic 
treatment and remained an intellectual curiosity in psychoanalytic circles. Another 
significant reason is the continuum that I already mentioned between family and culture. 
As far as the family is concerned, the challenge to its “naturalness” in psychoanalysis 
weighs on its normativity  more than on the dismissal of family  ties as some sort of 
primordial ties, as one would say  after considering Socpa and Geertz, or its recognition 
as a constructed reality, an illusion, a failed attempt at explaining history, as the case is 
for instance with Warnier and Bayart’s critique of culturalism in Cameroon. 
More to disciplinary authority however, it can hardly  be said that culturalism in 
anthropology developed in the same way as familialism developed in psychoanalysis. 
The comparative exemplification and juxtaposition, for instance, of other cultures 
against the “naturalness,” or the universality of Europe, cannot be said to have been a 
drawback at the time when the very existence of those other cultures were denied, in the 
same way that setting up the nuclear family and patriarchy as the normal structure and 
the universal matrix of personal development and societal organization has been. On the 
other hand, if cultural relativity, the heart of culturalism, contributed in any way to the 
relativization of the Oedipal standard, the balance sheet cannot be said to favor a radical 
contribution of the critique of familialism to study  of culture in anthropology; especially 
when one takes into account Freud’s investigation of dreamwork (Freud, 1999) and his 
further inroad into neurotic life separately from his rather hesitant and uncritical 
engagement with anthropological accounts on religion and sexuality (Freud, 1946). 
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Moreover anthropological inquiry has not succeeded to get rid of the lingering 
hypothesis that  cultural relativism is no more than a progressive theory born in the 
historical contingence of might, self-absorption and cynicism. In this regard, it can be 
said that there was at least a moment in history, the history  of both anthropology and 
psychoanalysis, when culturalism was at the antipodes of familialism, but  this does not 
mean that they were fundamentally opposed. It can be argued that culturalism challenges 
familialism indirectly through either the exceptionalization or the particularization of 
European family  standards. Accordingly, cultural relativism always requires a master 
narrative such as history, modernity, civilization, capitalism, globalization, and so on, as 
a standpoint capable of providing the variables of its global and comparative model of 
interpretation. Nevertheless, culturalism is not challenged in the way “dysfunctional” 
sexual life internally  challenges the normativity of the Oedipal structure in 
psychoanalysis, because cultural relativism relies on a modular comparativism by  which 
culture is understood as the containment of difference. It  is in this relationship  that the 
impasse of an internal critique of culturalism in anthropology lies. The unclear relation 
and circulation of concepts between the two disciplines cannot be evaded in the 
assessment of their history  nor in the theorization of difference and sameness in general, 
especially if one were to add to the geometric model, what, in Lacan’s view, divides 
practitioners: the ethical foundation or the authority  of analysis (Lacan,1988). This 
inescapably  takes us to the assessment of the source of the demand for cultural analysis 
comes from in the case of ethnic territorialization such as in Cameroon, before one can 
see how an ethical issue is at stake.
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CHAPTER THREE: LAMBERTON’S CURSE
... We did things the African way; by means of a bit of chicanery, a 
kind of sorcery. (...) We built  environments somehow strange for 
Europeans: where many things brought from Africa were gathered. You 
hang a sort of talisman in the trees, and you say  (jokingly): “No, no, that? 
That’s African witchcraft.” Well, things like weird settings that reflect 
African reality. (...) The traditional chiefs (...) were there to explain to 
foreigners the meaning, the signification. We would tell them: “No, we 
are not at all obliged to say it  all. In fact, its real value is this: it’s a myth. 
You ought not  seek to understand what is in there. Let’s simply put it this 
way: culture secrets are not revealed just like that. There are limits. You 
are not supposed to be told the ingredients, or who made it, and so on. 
The chief, you see there is a powerful man; who owns totems, who has a 
human dimension and a hidden animal dimension, which constitute his 
power. He could have elephants, and he could have panthers incarnating 
him.” And so on...
 ... On a fait des trucs à l’africain, avec des truanderies, des trucs un 
peu sorciers. (...) On a crée un environnement un peu étrange pour les 
Européens; où on a mis des tas de trucs emmenés d’Afrique, ... On met 
une espèce de grigris accrochés sur des arbres. On dit (d’un air amusé): 
“Non, non, ça? C’est la sorcellerie africaine.” Bon, des décors un peu 
bizarres qui reflètent la réalité africaine. (...) Les chefs traditionnels (...) 
étaient là pour expliquer aux étrangers le sens, la signification en leur 
disant que: “Non, on n’est même pas obligé de tout dire parce que, en 
fait, la valeur de ça c’est même que, c’est le mythe. On ne doit pas 
chercher à comprendre ce qu’il y a là-dedans parce que, disons-le, on 
n’extériorise pas les secrets de la culture comme ça, il y a des limites. (...) 
On ne doit pas vous dire que là-dedans on met tel ingrédient, c’est telle 
personne qui le fait tout ça. Et le chef que vous voyez là, c’est un homme 
puissant qui a des totems, qui a sa dimension humaine et une dimension 
animale cachée, qui constitue la force. Il peut avoir des éléphants, il peut 
avoir des panthères qui l’incarnent.” Tout ça, bon...
Etienne Sonkin
Sonkin’s fantastic tale of African reality provided as spectacle to the European 
gaze does not come from the excavated catalogue of early  twentieth century colonial 
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exhibitions. If this were the case, I would have said that it stands for an original tale of 
its own. I can tell why. Unlike the stories I have been accustomed to by the memorabilia 
of then-international world fairs, which seemed to have paid little attention to what 
Africans had to say about the exhibition of heteroclite objects deemed to describe their 
lifestyle and material civilization, I have here the voice of a participant, speaking to me 
from the intimate recesses of an art of being African, and doing things the African way. 
Moreover, Sonkin’s description of things African would be hard to locate in a known 
register of speech on Africa. Theories of African art or material culture do not allow for 
such loose speech. For obvious reasons, no collector of primitive art–in the shadow of 
whom I may be led to scrutinize the zealous missionary, the erudite colonial military 
officer or administrator, or else the seasoned tropical tourist–would love to hear that the 
value with which they seek to imbue those objects–fetishes, tokens of backwardness, or 
symbols of exoticism–is nothing more than the fumes of some mischievous tricks 
intended as make believe; even more so when traditional chiefs are said to have been 
convened for the scandalous business of shutting the mouth of the most audaciously 
curious visitors. If I were instead to consider this tale as the story told to me as an 
ethnographer by my informant, there will be portions that would require more scrutiny, 
and likely a greater deal of digression from the core of my well prepared set  of 
questions. Furthermore, I will need to assume some sort of intimacy between Mr. Sonkin 
and me, which would be outside of the relationship of an ethnographer to his informant, 
otherwise chicanery would prove too unscrupulous a term to characterize the means by 
which he does things the African way. By the same token, I would have to picture myself 
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as the ethnographer on the other end of the rope, lost in some painstaking effort  to hide 
his embarrassment in the face of the somewhat unpalatable maxims of his privileged 
medium, by whose exercise of speech I might have probably expected some mysteries of 
being African to be verbalized.
I could have long before acknowledged that the anthropologist’s embarrassment 
was mine if I had been driven away from Mr. Sonkin’s main point  in May 2011 when he 
was led to emphasize the importance of a trip taken by of a few chiefs from the West 
Region of Cameroon to Europe two years earlier in order to mobilize financial support 
for The Road to Chiefdoms. Perhaps I did pay more than enough attention to the story. 
Nevertheless, the fact of having no recollection of any sort of confusion must have been 
the result of my effort to dismiss it  at  the very  moment of its inception. What then is the 
significance of this tale? It appears to have had a second effect on my  assessment of 
Sonkin’s stories. I am using it now as a matter of introduction to a chapter whose main 
subject I have already indicated in previous chapters, and the under the eponym of the 
title reminds us of it, is to explore a certain way of formulating demands at the center of 
which the Bamileke take the stage. Where is this tale supposed to lead us? Is it into an 
art of locating oneself as an African in the phantasmagoric landscape of identities and 
their avatars, as Mr. Sonkin intimates? Absolutely not, or perhaps yes; but a scrupulous 
investigation, for instance, into the exhibition stand of The Road to Chiefdoms on the 
occasion of the International Festival of Plants and Flowers in Nantes in 2009, the 
background to Sonkin’s tale, will reveal the fact that the talk was not so much about 
African reality  as it was about Bamileke culture and chiefly  customs in West Cameroon. 
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Still, does the difference matter? Was I surreptitiously invited in this way to investigate 
the mysteries of Bamileke culture and customs? I must attribute my forgotten confusion 
to the belief–be it for the shortest period of time–in the existence of a radical background 
whose veil it was my calling perhaps to undo by  any means. This background should be 
sought in the simple idea of the gradual transformation of The Road to Chiefdoms from 
a municipal project into a regional one, or the more abstract idea of its insertion as a 
cultural program into the political economy of culture in Cameroon. Both subjects, I feel 
now befuddled to recall, were the two main topics of our conversation. In any case, if it 
is not to be put  on the register of inside jokes, Sonkin’s tale will remain for the greater 
part a riddle for the restless mind. Nonetheless, I firmly  believe that  neither the secret of 
Bamileke culture nor the mechanics of chiefly customs were amenable to the 
significance of my fixation on that tale. 
Let’s not be mistaken: Etienne Sonkin was not some random person that I 
encountered, and from whom I could expect a narration of the genesis of The Road to 
Chiefdoms and its entanglement into current cultural and political projects in Cameroon. 
I do not intend to explore the reasons why  my meeting with Mr. Sonkin was essential. 
Even if these reasons prove necessary I would rather leave it to be looked into on a 
different platform. For now, to dispel the likely assumption that his words were so much 
empty talk, I must reckon that it  took me a long while to prepare for my conversation 
with him. At first, I hoped to rely on Etienne Sonkin because he was one of the key 
personalities responsible for the birth The Road to Chiefdoms. Over the first ten years of 
the initiative’s slow development, Mr. Sonkin served as one of its central figure. He was 
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the mayor of the city  of Dschang. The Road to Chiefdoms being initially intended as a 
program of cooperation between the cities of Dschang in Cameroon and Nantes in 
France, he was the main de facto official to seal the operation. Moreover, beyond being 
the municipal officer, he worked with a couple of businessmen from Douala, 
Cameroon’s largest city, and local chiefs from municipalities beyond his, to later give 
some solid foundation to the initiative when it  started to take a regional dimension. At 
the moment of my stay in Dschang, however, he was no longer directly involved, at least 
as an official. A new mayor had been elected in 2007, the year the program launched the 
construction of the Museum of Civilizations. Mr. Sonkin would tell me that the 
construction of the museum was somehow rushed because they were apprehensive about 
the impact of municipal elections on the fate of the program. He was also a politician, 
and a member of the Social Democratic Front. As if the apprehension was justified, the 
incumbent mayor would be from the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement. Today, 
Sonkin is still active both as a politician and a businessman. He owns an insurance 
company with headquarters in Dschang. Lastly, it was not until after two months in 
Dschang that I realized that Mr. Sonkin was also my landlord, since I was renting one of 
his apartments located ten minutes distance from his office.
Insignificant in itself, Sonkin’s story of African reality on display was just an 
intermezzo in my post-fieldwork engagement with the traces of his participation in the 
Museum of Civilizations project. The crucial moment of my conversation with him 
unveiled an unanticipated interpretation of the background to Jean Lamberton’s 1960 
article. As a reminder, Lamberton was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the French colonial 
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administration and the military  leader of the anti-rebellion repression by the colonial 
government in the 1950s, and the primary  adviser on tactical matters for the newly 
formed government after independence, in 1960. Lamberton’s article was published on 
March the first of that year, three months after independence, in the Revue Nationale de 
Défense, the French Journal of reference in matters of war at the time. This article has 
taken an unprecedented meaning since its reappearance in an anthology  of ongoing 
ethnicity-based claims addressed to the government, and published anonymously in 1993 
by a group of Bamileke intellectuals. My reference to Bamileke intellectuals here should 
not be suspicious, just because I already said that Cameroun éclaté (1993), the anthology 
of reference, is an anonymous book.
In October 2011, I personally met Sindjoun Pokam, one of the anthology’s editors, 
to discuss the resurrection of Lamberton’s text. Sindjoun Pokam is the same philosopher 
who, in the late 1980s, was opposed to Mono Ndjana’s thesis that some Bamileke writers 
were victimizing the Bamileke in order to claim power insidiously (see Chapter 1). The 
quasi intact reprinting of Lamberton’s article more than three decades after its first 
publication for Sindjoun Pokam and the Bamileke scholars who were to later create the 
Université des Montagnes was an effort to write down the colonial origins of ethnic 
claims in Cameroon. It was after hearing my account of the voiced fear of an 
overbearing visibility  of the Bamileke at  the National Museum of Yaoundé that Etienne 
Sonkin deemed it crucial to provide a background to Jean Lamberton’s article. The 
convergence is not a simple matter. Sonkin did not make use of Lamberton to write his 
origins of ethnic demands, especially since it was clear to him that the stalemate at the 
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National Museum of Yaoundé was a matter regarding the visibility of the Bamileke 
nationwide. Sonkin’s idea was that of an original sin; and the sin thus considered was the 
predominantly Bamileke appearance of the anti-colonial wars of Cameroon, a 
retrospective view of the Bamileke in the spectacle of national representation predicated 
on ethnicity. Indeed, beyond Douala, which was part of the Wouri Region and the point 
of departure of early labor and anti-colonial movements in Cameroon, the two regions 
that became the battleground between the government and the Union des Populations du 
Cameroon’s insurgents were in chronological order the Sanaga-Maritime and the 
Bamileke. Is it not overstretched, one would want to ask, to attribute the 1950-60s 
insurgency to an ethnic group and, especially so, to one particular region, when it is 
known that the UPC movement cut  across ethnic groups, and its activities transcended 
the mere boundaries of the Bamileke Region? 
Before revisiting the appropriation of Jean Lamberton’s assessment of the rebellion 
movement and poking into the likely redemption sought by Etienne Sonkin with the 
concept of original sin, it  is first necessary  to get  used to a pattern of thought that neither 
the exegesis of some voice lost  in the meanderings of history, nor Sonkin’s 
conversational dramatization of its background would clarify. In the face of the 
appearance of the Bamileke as uncanny autochthons in museum exhibitions in 
Cameroon, I argued that the only  appropriate way to deal with is to neither dismiss them 
on the grounds that  the resilience of ethnic categories in politics is testimony to the 
incapacity of the newly formed states to transcend primordial ties, or reduce those 
categories to the discursive ramifications of some manipulating power. Instead I 
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suggested that one need to pay attention to the specific demands that find their formula 
in them. A little further, I also argued that looking into those demands entails considering 
them not only  as metaphors, in which case they would only reflect some preexisting 
representation, for example what I have chosen to call ethnic territorialization. On the 
contrary, they are the default means by which subjectivities at the moment of narration 
are articulated, owing to Lacan’s suggestion that “if the symptom is a metaphor, stating it 
as such is no longer one” (Lacan, 1957, p.80). Are they instead invocations, invitations, 
suggestions, summons, provocations, elicitations, solicitations, displacements, 
placations? What is their domain of truth? In any case, ethnic territorialization in 
Cameroon, no matter the trajectory it takes to reach us, is a tricky business. 
Ethnic territorialization is the ground where the most outspokenly genuine 
descriptions find themselves staged on the platform of the most insidiously  divinatory 
constructions. I do not bring this up  to shy away  from the other end of my musings on 
territorialization. On the contrary, my belief is that by verbalizing the pattern of thought 
that guides the network of ethnic references–thanks to the discussion of the manifold 
reverberations of Lamberton’s article today–I realized how hazy, contingent, ephemeral, 
elliptic and tentative their objects are whenever bestowed with some kind of explanatory 
capacity. None of my conversations in Cameroon were conducted without the frame of 
mind that I have called ethnic territorialization being taken into account. A more accurate 
way of understanding this pattern of thought in the context of a conversation is to call it 
a cognitive map of subjectification. In lieu of an illustration, I could for instance 
anticipate every time that the first five minutes of my conversations would be spent on 
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returning the favor to my interlocutors, in the manner of an autobiography, for having 
them speak to me both for themselves and for the positions they might be seen by  me to 
take in the invisible of subjectivities. What then is the cognitive map of subjectification 
supposed to unveil ethnic territorialization?
The term Bamileke for instance is unquestionably  today the name of an ethnic 
group in Cameroon, but things were not as clear as this in 1960 at the time Jean 
Lamberton wrote Les Bamilékés dans le Cameroun d’aujourd’hui (The Bamileké in 
Today’s Cameroon). A decade earlier it occurred to Delarozière, a French colonial 
administrator and indefatigable ethnologist who was the first French official to 
summarize the existing administrative information on the Bamileke, that this term had 
no basis other than being a convenient  term that had been used by  Europeans to 
designate the people living in today’s Dschang, encompassing nearly half of what is 
nowadays the West Region and a very  little portion of the North-West Region. Rendered 
in the anthropometric language of the time, the uniting factor for Delarozière derived 
from the observation that “they  had the same physical appearance, the same mores, and 
the same customs” (1949). Nevertheless, the origin of the designation itself was a 
linguistic contraption of the colonial administrators who happened to concatenate the 
prefix ‘ba’ (people) with an alteration of ‘mbaliku,’ a radical that originally  meant the 
ravines in Yemba and had been used to depict the environment in which the people thus 
designated lived. 
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Delarozière was furthermore eager to point out that the term Bamileke had been 
seen as some sort of linguistic ‘monster‘ by the catholic missionary Stoll, for its lack of 
historical consistency. Unlike other administrative ethnonyms in the area which were as 
a rule the conjoining of the same prefix to the name of a village or the village chief, 
Bamileke was so abstract that  the “natives were speechless” when asked whether they 
were Bamileke. It can be argued that if, perforce, the name of a village, or its chief, 
incidentally  became the name of its inhabitants, such was to become the case with the 
Region which was officially designated Bamileke in 1941. It is true today that to be 
identified as a Bamileke entails the idea that one’s origins are in the now inexistent 
region, since it was administratively  transformed into a simple division in 1959 and 
merged with the former Bamoun Region in 1972. It is not unworthy to note that unlike 
the Bamileke, the Bamoun Region, putative land of the Bamoun, was expressly 
recognized as the domain of the former Bamoun sultanate, unified and separated from 
the highlands by Islam in late 19th century.
I said that one can legitimately  consider the Bamileke as the people that inhabited 
the area that  became the Bamileke Region in 1941. However this is too cavalier, and 
even ill-advised; notwithstanding, it has become, over the past two decades, the default 
measure used by the State of Cameroon to record the tribal affiliation of its citizens on 
the occasion of national identification. The short description of the genesis of the term 
Bamileke is enough to first suggest that ethnicity in Cameroon may have nothing to do 
with what Clifford Geertz has called primordial ties, the so-called “congruities of blood, 
speech, custom, and so on” (1973, p.259). Nevertheless, what we can see behind the 
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demographics of an administrative unit are either the authority that controlled a 
theoretical group of people, or else the acknowledged territorial boundaries of his 
authority within a broader domain of circulation. The magic of the notion of tribe, or the 
idea of an ethnic group, with the alluring spectacles of physical appearance, mores, and 
customs, always waiting to be summoned from certain hidden recesses, whether in the 
guise of culture or social formation, is to obliterate the trace of their incongruities, and 
make it appear so that  their bases are to be found in other inscriptions more suitable to 
current agreement. 
Second, the same genesis of the term Bamileke indicates that the operating 
administrative structure in the identification of the Bamileke as an ethnic group today  in 
Cameroon would appear irrelevant to the informed eye or even for the veteran state 
official, since it has been superseded since 1972 by a new administrative structure, even 
though the latter might still require earlier structures in view of government control by 
means of tribal affiliation. From this perspective, a deceptive effort  was made by the 
early Cameroonian governments to give the sense that they  were doing away  with the 
ethnic contours that the French colonial administration had given to its main 
administrative constituencies. By 1941, the colonial administration in French Cameroon 
had created 16 administrative regions with the clear intention, according to Samson 
Ango Mengue, a Cameroonian geographer, of separating people ethnically  (2004). The 
Bamileke and the Bamoun were two of those regions. Together they represented the 
remainder of the German Grassland after the northern Grassland had been conquered by 
the British. 
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For the Germans, the Grassland was an ethnic and geographic complex unified by 
its highlands and pastures. For the sake of government, the German colonial 
administration divided the Grassland into four districts: Dschang, Bamun, Bamenda and 
Wum. Bamenda and Wum became part of the British Southern Cameroons at the end of 
the First World War. The former district of Dschang lost only a small portion of land on 
its western border to the British colonial administration. The city of Dschang itself was 
under British administration, and remained so until the demarcation of the borderline 
between French and British Mandates under the auspices of the League of Nations in 
1922. The former Dschang, which became Bamileke in 1941 under French control, 
merged with Bamoun in 1972 to form the West province of the United Republic of 
Cameroon. Between 1959 and 1972, all administrative regions inherited from the French 
were turned into divisions (départments in French). From Region to division, the 
difference was huge. Although that  change in denomination may  suggest that the 
government wanted to move away from the geographical connotation of region, the 
relevance of this move was a matter of centralization and termination of what were once 
called regional councils and that functioned as tribal consultative forums. The idea of 
province survived the shift of political power from Ahmadou Ahidjo to Paul Biya, and so 
did the West province even though Biya reshuffled the political landscape of Cameroon 
in 1983. The main target of Biya’s rearrangement, nonetheless, was the overwhelming 
size of the allegedly Islamic North province, which functioned as unified ethnic front in 
the hand of Ahmadou Ahidjo. The North province ended up being split into three 
70
separate provinces by  Biya. We can see from here the germ of what would appear as the 
sign of Bamileke domination at the National Museum project in the early 1990s. 
Insofar as our cognitive map is concerned, the 1990s inaugurated the resurrection 
of the epistemology behind French colonial administration with the reappearance of the 
idea of region. Indeed, since 1996, all ten provinces have become regions. I leave the 
significance of this transformation to be assessed in another chapter on the peculiarities 
of chieftaincy in Cameroon (see Chapter 5). It suffices to ask here why  the designation 
Bamileke still prevails as the term of reference for the people who once lived in some 
part of nowadays West Region. In my view, any answer to this question would only open 
onto a new cognitive map. By this, I mean that it is the very tenacity of this ethnonym 
that makes it possible to read history backward as such. In other words, every ethnic 
name in Cameroon is a cipher that makes its traces relevant in some respects, and 
irrelevant in others.
The traces of the Bamileke cipher, for Jean Lamberton, were immensely 
significant for the future he envisioned for the nascent Cameroon in 1960. At first  one 
can take Lamberton’s worries at face value. Thanks to Richard Joseph (1977), it is 
known broadly  that, even though French Cameroon was becoming independent in 1960, 
the country was not at peace. For the French government, independence in these 
circumstances appeared an incontrovertible means to assuage political tensions and to 
lighten the cost of war. However, in Lamberton’s view, things were rushed and probably 
ill-advised if it was the case that the French government really  intended a solid 
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foundation to any future independent government in Cameroon. His idea was that the 
origin of political turmoil in Cameroon was none other than the specter of an ethnic 
minority with unclear motives. Let us not be led astray by this alarming assessment. 
Lamberton was just the epitome of a colonial art of handling political issues typical of 
the French colonial administration in Cameroon. Even prostitution could be controlled 
by means of ethnographic divination. City girls or filles publiques (literally  public girls, 
the formal name with which prostitutes were registered by the colonial administration) 
were legally bound to ‘return’ to their ‘home region,’ or région d’origine in the event 
that they evaded weekly medical examination. 
Any riot and popular unrest in urban centers, no matter the subject of contention, 
would easily  lay the groundwork for the distinction between autochthonous natives and 
non-autochthonous natives, with the pending ‘repatriation’ of the latter in case it  was 
ascertained that they were at the origin of the mass disturbance. Owing to the relatively 
early enrollment of the Bamileke into the services of plantation owners on the coast, and 
of the colonial administration as middlemen elsewhere, most of the existing government 
accounts at the National Archives of Yaoundé on such repatriations are related to the 
Bamileke. Moreover, even though the Sanaga-Maritime Region, administratively 
delineated as the land of the Bassa, was the first refuge of the anti-rebellion movement, it 
is well documented that the second phase of the Cameroon counterinsurgency, fought in 
the Bamileke Region, was the longest, the most unyielding, and the most expensive for 
the French and later Cameroon government. From these lines, we have a lineament to 
Lamberton’s desire to formulate what was to later become the “Bamileke problem,” and 
72
consecrate a regime of interpretation of the relation of Bamileke to political power . Still, 
in what ways was the Bamileke cipher relevant for Lamberton?
Jean Lamberton’s short  piece of fifteen pages on the Bamileke would hardly stand 
as a treatise on the Bamileke. Not unlike Sonkin’s story, with which I opened this 
chapter, the article is made up of miscellaneous references, including administrative 
records, ethnographic accounts, and personal observations–all woven into a compendium 
of maps, chronologies, customs, and written in a style midway  between an encyclical 
and a war correspondence. The substance of Lamberton’s article appears to have been an 
attempt not only  to attribute the remaining UPC rebellion to the Bamileke and 
understand it as an ethnic rebellion, but above all to lay the grounds for suspicion–based 
on a defunct thesis on federalism advanced by André Marie Mbida, Beti and former 
prime minister–that behind this rebellion was a Bamileke project to establish the Great 
Bamileke: a semi-autonomous Region that would unify the entire Grassland as well as 
neighboring areas with significant Bamileke settlement, independently of existing 
administrative constituencies. 
In Lamberton’s view, the main area of contention was Douala which, at that time, 
had the single port of the country. While this section of Lamberton’s article has not 
deserved any great interest in the media since its reappearance in 1993, the prospect of 
federalism with such possible contours has remained a topic of political debate for some 
politicians. More decisive, however, have been the political skirmishes between 
Bamileke and Douala intellectuals and politicians in the Littoral Region, the former 
73
Wouri Region, where the city  of Douala is located (see Chapter 6). The element of his 
article that seems to have gained currency in recent references to the Lieutenant-Colonel 
consists of the first lines, in which the author seems categorical in his assertion that, in 
addition to being an ethnic minority uncommon in West Africa, the Bamileke “are at 
prey to convulsions with no discernible causes or origins” (p.464). If these lines imply 
the idea that  Lamberton’s article was to somehow explore the likely reasons behind this 
convulsion, the predominant focus on those first lines in the Cameroonian media is 
testimony to the fact that the reappearance of the text  in 1993 was not just a resuscitation 
by which the voice of Jean Lamberton had been revived, but a resurrection in the 
Christian sense, with the additional idea that the voice had been transfigured, or in a 
Freudian metaphor, that it had been displaced.
I argued in Chapter 1, regarding the metaphorical re-inscription of the Bamileke as 
uncanny  autochthons in the exhibition scheme of the National Museum of Yaoundé, that 
Francesco Pompeo’s fear was no more than a distant echo of Jean Lamberton’s article 
that is grounded in the history of state formation and ethnic tensions internal to the 
successive governments of Cameroon since the end of the Second World War. Moreover 
I stated that this article still informs current issues such as democratization, 
decentralization, the protection of indigenous people, the development of cultural 
associations, and ethnography at large. It would be a terrible misunderstanding to 
assume that  by  the reemergence of Lamberton’s article, the set of political issues that 
gave it a background have resurfaced unchanged, or else that it is still Lamberton 
speaking to us through a “purloined letter.” It is appropriate, however, to argue that we 
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owe the astounding power credited to Lamberton in shaping political issues in Cameroon 
today  to the fact that a few Bamileke intellectuals, such as Sindjoun Pokam, have made 
it their mission to make the voice of Lamberton resonate in the Cameroonian media. 
Indeed, if my meeting with Sindjoun Pokam in October 2011 had not abated my anxiety 
in the face of the ubiquitous reappearance of Lamberton’s article, I would have 
continued pondering the meanings of its republication. Here I refer not to the anthology 
of ethnic demands that I have mentioned–for Lamberton was not directly making an 
ethnic demand as such–but to various other mentions of Lamberton in Cameroonian 
newspapers and Africanist literature on Cameroon. These have occurred to such an 
extent that Lamberton’s reappearance has developed a symptomatic pattern. 
The last instance of the article’s reappearance was a couple of months after my 
return to the United States from Cameroon in 2012. It followed the scandal raised in the 
media by the publication of a confidential letter written by Mgr Tonye Bakot, then 
Archbishop of Yaoundé and Chancellor of the Catholic University of Central Africa, to 
Reverend Martin Birba, Dean of the Faculty  of Social Sciences and Management. The 
substance of the letter was to request a clarification on regional quotas pertaining to both 
students and faculty in the institution. It had occurred to the Scientific Board of 
Directors–following whose decision the chancellor was writing to the Dean–that there 
was an imbalance in the enrollment of students and scholars, regarding demographic 
quotas both internal to Cameroon, and within the six countries of Central Africa, whose 
Bishops’ Conferences are the trustees of the university. The letter became a scandal for 
the immediate reason, identifiable in it, that the major beneficiary of this imbalance was 
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the West Region and the cause of suspicion for manipulation was placed on Reverend 
Ludovic Lado, the vice-dean, who was from the same Region and who allegedly had 
been at  the origin of a fraudulent  diploma reported to the Scientific Board. This scandal 
would deserve the status of a case on its own, in the psychoanalytic sense, if we were to 
analyze the symptomatic character of Lamberton’s reappearance a couple of weeks later, 
after the event had invaded Internet-based news organizations and social networks such 
as Facebook and Youtube. Before the incident at  the Catholic Institute of Yaoundé, the 
same article had been published on various other occasions of political controversy  that 
would lead us astray  if we were to survey them all. Instead, I will explore a curious link 
between the Catholic University scandal, if we may call it that, and Jean Lamberton’s 
article in order to exemplify its symptomatic association with political competition in 
Cameroon.
The mystique of ethnicity  in Cameroon follows the pattern of what I called the 
cognitive map of subjectification. Unless you have first gone through a few 
clarifications, you might  miss the logic of ethnic inferences in everyday conversations. 
The ethereal beauty of the case at  the Catholic University of Yaoundé comes with the 
fact that there is no such mention of ethnicity nor even of the term Bamileke in Mgr 
Bakot’s letter. The reader’s knowledge is required to hold that Reverend Ludovic Lado 
and the West Region are Bamileke, and that the former might be conniving for the sake 
of the latter. The huge margin of error to which the larger surface area be-known to the 
Bamoun in the actual West Region may lead to cannot do anything against that 
“knowledge.” The task will then be to understand how regional backgrounds are 
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identified and how one knows who is a Bamileke and who is not at  the Catholic 
University. I would argue that it is the impossibility  of an answer to this question that 
was behind the whole scandal. 
By impossibility, I do not mean that there are no measures taken as such by 
institutions such as the Catholic University to these ends. I could be a witness in some 
ways, since I, myself, am an alumnae of that university. I played my  part, in fact, when 
the Catholic University  controversy was still raging. I was in communication with a few 
of the protagonists. The fact is, the Catholic University itself might have been guided by 
an impulse of the government of Cameroon without questioning its foundation. 
However, the practice of taking quotas into account was no longer go on unquestioned 
henceforth. I could vaguely remember that eleven years earlier when I was filing my 
registration at the Catholic Institute of Yaoundé, I had to state my Region of origin. Even 
before I registered, my prior qualification for the European Union Scholarship, at  the 
time I was admitted, was based on that origin. The fact that I was never asked what my 
ethnic group, or tribe, was does not mean that I never was situated in the so-called 
cognitive map of ethnicity. At a microscopic level, there are plenty of other signifiers 
that distribute individuals ethnically into the existing ten regions of the country. 
Even a theoretical eleventh Region exists in the literature. It is the penitentiary 
institution in popular culture. In the sphere of electoral politics and scholarly debates, it 
is the Region of those whose tribal origins can either no longer be traced back to any of 
the ten regions, or who are simply foreign to all of them (Geschiere, 2009). The 
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signifiers with most currency are often dramatized in popular culture. These have to do 
with names, accents, habits, and attires, which are deemed traditional. Do not be 
scandalized by the fact  that the place of birth is insignificant. I will come to this matter 
in my  other exploration of what Peter Geschiere has named rituals of belonging (see 
Chapter 5). None other than Dieudonné Afana Abecon, the most famous of postcolonial 
comedians in Cameroon, could give to this impossibility the letter of its existence. Born 
in 1956 in Akonolinga, in the Center Region, and mostly  known by his stage name Jean 
Miché Kankan in West Africa, he created a Bamileke origin for himself and stated in one 
of his plays that he was born in Mbouda, in the former Bamileke Region, “at the time 
when groundnuts were harvested for the last time before the Germans arrived in 
Cameroon” (Kankan, n.d.). By “impossibility”, I would like to suggest that, unless it is 
turned into a joke, with its ironic effect, the set  of inferences by which people identify as 
member of an ethnic group  or a tribe would reveal contradictions and inconsistencies 
that are hard to deal with in the letter of the present, like the neurotic who, in Freud’s 
language, not knowing what to do with his sporadic symptoms, wraps them up in a neat 
language, and consigns them to the care of the analyst. No wonder the anthropologist has 
become in popular culture he or she who has vested interested in studying ethnic groups 
and who hold the keys to their existence and coherence. That being said, I would not 
yield to the temptation of looking into historical narratives of identity formation in order 
to manage the so-called impossibility. My acknowledgement of narratives as a way of 
dealing with the contradictions and inconsistencies of speculative ethnography in 
Cameroon is a testimony to the value of narratives as palliatives. Kankan’s 
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theatricalization of Bamilekeness and Sonkin’s representation of an expendable African 
reality  are both to be understood as such. Yet there is more to the symptomatic character 
of the resurgence of Lamberton’s text.
When not partially  cited, as is often done in scholarly literature, Lamberton’s 
article usually resurfaces untouched and without commentary, as if it  had to speak for 
itself, e.g. the time it appeared in the columns of Le Messager in July  2012, during the 
Catholic University scandal. Nevertheless the contemporary version does not faithfully 
correspond to the article published in March 1960 by Lamberton. Not only did the 
original formatting of the article disappear for the sake of new media, changes were also 
made that can be said to have significantly altered the original article. New paragraphs 
have appeared that cannot be found in the original text and the apparent purpose of 
which might seem at first to replace an opening map that existed in the original with 
some kind of narrative and statistics. However, both narratives and statistics cannot be 
derived from the original article. 
The contemporary version of reference is definitely the one that was published in 
Cameroon éclaté in 1993. The reference of this anthology is slightly different from the 
reference of the original article in the record of both Columbia University and Worldcat 
online pertaining to the Revue Nationale de Défense. Instead of March 1960, first-year, 
from page 461 to page 477, the anthology’s reference is March 1960, 16th year, from 
page 161 to page 177. The parallelism is so striking that I wonder whether it is a matter 
of typographical error or circulation damage to the copy used to produce the anthology. 
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In either case, “1e année” has been turned into “16e année”; and “1” at the beginning 
of each page number has come to be read “4”. In any case, the discrepancy  between the 
two introductions is such that one cannot ignore it. It may be that there was a 
controversy  on the exactitude of the article as it was published in Cameroon éclaté, and 
the way it became the version of reference. I speculated on it only later when I recalled 
that Jean-Claude Tchouankap, a colleague during my fieldwork in Dschang and thanks 
to whom I could later obtain an interview with Jean-Louis Dongmo, had asked me if I 
could provide the original text. It was only  then that I decided to compare the two 
versions.
The two paragraphs of the original introduction has been extended with an addition 
of nine new ones in the later versions circulated in Cameroon and online. The last eight 
of those nine paragraphs are organized into three topics, each with a distinct title. The 
first title is “The Bamileke people” (Le peuple Bamileke); the second “An African 
Multitude” (une foule d’Afrique), and the third “Douala, A Virtual Bamileke 
Capital” (Douala est, pratiquement, une capitale Bamiléké). The first topic, which has 
become the most quoted section of Lamberton’s article in Cameroon and France, and 
which does not altogether figure in the original publication, deserves to be considered in 
full:
Monographs speak of a ‘race’ or a Bamileke ethnic group. In fact the 
Bamileke constitute a people. To be persuaded of the idea, it suffices to 
consider their number, their history, their social structure and their 
dynamism. A homogenous population of negroes demonstrating such 
factors of power and cohesion is not common in Central Africa; at least  in 
Cameroon, the Bamileke phenomenon is without equivalent. (p.54)
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Les monographies font état d’une ‘race’ ou d’une Ethnie Bamiléké : 
en fait, les Bamiléké forment un peuple. Il suffit pour s’en convaincre de 
considérer leur nombre, leur histoire, leur structure sociale et leur 
dynamisme. Qu’un groupe homogène de populations nègres réunisse tant 
de facteurs de puissance et de cohésion n’est pas is banal en Afrique 
Centrale ; au Cameroun, du moins, le phénomène Bamiléké est sans 
équivalent. (p.54)
Like the other paragraphs that I will introduce shortly, this paragraph may raises 
suspicion as to whether it  was penned by Jean Lamberton. The references I presented 
earlier suggest the same. Lamberton passed away in 2004, and his personal archives 
became the starting point of the recent historiography of the French counterinsurgency in 
Cameroon written by two French journalists, Thomas Deltombe and Manuel Domergue, 
and a Bamileke scholar, Jacob Tatsita (2011). On page 11 of their 740 pages book, they 
reintroduce the paragraph just as it is presented above, and attribute it to Jean 
Lamberton. They argue that the same paragraph became popular when François-Xavier 
Verschave mentioned it  in his 1998 book on Françafrica. The most curious aspect 
nonetheless is that the authors of Kamerun ! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la 
Françafrique 1948-1971 (Kamerun! A Hidden War at the Origins of Françafrica) refer to 
the original text in their bibliography, even though the paragraph cannot be found it. 
Moreover they do not mention the version of Cameroun éclaté in which the paragraph 
appeared for the first time. 
Does it matter whether the additional paragraphs were introduced later by  Jean 
Lamberton himself? Not for the sake of my argument. Not only is it not mine here to 
trace the origins of a discourse, but the ideas exposed in this first supplementary 
paragraph for instance were not uncommon at the time Lamberton drafted his article. 
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The communication of Roland Diziain on the factors of Bamileke expansion in 
Cameroon in 1953, published in the Bulletin de l’association de géographes Français, is 
suffused with such observations. Neither can it be said that such commentaries have 
disappeared since. Actually  they  are the voice of what has been crystallized in Cameroon 
as the literature on Bamileke exceptionalism. This literature can be seen as a background 
to Jean-Louis Dongmo’s thesis on Bamileke Dynamism (see Chapter 1), as well as it can 
be found underwritten in Jean-Pierre Warnier’s unyielding essay on the Spirit of 
Entrepreneurship in Cameroon (1993). Furthermore, ascertaining whether the paragraph 
is Lamberton’s does not bear much on my argument regarding the symptomatic character 
of the reappearance of his article, unless one would like to see in it, like Mono Ndjana, 
some sort of Bamileke conspiracy. 
On the contrary, I assume that, as in the case of a neurotic’s symptom, one should 
not be driven towards demystifying the reality of the images that constitute the 
symptom, but lean towards the articulated desire that insists in and through them, Lacan 
would argue, and to gradually drive out the dizzying reality that precipitates the course 
of the symptom, self-avowed to constitute a problem. In other words one should ask: 
what is the demand to which the symptom is merely  a response in disguise? In what 
language would such a demand be articulated? Is the symptomatic character of the 
resurgence of Lamberton’s text going to lead us to a kind of discourse analysis and the 
process of subjectification that it  entails, or to some sort of recycled critique of political 
economy? Are we doomed to cry after Karl Marx’s elaborations on value and the 
ghostlike materiality that constricts the capitalist’s desire (Marx, 1996 & 1971)? The 
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question of value, and the extent  to which its effect on the relevance of Lamberton’s 
voice in contemporary Cameroon and the formulation of the Bamileke as uncanny 
autochthons will be considered in Chapter 8. As for now, there is another fundamental 
question regarding the symptomatic character of Lamberton’s sporadic reappearance in 
and on Cameroon. How would I locate the pseudo-psychoanalytical analogy  that I am 
making, and that–it will be mine to recall– paved the way  to the misadventures of 
structuralism in the formulation of the notion of primitive mind?
The second title of the added section seems to stand in contradiction with the 
notion of ethnic minority  stated in the first  paragraph of the original text. Indeed, while 
there are no statistics on the map  used by Lamberton in 1960, all the ethnonyms figuring 
on the map have been given a numerical index in the contemporary version. Lamberton’s 
map is a sketch that he made up for himself, in which one can hardly distinguish ethnic 
groups from locales. An informed mind such as the one that translated the map  into 
statistics, would recognize five ethnic groups, from North to South: the Kirdis, the 
Foulbes, the Bamileke, the Bassa, and the Pahouin. An area that stretches from Douala, 
on the coast, to Foumban in the upper point of the North-West Region is distinctly 
designated as the Region of Bamileke settlement. The newly added section, “An African 
Multitude” provides correspondent numbers that illuminate what those land areas mean 
in size, and what  the population size of each ethnic group is. The Bamileke population of 
700,000 is second to none in size. Behind them, in diminishing order, come the Kirdis, 
the Foulbes, the Pahouin, with 500,000 each, and finally the Bassa with 200,000. Here 
we find an example of the transformation of his map into statistics in the second edition, 
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within three decades of the first. I will reserve my  exploration of ethnodemographics in 
Cameroon for Chapter 2, in which I will consider ongoing efforts to intellectually 
disentangle between culture and politics. It suffices, for now, to note that the 
reappearance of Lamberton’s article in 1993 was not a simple matter of reproduction. 
The same analysis is valid with the third title on Douala. It is hard to fathom where, if 
not on the map, the numbers came from. As the title says, the point of the section on 
Douala is to envision and emphasize the city as part of Bamileke settlement. 
The second title of the additional section of the contemporary version adds to the 
statistics that have been mentioned earlier. In addition to the 700,000 Bamileke in the 
French Cameroon, one should include, according this version, another 800,000 Bamileke 
in the British Cameroons. Let us keep in mind that  these statistics are supposed to have 
been in the March 1960 article, at a time when the British Cameroons were still a United 
Nations Trust to the British empire. Similarly, let us not feel driven to survey and 
compare the yearly reports of either French or British trusteeships to the United Nations. 
They  are irrelevant here. Even if the first version of Lamberton’s article does not provide 
statistics, the map gives substance to the possibility of envisioning the Greater Bamileke 
Region, on which Lamberton elaborated at the end of his essay. 
I have already evoked the concept of displacement or transfiguration before my 
exploration of Lamberton’s protean voice in the Cameroonian media today. The 
resurrection I want to put my finger on is not just a matter of technical production. The 
fundamental displacement is at the core of the means by  which the reader is left to locate 
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the speaking voice. The question is whether it is still Lamberton speaking in the 
reappearance of its articles over the past two decades. Obviously, we might be led to 
answer yes to this question. However, things are not so simple. I have already indicated 
that, contrary to the idea foregrounded by Sindjoun Pokam and his peers behind the 
publication of the article in 1993, Lamberton was not making a direct ethnic claim as 
such. One could theoretically conceive of a French ethnic claim made in order to 
maintain a hold over the newly independent Cameroon, but this claim would be an anti-
Bamileke claim made by a non-Bamileke. Here we should ask: What does it  mean for 
the Bamileke intellectual to appropriate an anti-Bamileke text  and publish it in its 
supposed original form? Is it  because he or she believes that the voice of Jean Lamberton 
still has some authority over the course of political events in Cameroon? If so, a series of 
other questions may ensue. Is it  a means for the Bamileke to remind the current French 
government of the accusations of one its former military officer in its former colonial 
territory, and probably speculate on the specter of French government in the current 
government of Cameroon? Is it, on the contrary, an instrument with which to nativize 
Jean Lamberton as a non-Bamileke Cameroonian, and to bring him thus to the belated 
tribunal of ethnic accusations in Cameroon? Is it instead the convocation of a somewhat 
neutral historiographer or ethnologist by whose lenses the current predicament of 
ethnicity in Cameroon should be assessed? We may  extend indefinitely our questions. 
An interpretation on behalf of Mono Ndjana can even be contrived. Why would the most 
quoted part of the text, which seems to magnify the Bamileke–in comparison to other 
ethnic groups–and contradict the idea of minority  in the original version, be placed 
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there? Is it  a perverted artifice that turns Jean Lamberton into a kind of schizophrenic, 
and by  means of which he is attributed an authority  on the racial superiority of the 
Bamileke? 
Whereas, with the idea of appropriation, I am trying to make a general statement 
on the current valuations of ethnographic materials accumulated over more than half a 
century, and circulating in popular culture, my  intention is not to consider the position of 
the Bamileke articulated in the reappearance of Lamberton as an unquestionable basis 
for self-identification, even when this identification was self-evident to a scholar like 
Sindjoun Pokam. On the contrary, I would be unfaithful to my Lacanian precept, 
according to which subjectivity is not reducible to its articulation in language, if I were 
to locate in the symptomatic return of Lamberton the desire of a Bamileke, 
incontrovertibly and irreversibly assimilable to the desire of an individual, be it  Sindjoun 
Pokam, or other scholars who would, after him, find the courage to identify  with this 
particular Bamileke, and would want to speak for the general Bamileke. 
Moreover, it  is precisely because the Bamileke subject is articulated 
symptomatically in certain circumstances and even taken up by others, beyond the 
Collectif C3, that it should be formalized at some other point than that of the desire of an 
individual closed in his perceptions and representations. Indeed it was from such a 
vantage point  that the story I was told by Etienne Sonkin struck my imagination. From 
whence did all those ideas on African witchcraft, reality, myths, and culture, so 
esthetically  articulated by Sonkin, originate? I asked myself. What was the subject 
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articulated in the story and what was the subject that articulated it? How was I to locate 
myself in it? Did Sonkin find in the birth of The Road to Chiefdoms such a successful 
venture that he could prescribe it to others like me, and by  which I could be led see 
myself as an African? Was he thus guiding me into the art of selling things African, as 
indicated by his later observation regarding the inability of the Cameroonian government 
to “sell” its culture? For a moment, I pictured myself in the shoes of a Claude Lévi-
Strauss (1958) or a Roland Barthes (1957), perplexed by the maxim that myth be the 
meaning, and not entail a meaning. It was to no avail.
Sonkin’s accounts of the travel of Bamileke chiefs to Europe in 2009 imposed 
itself on my imagination such that it became a signal, a warning of some sort. It was 
likely a signpost that I, myself, might have unwittingly erected by  the mere expectations 
I had put in Sonkin’s appraisal of the meaning of The Road to Chiefdoms as a cultural 
program with national significance in Cameroon. Yet it was to work not from within the 
conversation itself, but by virtue of my attempt to use it for another purpose: translating 
it from French to English and exposing it in this chapter on the meanings of Lamberton’s 
shadow in Cameroonian speculative ethnography. I am aware that I have not fully 
presented what should be scrutinized behind my notion of an articulate demand in the 
reemergence of Lamberton’s article. The said demand could be seen retrospectively as 
the specter behind the drafting of the original text. Dieudonné Zognong, who also relies 
on the contemporary version, sees in it what might be more appropriate to be called “the 
Bamileke question.” Even if, in his article “The Bamileke Question at the Inception of 
Democracy in Cameroon” he does not expressly distinguish between “the Bamileke 
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problem” from “the Bamileke question,” the two expressions appear clearly in his article 
and deserve separate consideration. The Bamileke question, in his opinion, and to which 
I adhere, is a Cameroonian political question not the question regarding the Bamileke, be 
it formalized by either Lamberton or Mono Ndjana. By this, he means that the 
predicament of a Bamileke problem in Cameroon is the predicament of democracy in the 
country. Against Zognong, who does not treat the Bamileke question and the Bamileke 
problem separately, I would like to argue that the Bamileke subject at stake in the 
reappearance of Lamberton’s paper is not  to be equated with the intellectual project in 
the background of its symptomatic and sporadic emergence in public discussions. 
The Bamileke subject at  stake in the reappearance of Lamberton is none other than 
the divided political subject of contemporary Cameroon, unable to stand imperturbable 
in the face of inconsistencies revealed by  its effort to self-identify in the image of 
congruous and multiple ethnic groups. More specifically the subject confronts an 
alluring yet threatening autochthony. I hasten to emphasize that, even though the said 
political subject may find incarnation in the acts and speeches of an individual, it is not 
reducible to an individual. If that individual happens to be a self-acknowledged 
Bamileke for instance, it does not follow automatically that he or she holds the key to 
understanding what it means to be a Bamileke in general, nor why it is the case that the 
Bamileke, among so many other ethnic groups, is the bearer of that political subjectivity 
in the most radical way. Consequently, I would not generalize the notion, like Zognong 
does, that “Bamileke intellectuals,” taking account of ethnic claims in the early 1990s, 
“would demand the actual detribalization of Cameroonian citizenship, i.e. that references 
88
to ‘race’ and ‘province of origin’ be banned from birth and other civil status certificates, 
the suppression of policies of quotas and regional equilibrium intended to equalize from 
the top down and drive the Bamileke into the shadows of the protection of minorities, all 
things contrary to the spirit of republican citizenship.” (Zognong, 2002) 
Generalization is not the only issue with Zognong’s statement. There are too many 
issues condensed in this single sentence for them all to be taken singlehandedly. The 
mention of ‘race’ for instance is not a feature of my Cameroonian birth certificate, or 
none that I am accustomed to. Moreover it  is presumptuous to attribute the desirability of 
all of the demands stated in his article to a notional Bamileke. We should recall the 
relatively distant observation made by  Emmanuel Ghomsi, the Bamileke historian 
(Bisseck, 2010, introduction), and Antoine Socpa, an anthropologist (2003), on the fear 
aroused by the manifest extension of Bamileke ‘tribal’ organizations, beyond the 
presumed territorial borders of Bamileke chieftaincies. In the coming chapters, I will 
critically  examine the question of ethnic statistics and territorial identification beyond 
the indication that I gave above about national identification. An introduction to the so-
called rituals of belonging and the drive towards separating culture from politics will 
also clarify those demands. Each is the subject of a different chapter. The warning of 
Sonkin’s tale nonetheless is to highlight the literary  environment in which these issues 
have been driven for discussion, in the absence of another that would bind them to 
deliberation, as well as to remind me that original sin makes no room for innocence.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROAD TO CHIEFDOMS
I can still vividly picture Dubois Gnigagne’s uncontrollable laughter that evening 
of March 7, 2011 as we prepared to leave Bafoussam and head back to Dschang. He 
must have been terribly amused by  an observation made by a voice in the crowd of 
home-goers returning from the Nyang Nyang cultural festival of the chieftaincy of 
Bafoussam. “Is there anything in this world that the Bamileke can’t use to make money? 
Look at this! They even made up an organization that specializes in repairing defunct 
roads to chiefdoms to garner funding from the European Union!” Dubois’s laughter 
stood in stark contrast with his mood moments earlier when the car would not start, and 
we, the other occupants, had to push it backward on the slope where it had been parked. 
He was so irrepressibly amused that we laughed after him. The immediate display  of 
ignorance that we, contrary to the rest of the crowd, could have assumed behind the 
observation did not prevent us. Nonetheless, this observation significantly altered the 
background noise that seemed to have been echoing another, already fading voice that 
had shouted: “Shame on you European Union! You can’t even provide a reliable 
vehicle!” The conclusive statement of our practical philosopher on the other hand, or our 
street ethnologist, if I may call him so, was the result of an elaborate interpretation of the 
peculiar signs that could be read on the car Dubois had been trying to start. 
The cause of Dubois’s laughter was not  the stereotypical image of the Bamileke 
as the “African Jew” or their association with money, so stereotypical in contemporary 
Cameroonian street culture–another façade of speculative ethnography. I have indicated 
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in the previous chapter that its origins are inseparable from the literary tradition that  has 
been called “the Bamileke exceptionalism” and dates back to early colonists’ accusations 
of the early European plantations’s workers on the coast. Most Bamileke gradually 
moved away from plantations and turned into traders of their own. It is not uncommon 
for such comments to be made even by Bamileke about the behavior of non-Bamileke or 
other Bamileke; a state of affair which can tell us a lot about the vulgarity  and the 
currency of Bamileke accusations in Cameroon. Dubois’s amazement was, after all, the 
result of peculiar inferences that the voice from the crowd had made by interpreting the 
signs on The Road to Chiefdoms’s car. A special meaning was attributed to the name The 
Road to Chiefdoms, written in French on the car. 
The casual semiotician from the crowd could not have reached that conclusion 
had he not linked the name to the most familiar and legible sign that was the flag of the 
European Union, and that could be seen painted on the blue pickup truck, no matter how 
less flamboyant the flag was, compared to the logo of The Road to Chiefdoms. Not 
unlike many in the crowd, the semiotician read the name li terally. 
“Chefferie” (Chiefdom) was not understood as an institution. Had it been the case, we 
might be led to think of either chieftaincy or chieftainship  as the most appropriate 
translation. Instead, it was thought of as a locale, the traditional compound of the chief, 
with roads leading there. Nevertheless, this is not an unusual interpretation. It even made 
me feel more comfortable later in my translation of La Route des Chefferies into The 
Road to Chiefdoms. The idea of chieftainship as an institution is scarcely  the subject of 
everyday conversation. Moreover, asking for la chefferie, in common parlance, amounts 
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to asking for the traditional compound wherein the chief and his entourage dwell. While 
chiefdom might imply the territorial boundaries or foundation of the chieftaincy, this is 
no longer the case in either the Francophone or Anglophone Grassland, where, as stated 
in the first chapter, I spend one month while working at the Royal Museum of Mankon, 
Bamenda in June 2005, and where chieftaincies are far more crucial in everyday  life than 
in other regions of Cameroon. The order is now the other way round. Chiefdom is the 
palace, and chieftaincy  is the territory  of the chief. Additionally, the semiotician did not 
have to look further to assume that  The Road to Chiefdoms was a Bamileke initiative 
since we were at Bafoussam, the main city nowadays in the West Region.
The street semiotician’s imagination sparkled more brightly  when he assumed 
that The Road to Chiefdoms was funded by  the European Union. This statement would 
prove true to some extent, even for those of us who knew that The Road to Chiefdoms 
had nothing to do with roads. Moreover, he who might have had the luxury to drop by 
The Museum of Civilization in Dschang would have read the colophon in its great hall, 
and learned that the panel of financial support was larger than the European Union alone. 
The fact that the semiotician’s deduction came so easily is telling. It tells the popularity 
of programs funded by the European Union since the 1990s, and the mode of appearance 
that this institution has privileged with an image of its flag or the clear inscription of its 
name on every  project of multilateral cooperation with the country. This is in stark 
contrast with the pre-democracy period, when such visibility was engaged only by the 
State of Cameroon. Nowadays, from roads to classrooms, from water-wells to cars, 
signage reminds us of the authority  of the European Union. Thanks to the guidance of 
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the voice from the crowd, the same signage can be said to have paved the way to a 
pattern of feeling the presence of the European Union, and making sense of the nature of 
programs such as The Road to Chiefdoms. 
No matter how inchoate or premature our street semiotician’s interpretation 
appears, it does open onto crucial questions on The Road to Chiefdoms. We can ask 
ourselves: What then is The Road to Chiefdoms, if not the collection of roads that lead to 
chiefdoms? Why would the program so called not reflect the creative imagination of the 
Bamileke and even actualize the proverbial Bamileke “penchant for lucre?” I do not 
refer here to popular imagination only, but also to my own complicated curiosity  in 
linking the museum project of The Road to Chiefdoms to the National Museum project 
of Yaoundé. Indeed, looking at things the way the so-named street semiotician does, one 
could ask: What the signs are by which I have come both to this curiosity  and to my 
ultimate understanding of the The Road to Chiefdoms? It might have become obvious 
from this anecdote, with which I started this chapter, that I was on the side of The Road 
to Chiefdoms; or at least, I was one of the occupants of the “European Union’s car,” 
which had been to Bafoussam, approximately 50 miles from Dschang, for the Nyang 
Nyang festival that  Monday. One would thus expect  me in some ways to present, or even 
represent The Road to Chiefdoms in a rather more accurate way. I hasten to state that 
such expectations would be unmet if one were to read in the voice from the crowd the 
sole declaration of ignorance, instead of a clearly  articulate inquiry  of its own. It is 
equally from such a perspective that I consider the four months that I spent in Dschang 
participating in the daily  activities of The Museum of Civilizations, the main project thus 
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far of The Road to Chiefdoms. My current rendition of the ways in which we might read 
the program is not to be considered otherwise as well.
From February to May 2011, I stayed in Dschang to get  acquainted with the 
Museum of Civilizations and research the genesis and the activities of The Road to 
Chiefdoms. My ambitions were neither small nor easy  to achieve. From the start, it 
seemed to me that I had put the Nantes-Dschang cooperation program in corner. I forced 
it into a field of irritating controversies. Had it not been the case, I would not have cared 
to insist on the uncanny character of the Bamileke in the Cameroonian speculative 
ethnography, the challenges that autochthony pose to the formalization of issues of 
culture and politics, and the somewhat quirky  cognitive mapping that informs everyday 
self-perception and self-presentation; each of which is subject  of one of the preceding 
chapters. My ambitions were somewhat beyond common sense, because I seemed to be 
the only  person throughout the four months to envision some connection between the 
National Museum of Yaoundé and the Museum of Civilizations of The Road to 
Chiefdoms in Dschang. It does not  follow necessarily that such connections do not exist 
and that they are not known in Dschang by  anyone else. I have stated from the start, with 
Francesco Pompeo’s paradoxes, that I had made it mine to assess whether the museum of 
The Road to Chiefdoms could correspond to Madeleine Ndobo’s notion of a regional 
museum with more acceptable ethnographic contours: a state of affair that appeared to 
have failed in the National Museum of Yaoundé.
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The peculiarity of linking the Museum of Civilizations to the stalemate of 
national representation–the issue at the heart of the National Museum project of 
Yaoundé–lies in making certain inferences that would hardly escape the rationale of our 
previous street semiotician’s interpretation of the signs on the pickup of The Road to 
Chiefdoms. I have indicated the four theoretical landscapes introduced by Pompeo. They 
could provide such signs as the signs on the car, and I came to make a general statement 
on ethnic territorialization. They  are ethnography, tribal homeland, political competition, 
and political legitimacy. The relatively greater frequency of ethnographic objects from 
the Grassland in Cameroon–from the perspective of the Nantes-Dschang cooperation–
made it a center of interest for the study  of African art and material culture and the 
primary focus of heritage conservation in the country. Following Paul Biya’s decision to 
turn the former presidential palace into a cradle of Cameroonian culture that would be 
exhibited synthetically, Germain Loumpet, the director of the Commission, himself a 
Bamoun, had made the suggestion, among many others, that “the treasures housed in 
chiefly compounds in the Grassland be considered national heritage artifacts” (Loumpet, 
1999). Even though I would discover later that the land ordinances of 1974 had made of 
chiefly compounds and their furniture a public property, Loumpet had just expressed a 
personal desire and later formalized it in his article. It was not until I had a conversation 
with Germain Loumpet on December 21, 2012, that I ascertained that no formal measure 
was taken by the government to ensure the desired status. The reason for this reluctance–
Loumpet supported Pompeo–was not the Commission’s suggestion on purchasing 
chiefly treasures from the Grassland for the future national museum, but the fear that the 
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museum would be crowded with artifacts predominantly collected from the Grassland. I 
would not exaggerate the weight of this outcome on the government decision since, in 
my opinion, the ambiguous character of ethnographic objects reaches far back, beyond 
the stalemate of national representation at the National Museum of Yaoundé. I would 
even hypothesize that the roots of said stalemate be sought in the return of the Afo-A-
Kom from New York in 1973 (Nkwi, 1975). This event set a precedent for the 
controversy  over the impossibility of a bridge between tribal adjudication and national 
appropriation in post-independence Cameroon. Again, by the term impossibility I do not 
mean that it is not  feasible. It simply  means that they are better kept separate unless one 
is ready to embrace all the entailments of their fusion. I leave the exploration of this 
impossibility to the question of belonging, the subject of the next chapter.
In Dschang, my goal then was to assess whether The Road to Chiefdoms, which I 
first heard of in 2006 from Flaubert Taboue Nouaye, the current director of the Museum 
of Civilizations, then director of the Community Museum of Bandjoun, had made it its 
own mission to accomplish the ethnographic exhibition, which had failed in Yaoundé, by 
means of its own museum project. There is no linear connection between the National 
Museum of Yaoundé, the community museums established by  the Centro Orientamento 
Educativo (see Chapter 1), and the Museum of Civilizations. The first  two categories of 
museum were the product of long established institutions, while The Road to Chiefdoms 
did not clearly exist, as we might think of it  today, independently from the project of 
municipal cooperation between the city  of Dschang in Cameroon and the city of Nantes 
in France. Indeed, at the moment I was preparing to travel to Cameroon from New York 
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to look into the Museum of Civilizations, I did not  separate The Road to Chiefdoms 
from the program of cooperation between Nantes and Dschang. This was a crucial 
interest behind my later conversation with Etienne Sonkin. The municipal character of 
the program’s initial contour was quintessential for my  project (see Chapter 3). Even at 
the current level of the program’s achievement, separating the Nantes-Dschang 
cooperation from The Road to Chiefdoms is a tricky and risky business, as much as is 
imprudent to see in The Road to Chiefdoms the mere continuity  of Nantes-Dschang 
collaboration. Alain Foka, the renowned journalist, said the following recently in the 
opening presentation of his conversation with Sylvain Djache Nzefa, the coordinator of 
The Road to Chiefdoms on the waves of Radio France International:
“For him to feel how comprehensive, real, and tangible success can 
be, he had to build it, to actualize it, to create a place that tells of the 
history of his country, and equally highlights his culture in its diversity. 
He wanted a place to house the chiefdoms and rites that  gave a rhythm to 
his life, a space that would state his identity, and that of his compatriots. 
It’s done, and not casually. At the heart of Dschang, a little more than 250 
kilometers from Yaoundé, the capital city of Cameroon, he built  a 
museum; where, with international techniques, he makes it possible to 
thoroughly  visit his country, its history, its cultures, its culinary art and its 
lyricism. That’s the Museum of Civilizations. The Road to Chiefdoms, an 
audacious challenge that he initiated by  himself alone, in a narrow-
minded environment, and by means of convincing a few personalities of 
the need for the protection of the national heritage. He can now return to 
his business, his other passion: architecture. At AUGEA, his company, he 
draws, conceives, and builds houses; as much as he designs cities, and 
new urban centers, by paying special attention to sustainable 
development. All things thanks to which African local communities call 
upon him; notwithstanding the fact that he still lives in Nantes, France. 
However, his heart has clearly already returned to Africa.” (Radio France 
International, June 30, 2012)
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“Pour que le succès soit plus complet, plus réel, plus palpable pour 
lui, il fallait qu’il le construise, qu’il le réalise, qu’il aménage un lieu qui 
raconte à la fois l’histoire de son pays, mais qui met également en 
perspective sa culture dans toute sa diversité. Il fallait un lieu qui abrite 
les chefferies et les rites qui ont rythmé sa vie, un cadre qui constitue son 
identité et celle de ses compatriotes. C’est fait, et pas n’importe comment. 
Il a construit, à Dschang à plus de 250 kilomètres de la capitale 
camerounaise Yaoundé, un musée où, avec des techniques 
internationales, il permet de visiter son pays de part en part, dans son 
histoire, dans ses cultures, dans son art culinaire et lyrique. C’est le 
musée des civilisations, La Route des chefferies, un pari audacieux qu’il a 
entrepris tout seul dans un environnement pas très ouvert, en 
convertissant au passage quelques personnalités à la conservation du 
patrimoine national. Maintenant, il peut retourner à métier, à son autre 
passion, l’architecture; puisque, avec son entreprise AUGEA, il dessine, 
concoit et construit des bâtiments, mais également conçoit des villes, des 
nouveaux centres urbains, en mettant un accent particulier sur le 
développement durable. Ce qui lui vaut d’être sollicité par quelques 
communautés locales africaines bien qu’il soit toujours installé à Nantes 
en France. Mais, son coeur est visiblement déjà retourné en Afrique !”
The panegyric Radio France International delivered to introduce Sylvain D. 
Nzefa on June 30, 2012 should not  distract us from our attempt to disentangle this 
program from the Nantes-Dschang initiative. Nevertheless, let’s first explore the 
contours of Alain Foka’s comments. On its own, RFI’s presentation of The Road to 
Chiefdoms lays the ground for a different story behind the entire program. It  is a story 
that remained out of my reach throughout my field research, even though it was one that 
I had anticipated before embarking on my project of bringing the Museum of 
Civilizations of Dschang into symmetry  with the National Museum of Yaoundé. 
Madeleine Ndobo’s idea for an ethnic regional museum was not the only stimulus behind 
my curiosity. Through personal acquaintance with the default permanent exhibition of 
the National Museum of Yaoundé–before it  closed down in mid-year 2008–I became 
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familiar with the exhibition room designed in 2001 at the occasion of the France-Africa 
Summit. Four ethno-regional booths had been set up. I also could legibly read on the 
presentation panel that Sylvain Nzefa was one of its designers. I would realize later 
when I stayed in Dschang that a couple of the exhibition panels initially designed for the 
National Museum of Yaoundé by  Nzefa could be seen inside the Museum of 
Civilizations. Additionally, when I read a draft  of this museum project in 2006, when I 
was studying the Community Museum of Bandjoun, it occurred to me that there had 
been a kind of general dissatisfaction with the outcome of the initial National Museum 
project of Yaoundé.
The genesis of the Museum of Civilizations can be legitimately read through 
Alain Foka’s rendition. No one today  in Cameroon can argue that the program could 
have come to life without the personal efforts of Sylvain Nzefa. Moreover, the success of 
the Museum of Civilizations has reached such an extent that  it has made the return of the 
initial design of the National Museum of Yaoundé nearly  irrelevant, unless the National 
Museum of Yaoundé is driven to become a replica of the more recent Museum of 
Civilizations. The subject of the actual relationship  between the the Museum of 
Civilizations and the National Museum has become a kind of taboo, and is reflected in 
the relative success of The Road to Chiefdoms in working under the tutelage of the 
Ministry of Tourism rather than the Ministry of Culture, which has remained practically 
silent about the rise of the Museum of Civilizations in the West Region. It is surmising, 
however, to assume that this relationship is only shaped by The Road to Chiefdoms’s 
defiance toward the ethnic disparities and imbalances it could display with its museum. 
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The idea of a permanent exhibition at the Museum of Civilizations that would 
encompass the cultures of Cameroon, in the manner of a “cultural synthesis” only came 
at a far later stage in the development of Nantes-Dschang collaboration program. It  can 
be argued that it was a measure that placated the likely and handicapping interpretation 
of The Road to Chiefdoms as a purely Bamileke initiative. Moreover, independently of 
the fear of imbalances, the National Museum of Yaoundé, according to Irène Ottou, its 
former steward, had its own misadventures. Mrs Ottou did not deny, however, the fact 
that the relationship  between the Ministry of Culture and The Road to Chiefdoms, which 
she personally described as ‘complicated,’ was motivated by those early concerns over 
national representation in the National Museum of Yaoundé. Nevertheless, the initial 
idea of The Road to Chiefdoms, which itself only  began in 2004, was literally  to create a 
center for the interpretation of the cultures of the highlands of the West Region. This 
idea, however, was originally secondary  to the immediate to develop the municipal 
artificial lake of Dschang and its surroundings as a tourist  destination, the only project 
that unite Dschang and Nantes. These hesitant early steps also suggest that the history of 
The Road to Chiefdoms can be written from Sylvain Nzefa’s personal perspective 
regarding Bamileke chieftaincies.
Retrospectively, one might conclude that the Nantes-Dschang collaboration was 
developed as an instrument for establishing a center such as The Road to Chiefdoms, 
with tentacles extending beyond the municipality of Dschang. In which case, the master 
concept would lie behind Sylvain Nzefa’s story as retold to Alain Foka, that day on RFI. 
In it he describes his passion for the architecture of the chiefly compounds in his native 
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Grassland, and his dedication to their formalization in the early 1990s. This one aspect 
of the Nantes-Dschang collaboration is noteworthy, since a visual inroad into the 
Museum of Civilizations today would take into account its permanent exhibitions, 
modeled after the former permanent exhibition of the National Museum of Yaoundé. 
More importantly it would consider the specific configuration of the section dedicated to 
the Grassland. This section was greatly informed by Nzefa’s 1994 book Les chefferies 
traditionnelles de l’ouest dans l’enfer du modernisme (The Traditional Chieftaincies Of 
The West  in Modernist  Hell), itself based on his thesis on the architecture of chiefdoms 
in West Cameroon. The name The Road to Chiefdoms thus reminds of this early  work. 
Furthermore the very architecture of the Museum of Civilizations follows the pattern of 
designs found in Nzefa’s book. Therefore, it can be said that AUGEA, the French 
company that Nzefa created with his associate Alain Melat in Nantes–which was 
involved in other urban planning projects in Cameroon well before the birth of The Road 
to Chiefdoms–found in the Museum of Civilizations the very  materialization of Nzefa’s 
study of Grassland architecture.
Therefore, from the perspective of Sylvain Nzefa’s desire “to create a place that 
tells of the history of his country,” a linear story of La Route des Chefferie can be written 
which would take him as the personification of Nantes-Dschang collaboration. It would 
thus take into account his participation as one of the designer-architects of the national 
museum project, his efforts to transcend the “narrow-minded environment” evoked in 
Foka’s story, and his gradual strategy to “convince” businessmen, mayors, chiefs, 
museum professionals, scholars, ministers, and so on, to the broad campaign that 
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culminated in the creation of the Association of the Museum of Civilizations’ Friends 
(Association des Amis du Musée des Civilisations) in 2007. This association was 
ultimately  create to raise funds inside Cameroon. Currently, it oversees the activities of 
the Museum of Civilizations. The narrow-minded environment mentioned would thus 
refer to both speculative ethnography  and its institutional undercurrent that is ethnic 
territorialization. On the various occasions he came on mission to Dschang in 2011, 
Nzefa avoided to comment on this environment. Of course, I could only agree to the 
necessity for him to leave the interpretation of his initiative in the shadow of the more 
demanding position of being at the center of a hub which brings together the 
municipality  of Dschang, forty chieftaincies of the West Region, the Cameroonian 
Ministry of Tourism, the municipality  of Nantes, the French government, and the 
European Union. This hub holds together thanks to a French association, known as the 
APLC (Association Pays de la Loire-Cameroun) and created well before the Association 
des Amis du Musée des Civilisations. The APLC is an association of Cameroonians 
living in France, more specifically in the region of Nantes. Not only had I already sensed 
in my early correspondences with him that my attempt at linking the program in 
Dschang to the National Museum project would be a dead end, bu I also felt that my 
complete association with The Road to Chiefdoms at  the time of field research would 
jeopardize the scrutiny that foregrounded my early curiosity.
Therefore, to the likely disappointment of our street semiotician, I would not be 
able to represent The Road to Chiefdoms, notwithstanding the fact that I was one of the 
occupants of the European Union’s car. My position in Dschang was somewhat in the 
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middle of being an independent investigator and an initiated person. Thanks to Flaubert 
Taboue Nouaye, with whom I had prior experience doing field work in Bandjoun, I had 
settled for a middle ground between working either as an insider or an outsider. The 
dilemma was once stated by Nzefa. I had been kindly  offered to access the 
infrastructures of The Road to Chiefdoms as an intern. However, considering the 
limitations of this position, I settled for hiring a work station on the rooftop of the 
Museum of Civilizations. Nevertheless, I agreed to contribute my services as an amateur 
photographer. It was as one of the photographers of the Museum of Civilizations that I 
accompanied the team to Bafoussam. I did so on most of the outings of The Road to 
Chiefdoms. Those outings were frequent  and would bring into focus the regional scope 
of the program. 
Apart from the Museum of Civilizations, itself located on the banks of the 
municipal lake of the city of Dschang, The Road to Chiefdoms has ventured into 
assisting the chieftaincies that signed a partnership with the program, in consolidating 
their own exhibition rooms. A heritage house (case patrimoniale) was to be established 
in each chieftaincy  and serve as a satellite of the Museum of Civilizations. It was for 
instance the case of the former Bandjoun community museum which became the 
Bandjoun heritage house. At the time I left Dschang, four heritage houses were 
completed. Beside Bandjoun, which was the only one to have had a previous exhibition 
room, we have to count the Bamendjida, Bamendjou, and Bangoua chieftaincies. Similar 
efforts have been made to equally incorporate the nearby Bamoun sultanate, a non-
Bamileke chieftaincy. None of those heritage houses are however located in the 
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municipality  of Dschang. If this arrangement appears to open the scope of the The Road 
to Chiefdoms beyond the two cities (Dschang and Nantes) that have been primarily 
brought into symmetry, it is worth considering how to locate this program, not from the 
vantage point of Sylvain Nzefa, but from the perspective of this initial goal that 
provoked the series of questions I raised, regarding the Nantes-Dschang cooperation 
initiative as a response of the Bamileke to the stalemate of national representation in 
Cameroon.
Locating The Road to Chiefdoms institutionally is a matter of negotiating a 
complex labyrinth of national and municipal agencies and institutions, international 
organizations, and diverse associations. As stated, the Association Pays de La Loire-
Cameroun (APLC) and the Association des Amis du Musée des Civilisations (2AMC) 
were created in France and Cameroon respectively for the expressed purpose of raising 
money. Even though they are the most important associations that today appear in 
conversations such as the one between Alain Foka and Sylvain Nzefa, it would be a 
tremendous task to write a history  of the various associations that were either created or 
mobilized along the road of the Nantes-Dschang collaboration agreement since its 
official launch in 1998, with the creation of the Office du Tourisme de Dschang. I did not 
venture into this matter. I focused mainly on those associations that were still active at 
the time of my field work. According to the director of the Museum of Civilizations, 
many associations had indeed been put in place to acquire the upper banks of the lake on 
behalf of the municipality  of Dschang, and to later launch the various activities of La 
Routes des Chefferies. In addition to those associations I have already  mentioned, one 
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should take into account the involvement of two other French associations, Les 
Volontaires du Progrès and Les Anneaux de La Mémoires, and the Cameroonian 
Assemblée des chefs traditionnels de l’Ouest (West Region Assembly of Traditional 
Chiefs), which owed its rebirth in 2009 to The Road to Chiefdoms. Indeed, in addition to 
funding the development of the Museum of Civilisations the European Union financed 
the construction of the West Region Assembly  of Traditional Chiefs headquarters in 
Bafoussam. At the center of the labyrinth were Dschang and Nantes. Thanks to these two 
cities, the French Ministry  of Culture and the Cameroonian Ministry  of Tourism 
intervened. Yet the most visible entity was the European Union, without which the 
Museum of Civilizations would not  have been completed. The labyrinth would only 
become more complicated if we were to cite all the secondary institutions, businesses, 
and individuals that have been involved after being deployed by the APLC and the 
2AMC. The object of the Nantes-Dschang cooperation agreement until the official 
launch of The Road to Chiefdoms in 2008 was not limited to turning the municipal lake 
into a tourist destination. The two cities were working on other issues such as road 
improvement, water access, and waste disposal. It  can be said that the rise of The Road 
to Chiefdoms with initial financial support from the European Union was done at the 
expense of the early Nantes-Dschang collaboration initiative, which had much broader 
and immediate relevance for the city of Dschang. Besides, I already mentioned the 
impact the mayoral succession had on the course of this cooperation. 
The juridical status of The Road to Chiefdoms is not the least difficult to canvass. 
Most of the agreements regarding the The Road to Chiefdoms in Nantes are tripartite. In 
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addition to the two cities, which signed the pact of friendship  and cooperation in 2003 
(Pacte d’amitié et de coopération), the APLC is the only association with direct 
involvement in the agreements as the third party. This association was created by the 
Cameroonian diaspora, including Sylvain Nzefa, in Le Pays de la Loire, one of the 27 
regions of the state of France. Nantes is the main city of that region. The association is 
not just a passive third party, but  the direct beneficiary  of those agreements. One can 
thus understand the centrality  of its current position at The Road to Chiefdoms in 
Cameroon. Of course, grounding The Road to Chiefdoms in French legislation and 
giving it French legal personality  was crucial to securing funding from the European 
Union. Nonetheless, seen from this perspective, one cannot easily  think of The Road to 
Chiefdoms as a municipal organization or a regional organization institutionally 
grounded in Cameroon. At the same time, efforts to disentangle the program from the 
municipality  of Dschang to the benefit of Grassland chieftaincies–as the course of events 
seemed to have been leading since 2010–highlight the fact that The Road to Chiefdoms 
cannot do away  with its municipal foundation without jeopardizing its own basis. Beside 
chieftaincies, the Association des Amis du Musée des Civilisations, which has seen the 
tremendous participation of high ranking government officials from the West  Region, 
has given support  to the program’s efforts to gradually move away from the municipality 
of Dschang, despite the city’s efforts to control the course of The Road to Chiefdoms.
Until the launch of its second phase in September 2012, The Road to Chiefdoms 
was only a component of Nantes-Dschang collaboration agreement, beside urban 
planning and development. It was known at the municipality of Nantes as the cultural 
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and touristic component of the agreement with the city  of Dschang. The preliminary 
project of The Road to Chiefdoms comprised the Museum of Civilizations, the Garden 
of Civilizations, the support to heritage houses in chiefly compounds, and the Office du 
Tourisme de Dschang. The heritage houses are located throughout the West Region. The 
other components of The Road to Chiefdoms are all in Dschang. Like the Museum of 
Civilizations, the Garden of Civilizations was supposed to have been developed on the 
other shore of the municipal lake. Unlike the museum however, the garden has never 
been completed. As for the heritage houses, two more have been opened since my return 
from Cameroon in 2012. All six heritage houses were built in the chiefly  compound of 
their respective chieftaincies, and are curated by professionals trained by The Road to 
Chiefdoms. They have become the satellites of the program and they are relatively 
independent from the Museum of Civilizations in Dschang. Individual booths have been 
established in the Museum of Civilizations for the first  fifteen chieftaincies that signed 
an agreement of partnership  with The Road to Chiefdoms. Each of these chieftaincies 
may temporarily exhibit a piece of their own collections in the museum. Furthermore, as 
in the four museums established by the Centro Orientamento Educativo in the West and 
North-West Regions between 2001 and 2006, the pieces that make up  the collections of 
chieftaincies include not only valuable artifacts, no longer in use. The collections also 
include items used for festivals such as the Nyang Nyang. This tells us a great deal about 
the purpose of the heritage houses, as well as the issues behind the problematic transfer 
of those chiefly objects to the museum in question, including the National Museum of 
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Yaoundé and the Museum of Civilizations of Dschang. One is reminded the Afo-A-Kom 
incident.
The reality  of heritage houses has made of the Museum of Civilizations a 
somewhat unconventional institution, which holds valuable collections indefinitely. It is 
considered by The Road to Chiefdoms to be a “museum of prefiguration.” The Centro 
Orientamento Educativo opted for living museums for the sake of making those royal 
treasures available for ceremonies and festivals, and because of the near impossibility of 
distinguishing a newly crafted or repaired item from an ancient one. One must add that 
these objects are not always in the immediate reach of the Museum of Civilizations. The 
task of this museum therefore is to “prefigure” what could be found in chieftaincies; 
another way of deciphering the “Road to Chiefdoms.” Apart from the couple of items 
each chieftaincy lends to the “permanent exhibition” occasionally, the museum’s 
instruments of prefiguration are dominated by photographic panels, installations and 
video projections. Moreover, the chiefdoms and their objects do not appear to be the 
primary target of exhibition areas in the museum. The booths designed for each 
chieftaincy take all only one-fourth of second floor of the museum. The remaining floor 
space is dedicated to the Grassland globally. On the lower floor, where offices are 
located, the exhibition area is divided in four sections. The first section delivers, by 
means of photography, a picturesque journey into the archaeology, colonial history, and 
contemporary  history of Cameroon, with a special attention to the transatlantic slave 
trade. The rest of the space is divided more or less equally between three other ethnic 
areas. While the Grassland can be found on the top floor, three other areas, presented as 
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the other ethnic divisions of Cameroon, are located on the lower floor. These are the 
forest area, the sahel, and the coastal area. The imbalance among the four areas, 
including the Grassland, has never been the subject of controversy  in Dschang to my 
knowledge. It goes without saying that, with such a premise, the Museum of 
Civilizations should not be included in the argument about national representation. Does 
Ndobo’s idea of ethno-regional museum hold here? Nevertheless, had our street 
semiotician had an idea of the initial conception of the National Museum of Yaoundé and 
discovered the Museum of Civilizations, he might have concluded that the latter is a 
Bamileke statement on the feasibility of that which could not be achieved in Yaoundé. 
Would his interpretation prove wrong? Not entirely. This interpretation is not so much 
different from Francesco Pompeo’s description of the paradoxes of national 
representation in Cameroon, even though it  proves to be an attempt to read the exhibition 
of Cameroonian cultures at the Museum of Civilizations retrospectively. So does Alain 
Foka in his assessment of the scope of The Road to Chiefdoms in the image of Sylvain 
D. Nzefa. Not only is the complex institutional background of this program lost, the very 
exhibition rationale that appears to literally take after the initial design of the National 
Museum of Yaoundé escapes scrutiny.
A critical inquiry  into the nature of ethnographic exhibition in The Road to 
Chiefdoms’s museum of prefiguration would include the rich and eclectic material that 
has been gathered to depict ethnicity  in Cameroon. Maps, ethnographic studies, musical 
instruments, statues, utensils, weapons, photographs, record books, canoes–whatever 
was donated to the program–found a place somewhere in the five exhibition spaces. 
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Again, it is impossible to know what is a museum artifact and what is a mere supporting 
material to illustrate the origins of museum artifacts. One can hardly distinguish antiques 
from recently crafted objects. The dominant theme that guides visitors is described in the 
culture-specific exhibits, as well as in the dense preliminary exhibit on Cameroon’s 
social and archaeological history. The world traveller would feel somehow as if those 
exhibits have been designed to remedy  the lack of information in an environment where 
archives and libraries is a luxury, or as if the blatant inflation in information had other 
intended effects independent from highlighting museum collections. Entire sections of 
ethnographic essays and history books have been pasted on many panels, which appear 
to completely cover the museum walls. The feeling is one being inside a picture book 
that has been divided into separate compartments. 
While visitors like Alain Foka are amazed to “discover” aspects of Cameroonian 
history that are broadly unknown to the general public, the very  significance of the 
demographic, sociological and historical data displayed remains obscured by  the latent 
suggestion that the material on display  “represents our culture and our history,” as one 
can read in the transcript of RFI’s broadcast above. I had multiple occasions to ponder 
visitors’ opinions on those exhibits. Most local visitors are only concerned with 
identifying something that would remind them of the place from which they come. This 
interest in the place of origins is informed by  the cognitive map of subjectification 
explored in Chapter 3. On the other hand, conversations with scholars such as Charles 
Dimi, Dean of the Faculty  of Human Sciences at nearby University of Dschang, assumed 
that the Museum of Civilizations was designed to stimulate popular imagination and 
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satisfy the desire of tourists for exoticism, more than to foster scholarly  research. Indeed, 
over the four months I spent in Dschang, I wondered what Jean-Pierre Warnier would 
think of the use of his thesis on precolonial history  to introduce contemporary Grassland. 
The second floor, which is dedicated to the Grassland, make use of entire sections of 
Echanges, développement et hiérarchies dans le Bamenda pré-colonial, his 1985 book 
on the old Mankon confederacy. Admittedly, familiarity  with ethnographic material on 
Cameroon is required to be able to unravel the many  voices and colors shouting in the 
museum. The reference of citations has not indicated systematically, apparently to avoid 
exhausting visitors. Consequently, one might feel that ethnographic literature has turned 
into living tradition. Etienne Sonkin’s tale of African witchcraft that I presented at the 
beginning of the third chapter is not an exception in the currency of traditionalized 
ethnographic studies in Cameroon.
I could not repress my curiosity  about the quasi-tradition of classifying the 
population of Cameroon according four ethno-regional groups, and then illustrating that 
classification with ethnographic material. Not only does it bring to bear the necessity  of 
articulating the present with the tricky cognitive map of identification discussed in the 
precedent chapter, but it also introduces an element of arbitrariness that I could not trace 
back beyond the National Museum project. Consequently, I asked Germain Loumpet 
about it at the end of my second and last conversation with him. He was taken aback 
when he learned from me that the four culture specific exhibits had been reproduced in 
Dschang. The appropriation of this exhibition scheme by The Road to Chiefdoms was 
not so much an issue in his view as the slightly  displaced idea that guided his own 
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conception of this approach when he was the director of the commission of the National 
Museum project. His idea, he insisted, was not exactly  to map out the country into 
cultural regions one finds in the Museum of Civilizations, but to avoid it by  all means. It 
was, he argued, to avoid letting “cultures” be read directly as “ethnic groups” and falling 
into the trap of willing to integrate the unofficially agreed number of more than 230 
ethnic groups identifiable in Cameroon’s colonial history. Since the National Museum 
project was meant to “synthesize the cultures of Cameroon,” he argued, one could make 
a macroscopic level synthesis focused on affinities between ethnic groups. For him as an 
archaeologist such affinities could be found both culturally and environmentally. 
Accordingly, the forest, the river, the savannah, and the mountains were taken as 
metaphors for four supra-ethnic groups to which everyone could identify, not for the 
sake of being member of an ethnic group  but for recognizing a familiar environment. In 
this way, he stated, behind the totemic idea of river, people who live around Lake Chad 
in the dry  and sunny Far-North Region will find affinities with people living in the 
humid and warm Littoral Region, on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. This might have 
been the idea behind the museography of the National Museum of Yaoundé, but the story 
is different at the Museum of Civilizations. The four regions depicted dissect the country 
in four. The Savannah People refers to the three northern regions, including the Far-
North. The Forest People refers to the three regions on the eastern side of the West 
Region. These are the Center, the South and the East  regions. The Coastal People bring 
together the Littoral and South-West Regions. The Grassland is made up of the West and 
North-West Regions. That such an arrangement might have been already  present in the 
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early conception of the National Museum of Yaoundé cannot however be discounted, at 
least if we are to turn back to the writings of Francesco Pompeo (see Chapter 1), 
especially since the Museum of Civilizations derived its permanent exhibition scheme 
from the National Museum 2001 exhibition design.
In September 2012, in the heart of Bafoussam, the main city of the West Region, 
The Road to Chiefdoms launched its second phase as a program of heritage conservation 
and cultural tourism. Unlike the earlier phase, whose focus was on the city of Dschang, 
the second phase broadens the scope of the program’s activities by investing in cultural 
tourism beyond the city. As far as heritage conservation is concerned, heritage houses 
would be gradually deemphasized, as the inventory of chiefly collections in the 
Grassland would gain emphasis. Considering that the incentive, for chieftaincies, of 
having a heritage house established in their chiefly compound might not come around so 
easily–given a requirement that each chieftaincy mobilizes its own funds for 
constructions–The Road to Chiefdoms has made it its own mission to request support 
from UNESCO, with the proviso that the royal treasures of the Grassland be turned into 
a World Heritage site. Thus, if we are to take into account Germain Loumpet’s desire, we 
would say that The Road to Chiefdoms is seeking the acknowledgement of the Grassland 
chiefly collections as a national heritage by the State of Cameroon by forcing the latter’s 
hand by means of an international organization. 
Apart from ethnographic collections, nonetheless, The Road to Chiefdoms has 
developed an institution that specializes in cultural tourism in the Grassland. It is the 
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Office Regional du Tourisme de l’Ouest Cameroun. The primary motivation behind this 
institution was the extension of The Road to Chiefdoms’s activities beyond the city of 
Dschang. The initial idea was to created The Road to Chiefdoms’s Office of Tourism 
with a scope broader than just the Grassland. The Road to Chiefdoms must have had to 
articulate this scope within the existing institutions and have been mapped onto the 
activities of West Region Assembly of Traditional Chiefs. Therefore, the birth of the new 
office of tourism inaugurated a clear distinction between the activities of the 
municipality  of Dschang through its Office du Tourisme and the activities of The Road to 
Chiefdoms. It can be said the latter helped establish the headquarters of the West Region 
Assembly of Traditional Chiefs in Bafoussam for this purpose. Nevertheless, an 
institutional readjustment has been made to clarify the overseeing position of The Road 
to Chiefdoms over both Dschang and other chieftaincies in the West Region. The 
activities of the Office Régional de Tourisme de l’Ouest Cameroun extend to the 
construction of guest houses in chiefly compounds.
A summary  of the complex background of The Road to Chiefdoms is sufficient 
to give us a first answer to the main question of this dissertation. I aimed at assessing 
whether this program could be considered as a response to the fear of an 
overrepresentation of the Grassland in Cameroon. Two trajectories are open to 
exploration. The first leads to an affirmative answer, and examines ethnic 
territorialization and ethnic identification in the heart of The Road to Chiefdoms’s 
museum project. Not only are Bamileke the major players in the program, to the 
satisfaction of our street semiotician, we have also seen that the nearly impossible in 
114
Yaoundé has become practically possible in Dschang, with the unquestionably 
prominent position of the Grassland in the Museum of Civilizations’s mise en scène of 
Cameroonian cultures. It is a matter of course that this asseveration is itself grounded on 
the cognitive map of ethnicity that  I dramatized in Chapter 3. The second trajectory, the 
negative one and one which, in my view the most important, has to follow the precarious 
institutional basis of The Road to Chiefdoms. In point of fact, whether this program 
owes its existence to the city  of Dschang, to the West Region Assembly of Traditional 
Chiefs, to the Association of the Museum of Civilizations’ Friends, or to their 
counterparts in France, the Association Pays de La Loire or the city of Nantes, is a tricky 
question. Accordingly, it is hard to say who, with The Road to Chiefdoms’ museum, 
offers a solution to the stalemate of national representation in Yaoundé. 
I was even leaning toward seeing the Museum of Civilizations as some sort of 
theoretical extension of the Quai Branly Museum because of the motto of “cultural 
dialogue” which The Road to Chiefdoms’ museum has taken for itself, with the 
supplementary  element, however unwarranted, that an emphasis was put, inside The 
Road to Chiefdoms, on the assumption that the Museum of Civilizations was some sort 
of native self-exhibition project. Moreover, the European Union, the major financial 
player in this venture, should not be discounted. From this vantage point, the relative 
success of The Road to Chiefdoms can be said to be due the gradual metamorphosis of 
Nantes-Dschang collaboration, and the capacity  of The Road to Chiefdoms, not to blur, 
but rewrite its traces at every step of its development. Accordingly, it would be 
unwarranted to read in The Road to Chiefdoms the sole trace of a Bamileke response to 
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issues of national representation in Cameroon. Nevertheless, either trajectories will 
prove insufficiently  explored if they  are not brought into confrontation with the other 
three ramifications of Pompeo’s paradoxes: tribal homelands, political competition and 
legitimacy. Accordingly these paradoxes would be left  in the shadow of the conditions 
that have made chieftaincies a central piece of this program, among as many national 
institutions as international ones. Not bringing in Pompeo would also leave undiscussed 
the relative indifference of the Cameroonian Ministry  of Culture to a program whose 
primary concern is cultural heritage. 
As a matter of fact, extending our street semiotician’s curiosity to the elaborate 
signifiers drawn from my own experience at The Road to Chiefdoms will require that we 
reconsider the ways in which the position of the Bamileke has become so problematic in 
Cameroon, such that  a chance outcry from the crowd could bring it up, as if by the trick 
of an inevitable hand in a game of cards. Accordingly, we will forget Dubois’s 
distracting laughter meanwhile, and focus on the cry itself, the story  it tells, the anxieties 
and aspirations it carries. Perhaps it was not, after all, the formulated desire to know, 
which I attributed to a street semiotician of sort, but a symptom on its own, the 
counterpart of the sporadic reappearance of Lamberton’s article in the Cameroonian 
media, one which we could locate at a position different from that of the Bamileke 
intellectual. What if, indeed, by experiment, we excluded the mere possibility  that the 
voice from the crowd could be a Bamileke voice, and we, against Pompeo, see in it  the 
desperate voice of the non-Bamileke who, in lieu of displaying hostility, might have 
found in the spectacle given by the pick-up an answer–probably out of his reach–to his 
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desire to be blessed by the fatherly figure of the European Union? Are we not  to fall 
back onto the inchoate demands that I introduced at the end of the previous chapter? My 
exploration of the activities of The Road to Chiefdoms was guided by various other 
concerns that were the immediate result of the three months I spent in Yaoundé, combing 
archival material on the administration of populations and chieftaincies, and engaging in 
multifaceted conversations with scholars at the University of Yaoundé and the Catholic 
University  of Central Africa, as well as with retired government officials and prominent 
scholars. 
Besides the treatment of ethnicity in museums and the Bamileke problem, which 
I hoped to disentangle from the Bamileke exceptionalism and the Bamileke question in 
Chapter 3, other concerns were ethnic regionalism, the protection of minorities and 
indigenous people, the development of cultural associations, and France-Cameroon 
decentralized cooperation. Each of these themes constituted a project on its own and 
they  could be presented separately  if I were to draw a historiography of The Road to 
Chiefdoms. Nevertheless, such a history  will only lead onto those hypothetical 
trajectories which are themselves the collective result  of my desire to see the controversy 
of national representation unfold behind the Museum of Civilizations. Against this 
inclination and to the benefit of my  attempt to formulate in terms of a question, both the 
Bamileke exceptionalism and the so-called Bamileke problem, I was particularly  drawn 
to see in the position of the Bamileke in Cameroon not an exception, but  a significant 
position. It  all happened as if, taking account of the overwhelming interpretation of the 
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1990s institutional amendments in Cameroon as an anti-Bamileke measure, I had to 
answer to two apparently unrelated questions. 
First, why are the Bamileke the main ethnic group to have issues with the 
protection of the rights of indigenous populations? An answer to this question did not 
come from empirical information, because the cognitive map of ethnicity in Cameroon 
fleshed out in Chapter 3 could not provide a basis. My conversation with Ludovic Kandé 
Houetchack at the National Institute of Cartography in Yaoundé, and my email 
correspondence with Léandre Ngogang Wandji of the National Institute of Statistics, 
alerted me that, unless I were to rely either on academic research on ethnicity, or on data 
provided by foreign research institutes such as the U.S.-based SIL International or the 
French IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement), no statistics on ethnicity nor 
the ethnic grid of the territory would come to my support in my endeavors. Officially  the 
production of statistics on ethnicity in Cameroon ended with the birth of the United 
Republic in 1972. It is the reason no census, beginning with the first  and most  successful 
one in 1976, has thus far included ethnicity. This was the reason for my surprise when I 
realized that tribal affiliation was established the services of the General Delegate to 
National Security since the mid-1990s. The answer came instead from the literature. By 
this, I do not refer to literary  works, newspaper articles and public debates only. I include 
academic publications. The categorization of those institutional amendments of the 
1990s as an anti-Bamileke measure came largely from Bamileke intellectuals, and was 
echoed in Dutch and French academic publications. 
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Second, I had to find an answer to the apparent contradiction revealed in the 
previous mentioned literature on the predominantly Bamileke emphasis on chieftaincy, 
tribal homelands, and traditions, all helmed by an overwhelmingly Bamileke presence in 
Cameroon in matters of cultural associations. The interest  generated by  this 
contradiction is the relationships between chieftaincy, tribal homelands, and traditions on 
one hand and ethnic regionalism, the protection of minorities and indigenous people, and 
cultural associations on the other hand. During the four months I stayed in the West 
Region, I attended various cultural festivals and funerary  gatherings, at the moment of 
which people from every place in Cameroon would come. This led me to think that The 
Road to Chiefdoms was not the appropriate venue for examining the significance of 
tribal homelands and ethnicity in politics. The next two chapters do not  simply bring 
both tribal homelands and ethnicity into focus, they  gradually  lay the ground for 
understanding the relationship between chieftainship and ethnic territorialization on the 
one hand, and the inborn political debate that takes shape among Bamileke politicians 
and scholars on the distinction between culture and politics on the other. How significant 
is the position of the Bamileke as an ethnic group in Cameroon? What to do with the 
apparent contradiction between a Bamileke emphasis on chieftaincies and Bamileke 
mitigation of the right of minorities and indigenous populations?
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CHAPTER FIVE: ON RITUALS OF BELONGING
The chief therefore organized a tour to install all the chiefs in the 
diaspora. He had not done so yet. On the occasion of the tour, he created a 
structure parallel to traditional chieftaincies; a structure for the 
Bamendjou community  in the diaspora. He called it the Higher Family 
Council. Community chiefs were made members by virtue of their 
positions. Besides these chiefs, a few other members of the Bamendjou 
community  had to be considered. That is how it  happened, against all 
expectations. I did not even know that such a structure existed. One day, I 
learned that the chief had designated me as a member of the Higher 
Family Council of the South, which is a separate structure; which is not 
about community chieftaincies as they are known. It is the structure that 
fixes village problems, for instance the organization of the Chepan 
[Festival]. (...) The chief was very outspoken about it, because he said 
that he wasn’t installing administrative chiefs. Already, he himself did not 
call them chiefs. He called them ambassadors. He called them 
ambassadors of Bamendjou in their local area. He always says that in a 
village you do not have chiefs. There is only one chief. 
Le chef a donc organisé une tournée–il n’avait pas encore installé 
tous les chefs dans la diaspora–pour installer les chefs. A l’occasion de 
cette tournée, il crée une structure à côté des chefferies traditionnelles, 
une structure qui dirige la communauté Bamendjou dans la diaspora. Il 
appelle ça le Haut Conseil Familial. Donc, il crée cette structure, les 
chefs de communauté sont déjà membres d’office. A ces chefs donc, il 
fallait adjoindre d’autres membres de la communauté Bamendjou. Voilà 
comment, contre toute attente–je ne savais même pas qu’il y avait une 
structure, comme ça, qui existait–un jour on m’apprend que le chef m’a 
désigné comme membre du Haut-Conseil Familial du Sud, qui est une 
structure à part; qui n’est pas les chefferies de communauté telles qu’on 
les connaît. C’est cette structure qui règle les problèmes du village, par 
exemple l’organisation du Chepan. (...) Le chef a été très bien précis là-
dessus, parce qu’il a dit qu’il ne vient pas installer les chefs 
administratifs. Déjà, lui-même, il ne les a pas appelé chefs. Il les a 
appelés des ambassadeurs. Il les a appelé les ambassadeurs de 
Bamendjou dans leur localité. Il dit toujours que dans un village il n’y a 
pas des chefs. Il n’y a qu’un chef.
Athanase Cyprien Mbarga
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Once familiar with the pervasive language of the immanent ethnic mapping in 
Cameroon (Chapter 3), or once the tricks of “negotiating” one’s way, like Francesco 
Pompeo, in the field of ethnic expectations and anticipations have been learned (1999), 
one is able to locate Athanase Cyprien Mbarga’s “origins” somewhere in the “forest 
area” or the “center regions.” More specifically, no background in ethnolinguistics is 
required to know that Mbarga is a Beti name. Mbarga Soukous, the Bikutsi singer, and 
author of the popular pornographic song, Occasion pressée will remind those forgetful of 
the ethnic character of his name that they cannot counterfeit a Mbarga. This was at  least 
my assumption until I read the biography of Athanase Cyprien Mbarga. I came across 
this biography on the occasion of Chepan 2011, the biennial festival of the Bamendjou 
people, from March 20 to 26. I was still doing fieldwork in the West Region. It attended 
festivals and popular events as often as I could, thanks to the access provided by The 
Road to Chiefdoms and its privilege for being the most sought-after partner of those 
events. Besides recording public speeches, I would also collect fliers, leaflets, 
pamphlets, CDs, and any other media available. In Bamendjou, my attention as The 
Road to Chiefdoms’ photographer was drawn away for a moment by  Mbarga’s 
biography, which the table of contents of the official journal of the festival named 
“Discovery.” The other titles were somewhat uninteresting. The journal was not so much 
different from the other festival journals that I already had in my collection.
The Chepan festival was the third of the five so-called cultural festivals that I 
attended in the Grassland that year. Before the Chepan festival, I attended the Nekou 
festival of the Bamendjinda people in Bamendjinda, and the Nyang-Nyang festival of the 
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Fussep people in Bafoussam. After Chepan, I would attend the Nsem Todjom festival of 
the Bandjoun people in Bandjoun, and the Macabo festival of the Bangoua people in 
Bangoua. All of these festivals are biennial and none are older than ten years. Annual 
purification rituals, usually  held together and officiated by the village chief, are much 
older. A survey of popular festivals carried out in 2009 by the Yaoundé-based Centre 
Culturel Francis Bebey indicates that there were up to 157 festivals nationwide. 
However, not all of those festivals are cultural festivals. The survey has classified 
Chepan as a traditional and sociocultural festival, and the other four festivals above are 
alike; they fall into the 46 festivals that can be found throughout the territory. Of the ten 
regions of Cameroon, the West Region comes first with eleven sociocultural festivals, 
and exceeds the Center Region by only one. I must point out that I have not included 
Bamendjinda and Bangoua as their festival did not formally exist in 2009. Beyond 
standing in for traditional events, these cultural festivals are notable by their common 
dominant feature, common in the West Region: the bringing home of the “sons and 
daughters” of the village. Even though these celebrations take place in villages or small 
towns, they have a nationwide scope. They  encourage the participation of originaires or 
ressortissants by means of an elaborate organization of associations, and soon-to-
become-associations; a state of affairs the intricacies which would only be revealed to 
me later when I decided to take on the challenge of pushing the discovery  of Chepan 
2011 to its limits. As associations, these organizations are at the core of cultural festivals, 
as reported to us by Athanase Cyprien Mbarga in the short excerpt  that opens this 
chapter, and are refered to as cultural associations, associations of originaires, or elite 
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associations (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 1998). They could not have come to life without 
the 1990 law on the freedom of association, thanks to imperative of liberalization. These 
associations are legally  confined by the broadly defined principle that their pursuits be 
lawful and not threaten “security, territorial integrity, national unity, national integration, 
[or] the republican character of the state” (Law No 90/053 on associations).
Scholars have taken two particular interests in cultural associations and their 
various activities in Cameroon. The first is in their capacity to motivate people and 
constitute a political force, and the second is in the ways in which they may challenge 
previous efforts at national unity and integration. Understandably, the most discussed 
festivals are not the most recently created, such as those that I attended in the former 
Bamileke Region, which is currently an integral part of the West Region. The Ngondo of 
the Sawa in Douala, with a territorial span broader than the Littoral Region, and the 
Nguon of the Bamoun, in the West Region, are relatively older, and are known in 
Cameroon as the two most influential cultural festivals. The first dates back to 1991, and 
the second to 1993. Accordingly, as emphasized by scholars such as Nyamnjoh & 
Rowlands (1998), Socpa (2003), and Geschiere (2009), those festivals are coextensive 
with nascent multiparty  politics and alter, in their view, public discourse on national 
integration to the benefit of an angst for a return home. If freedom of association ushered 
in the proliferation of those organizations, the 1996 constitutional amendments, which 
acknowledged the existence of minorities and indigenous populations, seemed to have 
defined villages of origin as the center of their mission, either for development purpose 
or for cultural promotion. It  is from such a vantage point that Peter Geschiere has 
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pondered the meaning of the increasingly publicized and elaborate funerals which, not 
unlike those cultural festivals I am bringing to the fore, are occasions at which kinship 
groups whose members are dispersed throughout the country are expected to come 
home. More precisely, Geschiere has taken at face value the philosophy of late Samuel 
Eboua, former chair of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP), and 
Gabriel Nlep, a posthumously influential figure and former professor of political science 
at the University of Douala. In 1995, Eboua stated in a newspaper interview that, “Every 
Cameroonian is an allogène anywhere [...] in the country... [other] than where his 
ancestors lived and... where his mortal remains will be buried” (Geschiere, 2009, p.56). 
Nlep, in a newspaper article a year later, developed the concept of election village 
(village électoral) to emphasize the notion that every  Cameroonian is autochthonous in 
their election village, and allochthonous elsewhere in Cameroon. He further argued that, 
as such, election village should be the sole basis for holding plebiscites.
The political force of those cultural or elite associations, on the other hand, has 
been overridden by a related concern among those scholars who have seen in their 
festivals and other manifestations a sort of mental handicap, delusion, alienation or 
voluntary servitude. Dissatisfaction with the political status quo and the tenacity  of the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), after three decades Paul Biya’s 
leadership, have led such scholars to hypothesize that the apparent resilience of the 
CPDM is due to its successful encouragement of those associations. Accordingly, the 
renascent ethnic regionalism that undergirds my discussion of Lamberton’s reappearance 
in the Cameroonian media (Chapter 3), and informs the very  notion of ethnic 
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territorialization that I have used to understand the dramatization of ethnicity  in 
Cameroonian museums (Chapters 1 and 4), has been understood as an instrument 
implemented by the ruling party to break down political opposition and 
compartmentalize political resistance. Armed with this hypothesis, Peter Geschiere 
fashioned a line of interpretation that reads in contemporary so-called sociocultural 
events, such as public funerals and cultural festivals, a type of ritual that runs parallel to 
the rituals of nation-building of held by the state, which they increasingly surpass in 
relevance. In Geschiere’s view, these rituals were more private during the first decades 
of post-independence and appeared to have less to do with identity. Their increasingly 
public character can only  be explained by “the new ‘autochthony’ strategy of the Biya 
regime that allowed this regime to survive democratization.” (2009, p.200) 
Understandably, this new autochthony strategy can consequently be said to have turned 
funerals and rituals of purification into rituals of belonging.
In Chapter 2, I indicated that Antoine Socpa could also be considered as one of 
those scholars who have interpreted the rejuvenating interest in homeland exclusively as 
the outcome of political manipulation. More significantly, my discussion of his thesis on 
ethnic strife between the Bamileke and the Beti in the Center Region, and the Kotoko 
and the Suwa in the Far-North Region (Socpa, 2003), has revealed that Socpa 
downplayed the fact, established by him, that the impetus for using those associations 
had come from the Social Democratic Front, the first and main opposition party in the 
1990s. Furthermore, in their attempt to emphasize the forcibly emotional character of 
those events and movements, scholars like Geschiere and Socpa have gone even further 
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than simply reading the facts in political rhetoric. I will not come back to Socpa’s 
reprisal of Lonsdale’s safety valve that consist in segregating ethnicity from tribalism, 
and locating political manipulation at the level of the latter only (see Chapter 2). 
According to this idea nonetheless, we can credit  cultural associations with embodying a 
genuine and legitimate use of ethnicity. In this case, the Social Democratic Front’s use of 
ethnic networks to mobilize its militants is theoretically distinguished from its use by the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement to divide citizens. More hesitant and 
indecisive on the other hand is Geschiere’s scrupulous observance of Samuel Eboua’s 
prescriptions on autochthony. He does not confine his analysis to surveying adamant 
statements such as those of the “Sawa (sea people) demonstrators of Douala,” intended 
to make the Bamileke return home for the municipal elections of 1996, especially if the 
Bamileke “insist on still burying their deceased in the village” (2009, p.190). Instead he 
questions the relative dearth of cemeteries in African urban centers (including in 
Cameroon) and explores the significance of confrontations over corpses, and frequent 
quarrels between villagers and urbanites at ever more elaborate funerals. Could these 
two entailments have implicitly led Geschiere to relativize his reliance on recent partisan 
maneuvers as the determinant factor behind the seemingly overbearing character of the 
so-called rituals of belonging? Could they have led him to question his doubts about the 
appeal to soil, and the increasingly  unfathomable challenge of grasping the scope of the 
so aptly called “elusive communities.” Could they have further forced him to do away 
with his inclination to still read the pattern of “local societies” (2009, p.76-7) or “social 
formations” (129, fn 43, on ‘pygmies’) at the core of those rituals? If not political 
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manipulation, what then? How are we to assess the popularity of cultural mobilization 
back home? What are we to look for in the popular character of rituals of belonging, if 
not the rather flimsy political indoctrination? Is my altogether slippery  notion of ethnic 
territorialization, introduced in Chapter 3, sufficient to explain this popularity, even 
when funerals “at home” and the evidence of corpses being “repatriated” seem to 
corroborate its validity? Are we, on the contrary, to seek behind the elusive character of 
communities, and their millennial patterns of either segmentation or centralization, 
reasons other than the incalculable inscriptions and internalizations of power?
Perhaps one does not need to understand the reasons for which cultural 
associations and the elusive communities of sons and daughters that they represent are so 
attractive. Accordingly, taking account of their motivational force, and putting it in the 
service of non-governmental initiatives such as The Road to Chiefdoms or political 
mobilization may be the most appropriate treatment. It did occur to me, when I was 
scrutinizing the position of chieftaincies within The Road to Chiefdoms’s projects, that 
international and multilateral political organizations such as the European Union, not 
unlike the Cameroonian government or political parties, have, perhaps, leveraged on the 
power of this reference to home, community, culture, and found chieftaincies as their 
sanctuaries. I could not explain otherwise the centrality of chieftaincies in the 
development of The Road to Chiefdoms. Nevertheless, I also thought that it would be 
naïve and shortsighted on my part if I did not anticipate the questions above, and wait for 
them to take shape later, as an afterthought. The expectations that were later to lead me 
on a journey from the Chepan festival to Athanase Cyprien Mbarga’s home in Ambam in 
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the South Region, approximately 350 miles from Bamendjou, his home village, took the 
form of a complex of hesitant and ill-conceived questions. I could say later that  my 
questions were the distant ramifications of a Foucauldian understanding of territory, all 
centered on the question of state formation, population and surveillance. 
On the occasion of my repetitive discussions and conversations with scholars in 
Yaoundé, Douala, and Dschang, I had doubts about the way to introduce the subject of 
my inquiry. From the start, I had clearly decided to survey ongoing discourses on the 
Bamileke, and to articulate them in light of the rise of ethnic regionalism ushered in by 
the 1990s Cameroonian legislation on decentralization and the protection of the rights of 
indigenous populations. The same subject would find a home in the endeavor to frame 
the “political economy of culture” in a country where the very definition of culture had 
become problematic with respect to the dispute over national representation between the 
Ministry of Culture and the National Museum of Yaoundé project. However, neither 
state legislation nor the peculiar institution of chieftainship  could escape my  scrutiny. I 
could explain this by  my interest in what I have indicated in Chapter 4 as the significant 
position of the Bamileke and the apparent  contradiction between Bamileke resentment 
toward the protection of indigenous people and the resurgence of Bamileke chieftaincy-
based associations.
Like Peter Geschiere, I was somehow following the prescriptions of Gabriel Nlep 
when I was running after festivals in the Grassland. I did not limit my visits to festivals. 
In the hopes of becoming acquainted with funerals at home, well before I settled in 
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Dschang, my curiosity  led me to travel with bereaved friends from Douala in the Littoral 
Region to Bafang in the West Region. As Geschiere had, I paid attention to how city-
dwellers were called back home, either for family succession, chiefly entitlement, or 
mere initiation into local associations. Less in keeping with Geschiere’s example, 
however, was the pervasive perspective I was reconstructing on the possible relationship 
between local and central governments, and the ways in which one might describe a 
continuum between chieftainship  and state power. I was under the spell of Mahmood 
Mamdani’s early thesis on state bifurcation and despotic chieftaincies; both of which can 
be understood from a Foucauldian perspective to have colonial institutions at their 
foundation (Mamdani, 1996). Indeed, the entire prospect of ethnic regionalism, which 
guided my  research on the political arena, and my exploration of state legislation and 
government decisions in Cameroon, was heavily staked on Mamdani’s suggestion that 
no effective political reform in postcolonial Africa could bypass the necessity of 
revisiting the institutional trajectory of chieftainship. 
From Mamdani’s perspective, focusing on partisan manipulation of the masses, 
amounts to limiting one’s scope to recent political history, as well as underestimating the 
masses and minimizing their efforts by means of concepts such as the idea of 
conviviality introduced in African studies by Achille Mbembe, who used it to describe 
the socialization of violence in Cameroon. My emphasis on Foucault is not an innocent 
move. From the outset, I had my doubts on the objective of surveying discourses on the 
Bamileke. Was I by the term discourse considering any statement on the Bamileke, as 
the case seemed most likely, or was I instead aiming at a conceptually articulate notion 
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such as “discursive formation,” whose archaeology may  yield an internal intelligibility, 
external limits and dead zones? While I did not endeavor to make such a distinction 
during my stay in Cameroon from October 2010 to January 2012, I nonetheless 
abandoned the idea of doing the archaeology of some sort of forgotten knowledge, even 
when my archival research was available to such an interpretation. Moreover, I reflected 
on my decision to make use of existing traces of ethnic identification. In so doing, I 
could assess, on the very occasion of my  conversations, the deep-seated expectations and 
worries these traces might reveal in me or in my apprehension of my interlocutors’ 
responses.
The challenge of looking through Mamdani’s eye was somewhere else than in the 
mere reconstruction of colonial discourse. Mamdani’s incursion into colonial 
governmentality  in Africa owes its position to a linear review of the evolutionary 
conflation and re-inscription of culture and customs within the self-avowedly 
antidemocratic practice of indirect rule that took shape in British colonial territories. 
Even though the history  of the Southern Cameroons teaches that  the special case of 
territories under the control of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, did 
not do much against the normalization of this practice within the British Empire at large, 
the predominantly French colonial background to contemporary  Cameroon does not 
permit the seamless use of state bifurcation and fusion of power as an instrument for 
legal historiography. Understandably, Mamdani has adequately argued that the French 
colonial administration gradually refrained from enforcing the policy of assimilation in 
its African territories and took advantage of lessons of successful authoritarianism from 
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British colonies. Particularly in Cameroon, most colonial legislation about indigenous 
chiefs (chefs indigènes) before the Second World War–and customary chiefs (chefs 
coutumiers) and courts (tribunals coutumiers) afterward–can be interpreted in light of 
this halting and gradual shift toward an indirect rule style of colonial government. I came 
across decisive evidence of this experimentation at the National Archives of Yaoundé 
when I found a 1955 report by  a colonial administrator who had been on a mission to the 
neighboring Emirate of Muri in northern Nigeria and contemplated “the virtues” of what 
he then called the chefferies traditionnelles of the “British system,” instead of a literal 
translation of Native Authorities. More significant than the disparity of the colonial 
antecedent was the very patchwork that the legal history of Cameroon could be taken 
for, even after the independence of French Cameroun in 1960, and its reunion with the 
former British Southern Cameroon in 1961, with the short-lived federal experiment from 
then to 1972. A different matter was the risk, stated in Chapters 1 and 2, of being 
unwittingly and irreversibly bound to the prejudice of distinguishing between culture and 
politics, once the ambivalence of each has been established within the colonial practice 
of customary law. Accordingly, instead of the colonial antecedent, I privileged current 
legislation and everyday practice. Instead of customary law I wanted to examine the 
peculiarity of chieftainship today in Cameroon; how to assess the relevance of 
chieftainship in the Cameroonian state’s call for the protection of indigenous populations 
and the drive of cultural associations back home? It obviously  follows that the ideas of 
chieftaincies, indigenous populations, and home, had all three to be considered within 
the context of today’s legislation, government practice, and everyday commitment. Let 
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us consider, for instance, the piece that  I borrowed from my conversation with Athanase 
Cyprien Mbarga and opened this chapter with. The piece was Mbarga’s narration of his 
designation as a member of the South Region’s Higher Family Council of Bamendjou in 
2010 by Fo’o Jean Rameau Sokoudjou of Bamendjou. 
The vulgarity  of chiefs in Cameroon has been brought to the World media by 
Jean Marie Teno in his 1999’s short documentary Chef! He argues that the title chief 
itself has become quite insignificant as one can find a chief at every  corner. Vulgarity 
deserves nonetheless some clarification. To this end I have italicized the various 
occurrences of the word chief in Mbarga’s accounts, whether accompanied by a qualifier 
or not. The first two unqualified occurrences, both in the first sentence of the excerpt, 
refer to traditional chiefs and community  chiefs respectively. The last three occurrences 
are a matter of semantics and hermeneutics. They were Mbarga’s answer to an earlier 
question that I asked about the relationship between community chiefs and traditional 
chiefs in the designated local areas. The notion of administrative chiefs was Fo’o 
Sokoudjou’s own interpretation of what Mbarga would take later for traditional chiefs. I 
will come to Sokoudjou’s concerns shortly. I deliberately traveled back to Bamendjou to 
meet him after my excursion to Ambam. First, let us focus on the notion of traditional 
chiefs and the corollary  of traditional chieftaincies. Where does the notion of traditional 
chief come from so as to stand for a point of reference for community chieftaincies and 
administrative chieftaincies in Athanase Mbarga’s story? How are we to understand it 
before considering the scope and articulation of the other references? What can it tell us 
about the renascent  interest in chieftainship in Cameroon? These questions matter not 
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because they might help us reverse the focus from colonial to postcolonial government. 
The directionality from one end to another depends more on the hope of explaining 
shifts and continuities than in formulating the demands that precipitate their course at 
every  moment of this trajectory. Consequently, it is my point of view that answers to 
those questions can best help point us toward the renewed interest in chieftaincies, and 
gradually make us understand the Bamileke predicament in Cameroon, whether the latter 
is conceived of as a question seeking answers to general political dilemmas perceived by 
ethnic group, or as a political problem whose origin must be located somewhere in the 
country’s history, or as an exceptional ethnic group  with a view to drawing a landscape 
of ethnic competition and confrontation. In the end I hope to describe the ways in which 
this predicament may aid us in our attempt to grasp the significant position of the 
Bamileke in contemporary. 
An important literature about chieftaincies has developed in response to the 
democratic turn of the 1990s in Cameroon. Unlike cultural associations, which have 
attracted scholars only from the vantage point  of political mobilization and national 
integration, chieftainship has been explored, when not dismissed outright as an anti-
republican institution (as does Njoh-Mouelle in his conversation with Michalon, 2011), 
in the hope that we may find in its existence and in the traces of its past a more stable 
foundation for the prospect of an end to authoritarianism; this, against the backdrop of 
the prevailing assumption that, not only are chieftaincies older and thus more sustainable 
in the long run, they  have also been sullied by a power foreign to them. I have already 
introduced Mahmood Mamdani’s take on this. Political reform should not only  start at 
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the level of the central government, it should overhaul chieftaincies insofar as the latter 
are incarnated in the person of chiefs, with their colonially inherited rights to legislate, 
govern, and administer justice all at once. 
My preliminary discussion of indirect rule can tell us why Mamdani has not been 
the subject of important scholarly  debates in Cameroon. Most texts have been committed 
to assessing the likely democratic basis of the institution of chieftainship by opposing 
them to the overarching state institutions, seen to have been inherited from the colonial 
government, and consolidated afterward. As one can see, their quest also pursues an 
ideal of “depoliticized” chieftaincies. Charles Nach Mback is a prominent figure in this 
regard. He argues in article published in 2002 that chieftaincies are “unidentified legal 
subjects” to an extent that the study of their constitution in present-day Cameroon may 
be the ground for an alternative to the current authoritarian state. Overall, the voices of 
scholars on chieftainship in Cameroon, including Mback, have struggled to find their 
place in the face of the prevailing voice of the most influential chiefs. Especially 
important among those chiefs is Jean Rameau Sokoudjou, who has been the traditional 
chief of Bamendjou for more than six decades, and whose perception of traditional 
chiefs as administrative chiefs is to be seen as a critique of the institution in and of itself. 
Athanase Cyprien Mbarga may not have seen it as such. It  was not until I spoke with 
Fo’o Sokoudjou personally  that I came to grasp the difference that his notion of 
administrative chiefs poses in contrast  to the Cameroonian state’s notion of traditional 
chiefs.
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For decree No. 77/245 of July  15, 1977, which is the legislation of reference in 
matters of chieftaincies in postcolonial Cameroon, “traditional chief” is the common 
term used for of all chiefs in rural areas, whether they are of the first, second, or third 
order or degree. The decree also acknowledges that these chiefs may elect to be referred 
to by customary titles, such as Fo, Fo’o, or Fon in the Cameroon Grassland. The 
classification of chiefs in hierarchical order is within the purview of the office of the 
Prime Minister and the Ministry  of Territorial Administration, and is said to depend on 
the size of the population and the economy of the chieftaincy; but chieftainship is not 
limited to rural areas. The decree does however discriminate between rural and urban 
areas. While in the former, the three degrees theoretically  corresponds to division, 
subdivision, and either district or simply  village, with the government’s prerogative of 
reshaping them on the grounds of disputes or population size, the case in urban areas 
hardly  follows this pattern and obeys the government’s need to control urban centers. 
Nevertheless the three levels are maintained even though the title of traditional chief 
does not apply automatically. The degrees in urban centers correspond respectively to 
zone (zone), block (bloc), and neighborhood (quartier). This configuration makes of the 
village in rural areas and the neighborhood in urban areas the lowest, but not necessarily 
the smallest units of administration. Chiefs are designated by  the Prime Minister for the 
first degree, and the Minister of Territorial Administration for the two other degrees. 
The mission of chiefs is d’encadrer les populations (to supervise populations) 
and de seconder (to assist) state representatives in their constituencies. While they are 
not functionaries, and so do not receive salaries from the Ministry  of Civil Service 
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(Ministère de la Fonction Publique) they do receive allowances from the Ministry  of 
Territorial Administration, and may occasionally  receive compensation for special 
services. Chiefs could claim fees for collecting taxes in their constituencies until the 
fiscal reform of early 1990s, which followed the civil unrest of 1991 and paralyzed cities 
and towns (Roitman, 2005). Since that time, they have been officially barred from tax 
collection, and have been confined to “transmitting directives” from the government to 
their respective populations, and to “monitoring public order” and the “economic, social, 
and cultural development” of their unité de commandement (unit of commandment). 
Fo’o Sokoudjou’s notion of administrative chiefs was a response to the decree. 
He sees in this legislation the colonial administration’s definition of “customary  chiefs” 
as auxiliaires d’administration (administrative auxiliaries). Fo’o Sokoudjou insisted on 
distinguishing between terminology and practice. The idea of les auxiliaires 
d’administration sounds, in his opinion, is that traditional chiefs and state representatives 
are to work hand in hand. Seen as such, an administration is not a body from which 
directives are to be received. Rather administration would be understood as the task of 
governing people; a task that requires the participation of traditional chiefs. On the other 
hand, the practice of subjecting traditional chiefs to the decisions of state representatives, 
for Fo’o Sokoudjou, not only  reinforces Charles Nach Mback’s idea that chieftaincies 
are “unidentified legal subjects” (2000, p.78), it also turns chieftainship into an 
appendage of government. Instead of an administrative auxiliary, Fo’o Sokoudjou sees in 
the colonial mission of a customary  chief that of the auxiliary of the Administration 
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(auxiliaire de l’administration), with the Administration understood as a separate and 
supreme body. 
Athanase Mbarga might not  have needed the exegesis of Fo’o Sokoudjou’s 
comparison of the current legislation on chieftainship to its colonial antecedent on 
customary  chiefs. He merely intended to distinguish traditional chiefs and 
administratively designated chiefs from community  chiefs, who are formally designated 
by the traditional chief, in the case of Bamendjou for instance, and act as his 
representative beyond the territorial confines of the chieftaincy. In other words, 
community  chiefs are chiefs of originaires or ressortissants residing outside of their 
villages of origin. I have already argued that in the Cameroonian landscape of 
chieftaincies, the village is the most basic administrative unit, and is putatively unsullied 
by urbanization. Even during the French colonial period, the village was the primary  unit 
for the survey of chiefs in Cameroon. The centrality  of the village is so crucial that, even 
today, chiefs of first and second degrees are primarily village chiefs, notwithstanding the 
reality  that  their unit  of commandment might stretch beyond the village, as much as it 
may remain limited to the village only. 
At the time I was researching at the National Archives of Yaoundé, I came across 
the manuscripts of a survey of chieftaincies carried out  in the 1950s by the colonial 
administration. There were approximately 6,500 chiefs of all types nationwide. Hans 
Hagbe, the person in charge of chieftaincies at the Ministry  of Territorial Administration, 
reported that there were no complete record of all chieftaincies half a century later. I 
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received a list of 77 chieftaincies of the first  order. I was also that a list  of the more than 
2,000 chieftaincies of the second order was being produced. I was curious about the 
overall number of chieftaincies nationwide so as to compared to the number I obtained 
from the colonial archives. Mr. Hagbe reported that even though there was no record 
there would be approximately more than 13,000 chieftaincies in all. I asked the official 
how to understand the discrepancy  between the 1950s and nowadays. Again Mr. Hagbe 
rushed to tell me that, had the creation of new chieftaincies by means of division not 
stopped in the early  1990s in response to ministerial decision, there would have been an 
incredible number of chieftaincies today because of the constitutional amendment of 
1996, which guaranteed not only the rights of indigenous populations and minorities but 
also the seats of representatives of le commandement tradtionnel (the traditional 
commandment) in the newly created regional councils. Accordingly I was handed a 1960 
memorandum of Arouna Njoya, then Minister of the Interior, who was warning Regional 
administrators against the dangers of their prerogatives in creating new chieftaincies. 
Considering the doubling of the number of chieftaincies over three decades, it can be 
inferred that such warnings became pointless over time. Yet the biggest concern 
expressed by Njoya, the self-avowed nationalist, was the creation of the so-called 
“chieftaincies of strangers” (chefferies des étrangers), which was until then a common 
administrative practice meant to keep autochthons separate from non-autochthons in 
urban areas, mostly in the current South Region where I went to meet Athanase Mbarga. 
This warning can be said to have led later to the designation of chieftaincies in urban 
areas by means of their degree only. The qualifier of ‘strangers’ was dropped even when, 
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on the basis of their putative ethnic origin, the people inhabiting said urban chieftaincies 
might still consider themselves as strangers or non-autochthons–as did Athanase 
Mbarga.
Thus, the diaspora of which Athanase Mbarga speaks is the population of 
ressortissants and originaires living away  from their village, both inside and outside 
Cameroon. Accordingly, it is not uncommon to hear in public speeches a distinction 
made between internal and external diasporas. In cities such as Ambam and the nearby 
Kye-Ossi, at the border with Equatorial Guinea, which both can be said, in Mbarga’s 
view, to stand for villes des allogènes (allochthons’ towns), we would therefore have two 
sorts of chiefs: official chiefs, who do not  discriminate within their population on the 
basis of origin, and who are accountable to the government; and community chiefs, who 
are chosen and held in check by  the community of ressortissants or originaires and 
assumed to represent the traditional chief of villages of origin. In any  given town of this 
kind, there would be as many community chiefs as there would be identifiable 
communities which would have organized themselves as such. Mbarga told me that, 
even though he had refused to follow in the footsteps of his father as the Bamendjou 
community  chief, he joined the Bamendjou Higher Family Council of the South; which 
comprised four community  chiefs corresponding each to three out of the four divisions 
of the South Region. The Vallée du Ntem division has two Bamendjou community 
chiefs; one in Ambam and another in Kye-Ossi, which has a relatively  larger community. 
The two other community chiefs that are members of Bamendjou Higher Family Council 
of South are from the divisions of Dja-et-Lobo, with Sangmelima as the main town, and 
139
the division of Mvila, with Ebolowa, the capital of the South Region, as its main urban 
area. In addition to the four chiefs, the Higher Family Council is made up of six other 
members also designated by Fo’o Sokoudjou. 
Mbarga’s words also bear witness that the selection of the supplementary 
members of the Higher Family  Council is left to the discretion of the traditional chief, 
even if the wishes of the local community council may be taken into account. Many 
factors are considered in the process. Besides being a ressortissant, the candidate must 
display  social success and the capacity  to benefit the community of Bamendjou. 
Contrary  to the suggestion of his name, Athanase Mbarga is a proud Bamileke 
ressortissant in Ambam. Born in Ambam of a Bamileke father and a Beti mother, he was 
named after his deceased maternal grandfather who had requested as much before his 
death. It was not until the age of ten that Mbarga began to spend his holidays in 
Bamendjou. It  was in this that he learned, in his own words, “the language, the customs, 
and everything else.” His emphasis on “the” language was not surprising because he 
made me hear that, even though he could be seen as a Bamileke-Beti “hybrid” his 
“mother tongue” and “the language of here” was not his. He is the only son of his father 
out of 23 to be of a Beti mother and he is one of the youngest in a huge family of 26 
siblings. Despite this, he was chosen by  local notables and friends of his deceased father 
in Bamendjou and he was made the successor of the father in 1996. This entitlement 
implied that he became the sole “owner” de facto of his father’s rights, obligations, and 
possessions. He jokingly told me that even his father’s spouses were thus placed under 
his care. Today, in addition to being a businessman, self-acknowledged elite of Ambam, 
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and “father” to his siblings, Mbarga has many other titles. He is in notable of Bamendjou 
and the person in charge of identifying the Bamileke of Ambam. He is at  once member 
of the “civil society” in charge of public investments in the Vallée du Ntem, Secretary of 
Procurement in the municipality of Ambam, and the CPDM sub-section’s president in 
Ambam-town. Beside these positions, he is also an honorary member of the Bamileke 
and the Beti cultural associations of Ambam. All things considered, like Fo’o Sokoudjou, 
who himself was brought back from Ebolowa and made chief of Bamendjou in 1953 
after spending four years in the South Region, Mbarga was ultimately proud to tell me 
that he was a living example of national integration.
I stated in Chapter 1 the concern expressed by the Bamileke historian Emmanuel 
Ghomsi (Bisseck et al, 2010) regarding what he referred to as the Bamileke tendency to 
export their “traditional institutions” to every area of Bamileke settlement beyond the 
West Region, and particularly  in areas such as the Littoral, where the presence of the 
Bamileke is increasingly felt as a foreign threat. The extension of Bamileke chieftaincies 
through an umbrella of community chieftaincies scattered in all ten regions of the 
country  may contribute to the idea that the phenomenon under consideration is indeed an 
export of traditions. However the notion of tradition here may lead to ambiguities if it  is 
not considered in the context of Cameroonian legislation that has made tradition the 
dominant category  by  virtue of which all chieftaincies–not in the former Bamileke 
Region alone–achieve their political existence. 
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It was in July  2011, well after my research in Dschang, that I heared similar 
concerns from Antoine Socpa of the University of Yaoundé. His position was less clearly 
articulated than Ghomsi’s. I discussed his anxieties regarding the use of ethnic categories 
in scholarly  inquiries in Chapter 2. These anxieties can be attributed to the accusatory 
character of most ethnographic inquiries in the country, especially in the case of his 
exploration of Bamileke-Beti tension in Yaoundé. Moreover, the distinction between 
tribalism and ethnicity  led Socpa to inadvertently associate autochthony with ancestral 
territory rather than with the political inscription of differential entitlement to land and 
other resources of the national and public domains (2006). Nevertheless, it was Antoine 
Socpa who suggested the notion of the deterritorialization of chieftaincies against  the 
idea of an export of traditions. By  this notion, Socpa meant that, while the Cameroonian 
state has territorially defined the domain of chiefly authority, the current trend, 
predominantly among chieftaincies from the West Region, of making community chiefs 
stand in for their extension beyond their territory is liable to be interpreted as a 
deterritorialization of chieftainship. Again, if one were to follow Socpa, those scholars 
who read in the current proliferation of cultural associations and festivals the mere 
manifestation of post-one party  rule political strategy, including Socpa himself, would be 
held in check by the Grassland, which is often presented as the first  bastion of anti-ruling 
party  sentiment. In fact, in order to speak of deterritorialization, one must first ascertain 
that there has been an effective territorialization. My interest in the prospects of ethnic 
regionalism in Cameroon has led me to realize that there has been an obverse situation. 
The creation of community chieftaincies is not in confrontation with the current 
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legislation about  chieftaincies. The Cameroonian legislation defined the borders within 
which each traditional chief is held accountable by the government, it did not specify 
who is to be considered a member of a chieftaincy in the absence of the elusive notion of 
tradition. I would even say that, instead of a deterritorialization, one should read in the 
gradual hold of traditional chiefs over community chieftaincies a type of re-
territorialization of traditions from the vantage point of the decree of 1977.
My interest in Athanase Mbarga’s background at the time of the Chepan festival 
was motivated by  the prospect of ethnic regionalism in Cameroon. This was well before 
I came to realize that political reforms since early 1990s were following the patterns of 
pre-independence regional councils. I was driven to understand by what legible 
processes one could become an autochthon of a Region taken at large. The whole 
discussion about this notion of autochthony in Cameroon, which I left inconclusive in 
the second chapter, apart from the Bamileke and Non-Bamileke polarization introduced 
in Chapter 3, has thus far revolved around who are to be referred to as populations 
autochtones in French and indigenous populations in English, in accordance with the 
preamble of the bilingual constitution of 1996. For etymologists and followers of 
international conventions, among whom I would include Peter Geschiere because of his 
doubts about Samuel Eboua and Gabriel Nlep’s reasoning, there is no universal standard 
to apply beyond the limited scope of international institutions such as the United 
Nations. The decision of the United Nations to insist on vulnerability  and 
marginalization supports in Cameroon the consideration of a couple of ethnic groups 
only such as the Baka, the Baguiele, or the Bororo as the exclusive target of the 
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protection of the rights of indigenous populations. Vulnerability  and marginalization thus 
considers their life-style and the precariousness of their living conditions. On the other 
side, jurists and politicians at large elect to provide common sense on firmer ground by 
tapping into the same constitution. The constitution has made the requirement that 
regional councils, even though they  have yet  to be implemented, be presided over only 
by an indigene in the English version and an autochtone in the French version. James 
Mouange Kobila, a scholar and activist, published a commendable essay on the subject. 
He argues after Gabriel Nlep that the constitution of 1996 recognizes the existence of 
indigenes or otherwise autochthons in each of the ten regions of Cameroon (2009). It 
would be absurd to assume, Kobila continues, that the constitution sees the “pygmies, 
the Bororo, and the mountain and border peoples” (2009, p.101), who have been placed 
under the care of the Minister of Social Affairs, as the sole candidates for presidency in 
regional councils.
Beyond the designation of groups of people, however, I was much more 
interested in understanding how one becomes an indigene or an autochtone. Broadly, 
this question also pertains to the notion of becoming a member of an ethnic group, and to 
the origin of the principle that gives greater credence to ethnicity  over either birth 
location or residency  in the determination of indigenes. The case of Athanase Mbarga 
became an interesting one only in the aftermath of my conversation with him. From the 
short biography I supplied above, one can see that despite being born in Ambam and 
living in Ambam, Mbarga does not consider himself as an autochtone of Ambam. 
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Moreover, instead of considering the origins of both parents, he dismissed his Beti 
mother’s origins. It is not pointless to hear Mbarga on this subject.
“From birth I learned my mother’s language first and foremost... It 
was around the age of ten that I started to spend holidays in my father’s 
village. Thus it was a matter of learning the language, customs, and so on. 
It means that, at that age, I already had a culture which was, in fact, not 
mine. It was my mother’s, it was that of here [Ambam]. It was this 
situation that made it so that, when I was learning the language [of 
Bamendjou], I already had the ability  by  virtue of my mixed origin to 
learn the language. I would not learn it like someone from a different 
tribe who was to learn the language. I already had it in the blood. I 
already had the genes, and it has never been difficult.”
“Lorsque je nais j’apprends d’abord la langue de ma mère... C’est 
vers l’âge de dix ans que je commence à aller en vacances dans mon 
village paternel. C’était question d’apprendre la langue et puis la 
coutume, tout et tout. Donc, ça veut dire que j’avais déjà, à cet âge là, 
j’avais déjà une autre culture qui n’était pas la mienne, en réalité. c’était 
celle de ma maman, c’était celle d’ici. Ayant grandi dans ce contexte, 
c’est ça qui fait que lorsque j’apprends la langue [de Bamendjou], j’avais 
déjà, de part ma nature d’être hybride, la facilité d’apprendre. Je 
n’apprenais pas ça comme quelqu’un qui est d’une autre tribu et qui 
venait apprendre la langue. Moi j’avais déjà dans le sang. J’avais ces 
gênes et puis ça n’a pas été difficile.”
Mbarga’s invocation of blood and genes, which might appear repugnant at first, 
with its social Darwinistic connotations, should not detract us from his attempt to read to 
us the legend that  has an authority over his reasoning in matters of autochthony and self-
identification. I refrained from noting humorously that it was the doing of Paul Biya, the 
ruling party, or the current political regime that caused him to think of his status as a 
Bamileke and an allochthonous person in Ambam. There were many arguments to 
support this joke. Far from simply tapping into the 1990s reforms of ethnicity-bound 
regional councils and their colonial background, which I termed ethnic territorialization 
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in Chapter 3, I could see the lineaments of such arrangements in the measures taken by 
the administrations of both Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, the only presidents of the 
country  since independence. They codified and enforced the criterion of region of origin 
(province of origin until 1996) in the selection of government officials and civil servants 
in general. According to Zambo Belinga, one can read about this criterion in decree 
82-407 of September 7, 1982, pertaining to administrative examinations. “Must be 
considered the province of origin of a candidate,” the decree says, “only  the province 
where his [or her] legitimate parents originate from” (2011, p.203). In short, for Zambo 
Belinga, it was nearly a year before he resigned from office that Ahidjo developed what 
would be called later the policy  of regional balance. Besides loosely defining origins on 
the sole basis of filiation and administrative constituencies, the policy includes a system 
of quotas for each region. Additional measures would be taken later within Paul Biya’s 
administration to adapt the quotas to the gradual reshaping of constituencies, but 
amendments have generally  followed the pattern of the first codification, which in itself, 
according to Zambo Belinga, was a stochastic determination of quotas based on the 
population census of 1976, the land area of each region, and the supposed greater needs 
of the populations of some regions. This was the case for instance of the Far-North 
region which was assumed to be both enclaved and backward. 
While the policy of regional balance has been criticized among scholarly  circles, 
especially by Bamileke scholars such as Sindjoun Pokam and Shanda Tonmè, it has 
rarely been about the ethnic basis of administrative regions. Other scholars, such as 
Ebenezer Njoh Mouelle, former professor of philosophy, assemblyman, and minister, 
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with whom I had a conversation on October 4, 2011, have instead seen in such measures 
an unvoiced and pervasive mechanism which has guaranteed the stability of the 
government of Cameroon despite its shortcomings. In any case, no one on either side of 
the issue has taken an issue with the ethnic contours of provinces or regions. The 
oversight of indigenes over regional councils, which appeared in the constitution of 
1996, is therefore not a mere incidental occurrence expressing the sole desire of the 
ruling party to break down the country ethnically. It  can be considered as the very 
outcome of the idea of democracy, as it  was anticipated and taken over by Antoine 
Socpa, in his reprisal of Clifford Geertz’s hermeneutics of culture (see Chapter 2). I 
leave the discussion of the presentation of this aspect aside until the next chapter. My 
idea of a joke does not mean, however, that I underestimate the force of the arrangement 
formalized by the constitution and the electoral code as the principle of respect for 
“inter-regional equilibrium” or the “sociological composition” of regions and 
administrative constituencies. On the contrary, I see in the form of a joke the counter-fact 
of its own truth i.e. the possibility of suggesting that the legend to have authority  of self-
identification could be different from what it is for Athanase Mbarga. Yet the reign of a 
different legend might require a revolutionary and traumatic move toward willing or 
desiring birth location, residency or simply the radical erasure of the conjunction of 
place, filiation and ethnicity in matters of autochthony and identity.
At the time I traveled to the South Region for a short stay, Hubert Ndeodeme, a 
childhood friend who had worked in Ebolowa for three years and had agreed to guide 
me, brought to my attention the story of his gendarme colleague whom I met later. The 
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colleague was part of a large Bamileke family from Fongo-Tongo, now dispersed 
nationwide. The family’s earlier origins could be traced back, he told me, not to the so-
called Bamileke Region of the French colonial administration, but to the upper Benoue 
Region, nowadays Mayo-Louti division and part of the North Region. Ngoumnai, the 
family name, has become the only  ethnic trace and signifier of that origin. In spite of my 
failed attempt to learn more about the family, my  friend’s colleague, who was not 
personally prepared to embark on the adventurous road of locating her origins anywhere 
else than in the West Region, acknowledged that first  origin. Indeed I would not have 
measured the scope of her concerns if I did not venture to ask the current traditional 
chief of Fongo-Tongo on the subject later. While Fo’o Clement Djoukeng, the chief in 
person, knew the family, he had no knowledge of the origin of the name. The family  had 
informed the chiefdom about a funeral, but it did not take place accordingly. Fongo-
Tongo, which is only eight miles from Dschang, had been engulfed, like many 
chieftaincies in the West, South-West and North-West regions, in land conflicts with 
neighboring chieftaincies. The case reported to me by the chief resulted in three dead 
and 18 wounded on the Fongo-Tongo side and there was considerable property 
destroyed by fire. According to Fo’o Djoukeng, the question of who belongs and who 
does not had become crucial in the reassessment of land value in the West Region. Thus, 
the matter of origins has become highly sensitive. 
While a conflict like the one between Fongo-Tongo and Fontem may give us a 
clear idea of the territorial basis of chieftainship, it does not follow that it helps answer 
the question of how an autochthon comes into being. In most of the conflicts that were 
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brought to my attention by the media, the Ministry of Territorial Administration more 
than any other government institution was the first to intervene. The conflicts were not 
always direct claims to land. They often start from conflicts that could have been 
otherwise managed by the police or the Ministry of Justice. This was for instance the 
case of a murder that ended up pitting Musaka against Essimbi at  the border of the 
North-West and South-West regions. In another case, the destruction of property for 
failure respect local customs caused an uproar among the Babalang and the Balikumbat 
in the North-West Region. I realized the two conflicts were cyclical and long-lived like 
the conflict in the former Bamoun Region that opposes the Bamileke chieftaincies 
created by the French colonial administration and the former Sultanate of Foumban. 
It has become a principle for the Ministry of Territorial Administration that 
village people must submit to the authority of village chiefs even though they may not 
change their putative village of origin. At times the Ministry calls for peaceful existence, 
and at  other times it redefines the boundaries of chieftaincies. I noted above that the 
tendency to create new chieftaincies has diminished since early 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
big question raised by these rearrangements concerns the very nature of chieftainship 
itself: how the State of Cameroon understands it, and how it  explains its existence. 
While an answer to the first question comes with the decree of 1977, the second question 
cannot be answered without taking into account the relevance of chieftainship in the 
overall political landscape of contemporary Cameroon, beyond the mere discussion of 
party  politics, and deep into the political economy of the country. Still, I have not yet 
provided a sufficient understanding of the decree’s definition of chieftainship. I have just 
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indicated that community chieftaincies extend or reterritorialize chieftainship but do not 
deterritorialize them as such.
Hans Hagbe, the official in charge of chieftaincies at the Ministry  of Territorial 
Administration, who told me that the state does not provide a standard definition of 
chieftainship, was indeed appalled when I brought to his attention my personal reading 
of the decree of 1977. Mine was the idea that the State of Cameroon, in its legislation on 
chieftaincies (chefferie), had a compounded idea of collectivity  in which every 
individual could be systematically located. The decree does not present chieftaincies as I 
presented them in Chapter 4 by  distinguishing between chiefdom (palace), chieftaincy 
(territory) and chieftainship (institution). On the contrary, it requires for this purpose the 
notion of “traditional collectivities.” Indeed one can argue that the decree pertained to 
traditional collectivities and nothing more. The first article states that “traditional 
collectivities are organized into chieftaincies.” Accordingly, the whole landscape of 
villages and neighborhoods in Cameroon can be seen without consideration to their 
inhabitants as a legal landscape of traditional collectivities, whether the tradition is 
pronounced or not (the urban/rural divide), or whether it  is homogenous or not, since 
heterogeneity appears to have been promoted thanks to the invocation of tradition in the 
designation and the selection of chiefs. If not traditional what would the collectivity then 
be? The decree does not answer this question. The constitution of 1996 shed some light 
on the subject. 
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The very constitutionality of chieftainship in Cameroon hinges on the notion of 
tradition. The constitution does not yet speak of traditional collectivity. Instead, it speaks 
of two sorts of collectivities: public collectivity, and territorially decentralized 
collectivity. The first type of collectivity is mentioned in relation to the judiciary, the 
second pertains to an unprecedented structure that reorganizes municipalities and regions 
as financially  semi-autonomous institutions that are to be represented by the senate, 
altogether to be created. While there is no direct mention of chieftainship in the 
constitution, its existence can be inferred from the requirement, stated earlier, that the 
“traditional commandment” be represented in regional councils. Fo’o Sokoudjou 
ridiculed my understanding of the subject by telling me that this line does not necessarily 
mean, as Charles Nach Mback assumes (2002), that traditional chiefs are to be present  in 
regional councils. Why not? According to Fo’o Sokoudjou, anyone who deems to be a 
ressortissant of a chieftaincy can “represent” the chieftaincy. Thus, at the time when the 
decree of 1977 relating to chieftaincies was drafted, one could say that the Cameroonian 
state conceived of only traditional, public and/or territorial collectivities. 
Decentralization was the innovation of the constitution of 1996. The terms 
“public” and “territorial” should not, however, be confused. The first term refers to 
administrative constituencies, at the center of which one finds state representatives, 
while the second refers to municipalities, at the center of which one finds elected 
councillors. Assembly persons in Cameroon, so-called deputies, do not represent their 
constituencies. They represent the nation (Njoh-Mouelle, 2001). Thus every individual 
might claim to belong at once to a traditional collectivity, a territorial collectivity, and a 
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public collectivity, depending on the authority  in charge of any aspect of his everyday 
business. How then to explain the relevance of chieftaincies once their participation to 
tax collection has been taken away? In a more appropriate fashion, why should the 
population of the country be conceived of as a collection of traditional collectivities if 
the latter do not correspond to the inhabitants of territorially bound chieftaincies? Is it 
only to safeguard traditions or for the mere surveillance of its population as the case 
appears? What does it mean for an individual to be recognized as a member of 
traditional collectivity? 
I may  not have made it clear thus far that  for an individual such Athanase 
Mbarga, the traditional collectivity to which he belongs is not the territorially-bound 
traditional collectivity where he was born and where he lives, but  the traditional 
collectivity of his putative home village. Apart from the respect due to traditions and the 
prospect of a political career, I have long sought to explain the relevance of these 
putative home villages for people whose parents had long settled in other regions, and 
whose life experience can only be traumatically segregated from the places they live in. 
This is particularly the case with the Bamileke in the Littoral Region. I have thus come 
to the realization that the very basis of citizenship in Cameroon is not quite different 
from the principle mentioned above about the determination of provinces of origin (Law 
n° 1968-LF-3 of June 11, 1968 on the code of nationality). It all goes as if the symbolic 
threshold of self-identification, the threshold of articulate subjectivity in the legend that 
guides Mbarga’s principles of blood and genes and rules over his status as a Bamileke 
from Bamendjou, could be written as such: either you are an indigene, or you are a 
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foreigner; either you are an autochthon or you have become a Cameroonian by virtue of 
some accident of your family history. In the next chapter, I will examine how this 
threshold of subjectivity translates into ideology and political propaganda.
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CHAPTER SIX: POLITICS PAST, POLITICS PRESENT
We must recognize that no ethnic group is genetically flawed or 
wrong, nor congenitally perfect or right. Only individuals are unsavory or 
dishonest, lazy or hard working. Every sociocultural group  has whatever 
there is, of best and worst, among humans. The rest is just a matter of 
cultural reference. Once this is understood, coexistence is no longer an 
issue because it then turns into a question of handling differences. 
However it is possible that some cultures are more capable than others of 
producing modernity, of generating progress and development. This is 
nevertheless another debate.
Car nous devons reconnaître qu’il n’y a pas d’ethnie génétiquement 
tarée ou mauvaise, ni d’ethnie congénitalement parfaite et bonne. Il n’y a 
que des individus crapules ou honnêtes, paresseux ou travailleurs. 
Chaque groupe socio-culturel contient ce qu’il y a de meilleur et de pire 
parmi les humains. Le reste est question de repère culturel. Une fois 
qu’on l’a compris, la coexistence devient facile car il n’est plus question 
alors que de l’aménagement des différences. Il est cependant possible que 
certaines cultures soient plus aptes que d’autres à produire la modernité, 
à générer le progrès et le développement. Mais il s’agit là d’un autre 
débat. 
Maurice Kamto, interview with Valentin Siméon Zinga, La Nouvelle 
Expression, December 8, 2011
I took a special interest in the intellectual and political career of Maurice Kamto a 
year before November 30, 2011, when he resigned from office as the vice minister of 
justice and became a full-time politician. The excerpt above comes from the concluding 
remarks to his comparison of democracy with tribalism, during his first published 
interview after his resignation. If I were to hear in Kamto’s statement not only  a 
Cameroonian discourse on the inequality  of ethnic groups or cultures, or even more 
radically a Bamileke intellectual position on cultural diversity  and politics in Cameroon, 
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I would most likely be asked to respect Kamto’s reserve on this issue. However, in a 
context where the exhibition of ethnographic objects is subject to accusations of 
overrepresentation (Chapter 1 and 2), where decision-makers face overwhelming 
suspicions in respect to their ethnicity (Chapter 4 and 5), where every individual is 
expected to identify  with an ethnic home (Chapter 3 and 5), Maurice Kamto’s a 
statement can hardly escape scrutiny. Perhaps a decisive step on my part  will consist not 
in locating Kamto’s voice in a power struggle that finds its articulation in the language of 
ethnicity and culture (even though it is necessary), but in exploring the reasons for which 
a hermeneutics of individuals is painstakingly  summoned to rescue a yet triumphant 
hermeneutics of culture. 
Both individual and culture are in Kamto’s statement convened to articulate 
difference, infer its origin, anticipate or repudiate its effacement. Indeed we could focus 
on the crux of these two hermeneutics, and ask ourselves what the nature of the 
coexistence is, whose absence Maurice Kamto attributes to a lacking ethics of 
individuals a dominant ethics of ethnic groups. Is Kamto speaking about the coexistence 
of individuals or that of ethnic groups? If it is the coexistence of individuals, where does 
the quarrel over “sociocultural groups” come from? If it is the coexistence of ethnic 
groups, why would such a coexistence depend on the behavior of individuals alone? Is 
Kamto telling us that ethics, or even politics, should be located at the level of individual 
action instead of group action? If so, what would be the demarcating line between the 
respective spheres of individual action and group  action? All things considered, how are 
we to take Kamto’s inconclusive suggestion that that which presides over the 
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hermeneutics of individuals, their uneven flaws, virtues, and abilities, can also be 
attributed to sociocultural groups, especially when confronted with the challenge, in his 
view, of becoming modern or any other challenge for that  matter? In this chapter, I 
would like to disentangle the complex issues that underlie Maurice Kamto’s emergent 
distinction between culture and politics in order to argue that the opposition of 
citizenship to autochthony, which has been an intellectual undercurrent of the literature 
of belonging, is predominantly meant to silence claims of autochthony, and its 
constitutional inscription, more specifically, instead of exploring the voices that such an 
opposition masks, which are capable of yielding the major axes of confrontation behind 
what has become a constitutional controversy. 
I would be reminded of a scrutiny of this sort two weeks later in Douala, on 
December 30, 2011, exactly a day before the Deido riot. The Deido riot was a 
confrontation between the Deido neighborhood and motorbike taxi-drivers which 
followed the death of a client. The confrontation was later described in the news as a 
confrontation between autochthons and allochthons. James Mouangué Kobila, a vibrant 
scholar, law professor, and author of the most compelling compendium of legal debates 
on the protection of minorities and indigenous populations in Cameroon (2009), whom I 
visited, handed me the transcript  of the first and last episode of a television program on 
Cameroonian communities. The program had been launched in February  of 2010 by 
Canal 2 International, a Cameroonian private broadcasting company. Les Bamilékés et le 
Renouveau (The Bamileke and the Renouveau) was the topic broadcast on February  23, 
approximately a year and half before my meeting with Kobila. The single episode 
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brought a couple of Bamileke intellectuals, businessmen and politicians around Sindjoun 
Pokam, the leading figure in Cameroon to align the origins of Bamileke political issues 
to the late colonial period. The heated conversation between the panelists focussed 
essentially  on assessing the place of the West Region and the Bamileke community at 
large in present day  state politics, particularly since Paul Biya came to power in 1982, of 
which Biya’s slogan of Renouveau is indicative. The prevailing dissension, during the 
broadcast, on the significance of the colonial past, the national liberation movement, the 
post-independence political reforms, and the incidence of Biya’s ultimate rise to power 
contrasted with a convergence of mind on two issues. First, there was a general 
assumption that assessing the Bamileke participation in national politics amounts to 
assessing the presence of the West Region in state politics. The second point of 
convergence was the panel’s general acknowledgement of ongoing Bamileke discontent. 
My immediate interest in Kobila’s gesture, however, was not so much in the content of 
the program as it was in the radical signifier that Canal 2 International’s initiative had 
come to play in Kobila’s general assessment of Bamileke voice in the Cameroonian 
media. Kobila had come to think that the idea behind the program was not about giving 
the panel to a new community at every new episode, as the program was initially 
presented by the broadcasting company, he told me, but to force its audience into 
welcoming and listening to a one-time thing that would put the Bamileke in the spotlight 
against any other ethnic community in Cameroon.
In making the Bamileke the one and only deserving ethnic community, Canal 2 
International would have demonstrated, for Kobila, its biased commitment to the 
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Bamileke plea alone. Accordingly, I could ask what the lacking voices were, or at least 
what the voices left out by Canal 2 International were, the voices that might have equally 
mattered for Kobila. Adversely and against the drive toward the programmatic and 
improbable exhaustion of communities in Cameroon, I asked whether the surreptitious 
gesture of Canal 2 International could bear witness to a political situation in the country 
that could not succeed to take shape otherwise? Accordingly, can it  be said that the 
Bamileke, by the very misinterpreted initiatives that they take, or that are taken in their 
name–like The Road to Chiefdoms, or here the television program–have become the 
most capable of raising the enunciated situation to political consciousness? In 
consequence attention should be paid to the reasons for which this situation is articulated 
in the language of either cultural difference or differential access to political power. With 
the likelihood of this series of entailment in mind, I would later come back to Maurice 
Kamto’s interview, and ponder how a scrupulous scholar such as Kobila would have 
taken his half didactic and half doctrinal statement on cultures. Indeed, how are we to 
read Maurice Kamto? Does he not formalize for us, in context, the whole series of 
questions that I explored about belonging in Chapter 2? In this regard, I argued that a 
overhauled theory of identity  politics could be useful only if it were to help us formalize 
an ethical issue discernible in a particular voice, a particular demand, and not left to the 
boundless realm of metaphors? If Kamto does not appear to speak directly about 
belonging or autochthony, if he does not conspicuously draw on a theory  of primordial 
attachment or on the distinction between ethnicity and tribalism, if he does not  castigate 
the constructed character of either referent so as to read their origins in colonial history, 
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or to postulate the virtues that the postcolonial state might have found in them, are we 
not at least to explore the specific concerns in his voice? Indeed, we can ask Maurice 
Kamto: By whom, and in whose name, are the differences spoken of to be handled? Who 
would not fall within their field? Is the challenge of handling differences not located at 
the very heart of the notion that calls for its requirement? What is the knowledge that 
supports Kamto’s diagnosis and binds his aspiration? Is it the knowledge of articulate 
differences, or is it  instead the knowledge of something else, certain yet not necessarily 
discernible in his speech, which I will identify at the end of this chapter as the 
consensual postcolonial nation? In either case what is the predicament? 
As expected, at the time of Kamto’s interview, the Cameroonian media was 
attuned, more than to anything else, to the reasons the career politician, lawyer, and 
former law professor at the state universities of Yaoundé and Ngaoundéré, and member 
of the International Law Commission of the United Nations since 1999, would give for 
his unanticipated departure from government, especially  since none had been mentioned 
in his official resignation statement. Additionally, over the couple of months that 
followed the interview, his statement on cultural difference would remain in the shadow 
of his subsequent call for a new movement that would unite dissatisfied political parties 
around common goals. At a formal level nonetheless, Kamto’s belief in the possibility of 
profiling cultures and assessing their relative competitiveness did not seem to me 
different from the belief displayed two months later by Claude Guéant, the then French 
Minister of Interior, whose statement on the inequality of civilizations would prompt a 
renewed global interest in the question of cultural difference. Yet there was a difference 
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between the context in which the two politicians made those statements and between 
their understanding of the relationship  between politics and culture. Whereas Kamto 
attempted to separate culture from politics and downplay the relevance of ethnicity in 
state affairs, Guéant, on the other hand, asserted its significance to the student 
association before which he felt compelled to take a stance against “the teachings of 
leftist ideology” (Le Monde.fr & AFP, 2012). On a broader scale, the specter of 
immigration in France, which could be read behind the French politician’s statement, can 
be contrasted to the accusations of tribalism rampant in Cameroon, and to which 
Maurice Kamto was directly responding in his interview with Valentin Siméon Zinga. 
Consequently, it  is tempting to ask–as Geschiere does at a level broader than the 
comparison of Cameroon with France (2009) and in a sagacious move to look at  issues 
of ethnicity independently from the tropes of culture and civilization–whether 
immigration issues in Europe share a common denominator with tribal issues in Africa. 
In this regard, the congruity between the relative growth of transnational flows of capital 
and people and the rising impulse of governments and local constituencies in reaffirming 
their particularities and marking their boundaries is scrutinized. Concomitantly, 
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh sense a tension between capital formation at a global stage–for 
being taken as the prime mover of autochthony–and the nation-state as a political 
formation that builds upon citizenship within the borders of a territorially defined state 
(Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2001). Against this effort nevertheless, the collusion between 
capitalist economy and the nation-state form as a political instrument is obviated. The 
same applies to the congruities between citizenship  and autochthony. No matter that they 
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are acquirable, alterable, or simply imprescriptible, and no matter whether they are 
mutually  exclusive or inclusive, both can be considered as inscriptions of birth privilege, 
more or less open to exceptions. 
I also noted in Chapter 2 that the major consequence of an emphasis on the “global 
conjuncture of belonging” (Geschiere, 2000, p.424) in the consideration of ethnic issues 
at an infra-global level, such as in Cameroon, is to first draw attention to global 
processes to the expense of situated ethical challenges, and second to urge the latter to 
find answers in the former. If there is a need to look at the movement of people and 
capital, if there is a need to articulate capitalism and nationalism, there is no specific 
reason why this would rest on a perspective that binds autochthony  to globalization 
alone. On the contrary, I would like to ask whether the distinction between citizenship 
and autochthony, as it takes shape in the belief of a Cameroonian intellectual such as 
Kamto, can really address his worries. Accordingly, this chapter urges us to explore the 
lineaments of Kamto’s specific concern and invitation to think about difference and 
political competition in Cameroon. My inclination to read an articulate political 
statement in Kamto’s discussion of ethnicity  in La Nouvelle Expression, against the 
general indifference to it at the time of its publication, can be explained by an earlier 
effort on my part. 
In November 2010, during a conversation on accusations of tribalism, Fabien 
Eboussi-Boulaga, retired philosophy professor and director of Editions Terroirs, directed 
my attention to the proceedings of a colloquium on tribalism and democracy in 
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Cameroon. The colloquium had been held in April 1996 at the Yaoundé branch of the 
German Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, approximately four months after the constitutional 
amendment that inaugurated the protection of minorities and indigenous populations. 
Maurice Kamto was one of the participants. His discussion of chieftainship would be of 
special interest to any prospective inquiry into ethnic regionalism in Cameroon since 
chieftainship remains for the state a central institutional piece in the protection of 
indigenous populations. The centrality of chieftainship  is determined by  the structure of 
tribal affiliation developed by the state and the tribal entitlements that run through state 
institutions. 
Kamto, in a very succinct paper delivered at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
argues that despite the measure taken by the new constitution to create a body in charge 
of debating the constitutionality of laws, individual liberties and human rights would 
continue to be unprotected from earlier non-abrogated legislation that might prove 
unconstitutional and remain so, unless the newly instituted Constitutional Council were 
to be open to direct citizen entitlement. In fact, as stated in the constitution, only  a 
couple of privileged state officials, namely the President of the Republic, the President 
of the National Assembly, and the President of the Senate may reach the Constitutional 
Council. I found Maurice Kamto’s statement crucial because, in my overall treatment  of 
Cameroonian legislation, a question can be raised as to the relevance of older 
ordinances, laws and decrees, such as the decree of 1977 pertaining to chieftaincies, 
which do not find a formal foundation in the constitution of 1996. It  is precisely  the case 
with chieftainship, on which Kamto had to elaborate in his response to the audience. It is 
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also the case with ordinances, such as the land ordinances of 1974, which is the subject 
of the next chapter, and which, in my view, is the crux of the political demand that is 
seeking formalization behind the scenes of ethnic pluralism in Cameroon; beyond the 
mere structure of tribal affiliation that I explored in Chapter 5. 
Understanding the relationship  between central and local government, in Kamto’s 
view, not only entails assessing the relationship between chieftaincies and the 
government but also discussing the notion of “minority  communities.” At least that was 
the gist of his answer to a question during the colloquium on tribalism and democracy. In 
so doing, however, Kamto unwittingly aligned local government, minority issues, and 
chieftainship. He did so with the prospect not of seeing chieftainship as the general 
foundation of tribal affiliation and entitlement, as I did when I explored the controversial 
status of the Bamileke at the National Museum of Yaoundé (Chapter 1), but in the view 
of asking that chieftainship  be maintained as a cultural institution only. Accordingly, 
Kamto made reference to a draft of constitution that he submitted to the constitutional 
commission in 1990. In the document, he suggested that chieftaincies be understood as 
cultural entities and be given no political power. The state would thus have to protect 
chieftaincies from disaggregation, as much as it would have to curb their political 
significance. It follows that the minorities evoked by the new constitution, in Kamto’s 
view, are to be understood as cultural minorities, amenable to chieftaincies, but not as 
political entities. He went on to emphasize this by saying, “It has been said that 
republican principles and traditional chieftaincies cannot both be defended, to me it 
seems that they are not incompatible” (Kamto, 1996, p.45). Although Kamto speaks of 
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traditional chieftaincies in these lines, we should not read in it the letter of their 
inscription in the decree of 1977, which equates chieftaincies with traditional 
collectivities, as qualitatively yet cumulatively  opposed to public collectivities and 
territorial collectivities (Chapter 5). For Kamto, like most scholars in Cameroon, not all 
traditional chieftaincies are truly  traditional; no matter the relationship between chiefly 
authorities and territory. The traditional character may be inferred from a particular 
reading, not of the law but of history  and, more specifically, of the most recent  history; 
the colonial past. To ascertain the difference, and point  at the historically heterogenous 
distribution of such traditional chieftaincies, Kamto suggestively draws on his personal 
background and urges that culture be considered separately from state politics. 
In my view as an originaire of a corner of Cameroon where there are 
traditional chiefs, when I am with my traditional chief in politics, where it 
is about voting, he is just a mister, a citizen like any other. Now, when he 
returns and dons his chiefly adornments, and he is bestowed with the 
power to officiate over skulls, he is wearing a different mantel and he 
must be respected as such. (...) Now, if the traditional chieftaincy, because 
it has gradually acquired political power, or in its willingness to acquire 
political power, turns into a sort  of feudal system that hinders the 
Republic and citizenship, then one must speak of a struggle between the 
Republic and archaism. Archaisms can be found in every domain. Thus 
for me, there is no incompatibility.
Pour moi qui suis originaire d’un coin du Cameroun où il y a des 
chefs traditionnels, quand j’agis avec mon chef traditionnel sur le terrain 
politique, où il s’agit d’aller voter, il est un monsieur, un citoyen comme 
n’importe lequel. Maintenant quand il rentre dans ses habits de chef 
traditionnel, qu’il a le pouvoir d’aller officier sur les crânes, il a un autre 
manteau et on doit le respecter comme tel. (...) Maintenant si la chefferie 
traditionnelle, parce qu’elle a acquis progressivement le pouvoir 
politique ou veut en acquérir davantage de pouvoir politique, devient une 
sorte de féodalité qui brigue la république et la citoyenneté, en ce 
moment là, c’est un combat entre la république et des archaïsmes. Mais 
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les archaismes, on les retrouve dans tous les domaines. Pour moi, il n’y a 
donc pas incompatibilité. (Kamto, 1996, p.45)
The corner of Cameroon Maurice Kamto speaks of as his origin is none other than 
the present-day West Region, more precisely the former Bamileke Region. The third and 
fifth chapters of this dissertation explore the notion of originaire. We have seen in 
Chapter 3 that the notion of origin leads to a territorially defined ethnic origin. The West 
Region is thus to be read again not as the land of the Bamileke alone–as the previously 
mentioned television program might lead us to think–but equally as the land of the 
Bamoun. Kamto’s reference to skull rituals is a personal indication of that origin. He 
assumes that this memorial service is practiced nowhere but among the Bamileke, or 
among the non-Muslim Grassland population. On the other hand, the fifth chapter which, 
thanks to Athanase Mbarga’s autobiography, made precise the notion of autochthony 
gave us a microscopic definition of the village of origin, the putative home village, 
which is independent from either birth place or place of residency. Whereas this notion 
of autochthony is presided over by  the current Cameroonian legislation on chieftaincies, 
the implied idea of traditional is different from that of Maurice Kamto and operates 
mainly as an identity marker. The idea of “village,” for the Cameroonian state, entails 
the notion that  tradition, the principle which rules over the whole institution of 
chieftainship in the constitution of 1996, is not a subject of competition between 
outsiders and insiders. Moreover, the traditional authorities of the village do not see 
themselves as other than autochthons. Even for the Ministry  of Territorial 
Administration, as reported to us by Fo’o Djoukeng of Fongo Tongo, non-autochthons 
have to abide by the rule of the chieftaincies in which they  live. Once the identification 
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of chiefly  authorities with the land is no longer possible, as is the case in some urban 
areas or in small towns such as Ambam, which in Athanase Mbarga’s view had been 
nearly created with allochthons, we have neighborhood chieftaincies instead of 
traditional chieftaincies. The disappearance of villages in favor of neighborhoods, while 
it does not jeopardize chieftainship, creates a traumatic void that finds its outlet in urban 
reactionary impulses over ancestral lands, a regressive identification to an earlier village 
of origin, or the mere outcry of people who have lost their origins such as the members 
of the Association of the Eleventh Province in the South-West Region (Geschiere, 2009). 
The major difference between chieftaincies as cultural entities, as Kamto envisions 
them, and chieftaincies as traditional collectivities, as the Cameroonian state understands 
them, lies in the fact that, unlike the latter the former requires a cultural recognition and 
cannot be said to be equally distributed nationwide or of equal relevance in matters of 
cultural endowment or signifiers. Moreover the Cameroonian state’s notion of traditional 
collectivity, although peremptory by definition, unlocks in practice the territorial basis of 
group identity  by creating unspeakably  nontraditional traditional collectivities that are de 
facto territorial collectivities. When the chiefly authorities cannot claim to be 
autochthons on the basis of their ethnicity, they become non-existent morally  because 
chieftaincies are not  recognized as territorial collectivities with juridical standing by the 
constitution, which recognizes only the more encompassing constituencies that are 
municipalities and regions in this way. Though nontraditional their legality  depends on 
the reference to them as “traditional commandment” in the constitution and on their 
governmental subjection to the central administration (Chapter 5), even when the chiefly 
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authorities do not identify with a specific tradition and the population under their 
supervision is either mixed or completely made of allochthons, as the case appeared to 
Mbarga in Ambam. On the other hand, we can see how Kamto’s idea of cultural entities 
can only embolden the tribal value of land and inadvertently provide a stronger 
foundation to the political claims of the so-called sociocultural groups, especially when 
their attacks resort to Bamileke attaching to their ancestral lands as the basis of their 
motivation. 
When he became a party  leader, I learned that Maurice Kamto’s home village in 
the West Region was none other than Baham. Unfortunately, in the heat of political 
controversy  over his pending departure from the government and the later ban placed on 
his attempts at giving a press conference after his resignation, I was unable to interview 
Kamto. Among other issues that I had deemed relevant, such as the Bamileke effort  to 
dissociate culture from politics, I had in mind to ask him about the insignificance of birth 
place and residency in the discussion of autochthony. Furthermore, if there were to be a 
vanguard in the dissociation of putative home village and chieftainship as an institution, 
it seemed to me, thanks to the literature on the relatively greater dispersion of the 
Bamileke inside the country and their assumed hold over the economy of urban areas 
(Warnier 1993), that no ethnic group other than the Bamileke was better prepared to rise 
to that position. It was precisely  from this perspective that I conceived of the Bamileke’s 
significant position in Cameroon, despite the persistent silence among Bamileke 
intellectuals on the relationship between chieftainship and the protection of “indigenous 
populations,” in accordance with the language of the constitution. I argued in Chapter 3 
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that Zognong’s generalization of the call for detribalization as a Bamileke call should be 
relativized. Not only is Zognong’s idea limited to the immediate signs of tribalization 
that he can read in the governmental use of regions of origin to allocate seats in the 
administration and the military, it  also refuses itself to consider the dependence of this 
measure on broader and deeper institutions, such as chieftainship. I have already argued 
in Chapter 5 that such a governmental use of regional origin could be conceived of as the 
instrument of state-censored tribal discrimination, only  inasmuch as regions are not only 
legible tribally but  also that their tribal character is not subject to change. We have seen 
that the determination of origins, which is legally bound to filiation, instead of birth 
place or residency in existing legislation regarding both the civil service and nationality, 
follows the pattern of what  I called ethnic territorialization, which could in fact be taken 
for a tribalization of the territory. Thus, by not considering ethnic territorialization as the 
very springboard of tribalization, Zognong makes of it the mere outcome of a 
governmental discrimination, and thereby insinuates that the government is globally 
anti-Bamileke. Accordingly, Zognong’s call for the detribalization of citizenship does 
not correspond necessarily  to a call for the detribalization of regions, and more broadly 
of the entire territory. Maurice Kamto’s dichotomy between chieftainship  as culture and 
republicanism as politics also points at his reluctance to examine chieftainship as the 
firmest foundation of autochthony. Yet there is more to consider in the drive toward the 
Bamileke and non-Bamileke opposition before asking in what ways postcolonial reform 
generated this situation with its treatment of the land question.
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More to the issue of the tribal character of state institutions, the predominant 
position of Bamileke networks of home village associations in popular culture and 
academic literature, despite the absence of a sustainable statistical basis, led me to the 
awareness that Zognong’s efforts can hardly be formalized as a Bamileke call for 
detribalization in general. If such a call was to be located, it  could find room nowhere 
else in Cameroon than among the so-called members of the Association of the Eleventh 
Province in the South-West Region, an association which has been described by Peter 
Geschiere as the association of non-originaires, or those whose tribal origins can no 
longer be traced to anywhere in the country. Yet, an association of this sort cannot have 
both the visibility  and the might of the Bamileke in state politics. Reasons for this should 
be sought in the very idea of nation central to politics in Cameroon. Instead of calling for 
the demise of traditional collectivities, the voice of Bamileke scholars, such as 
Dieudonné Zognong and Maurice Kamto, has consistently  echoed the political rhetoric 
against tribalism, understood as the maneuvers of one tribe against another, or one party 
tapping using tribal networks against  another. Accordingly, the broad interpretation of 
the protection of the rights of indigenous populations as an anti-Bamileke measure has 
been read as the new form of politicization of chieftaincies in the hands of non-Bamileke 
such as the Beti, assumed to be behind Paul Biya, and the Douala who were the first, 
after the constitutional amendment, to march openly  against  the Bamileke in the name of 
autochthony. Can Maurice Kamto’s idea of depoliticizing chieftainship clarify  the 
context of this polarization and his notion of differences?
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It is not from a broad and elaborate interpretation of chieftainship, such as that of 
Athanase Mbarga in Chapter 5, that Maurice Kamto speaks of traditional chieftaincies, 
especially when he comes to compare the West Region to other regions of Cameroon. I 
would even say  that Kamto’s legal proposals on chieftaincies aims at re-institutionalizing 
them anew, and in a most unintended fashion, by transforming them into territorial 
reservations and cultural cradles that have had the luck of surviving the flow of time to 
the benefit of some free-riding traditional collectivities or ethnic groups. While Kamto’s 
interpretation is not totally foreign to the loose Cameroonian legislation on chieftaincies, 
his call for the protection of chieftaincies, qua cultural entities, runs against any  current 
that will force home villages to turn into mere eclectic neighborhoods, as scheduled by 
the programmatic line of the decree of 1977. With more than a century  long background 
of urbanization and a gradual expansion of extractive and transformative industries in 
certain areas, added to the development of large scale plantations, especially in the 
South-West and the Littoral regions, one can see that the state’s territory, in Kamto’s 
view, is not only partially traditional but also placed under the permanent threat  of that to 
which it is opposed. 
Yet, Kamto’s understanding is not original. In the background of Kamto’s concerns 
one can see the whole picture on chieftaincies that comes out of the dominant literature 
and opinions about chieftainship  in Cameroon. The basic principle of differentiation 
between the Grassland and the northern regions on the one hand, and other regions of 
Cameroon on the other hand, is none other than the acrimonious perception of the 
colonial past, and the self-redeeming assumption of contemporary politics and 
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economies as a power foreign to the alleged earlier political entities and local 
communities, oftentimes reconstructed as either stateless or state-like social formations. 
This was the case with Charles Nach Mback’s assessment of chieftaincies as objets 
politiques non identifiés (unidentified legal objects) in Cameroon (Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, beside the nostalgia a description of chieftainship such as Kamto’s fuels, 
one can see the residual and malicious doppelgänger of the idyllic lost in his revamping 
of feudalism as a form of archaism to anticipate the possible encroachment chieftainship 
might have on his unquestioned and unconditionally  cherished republicanism. I would 
add to the ambivalent function of the past the continuity  between Kamto’s dilemma on 
chieftainship and Antoine Socpa’s uneasiness with the role of ethnicity in political 
competition. 
I do not discount that my interest in Kamto’s opinion on chieftainship  may  be 
informed by his position as a Bamileke intellectual. It occurred to me, during the first 
stage of my field research, to think that the emergent distinction between culture and 
politics in Cameroon–which is at the center of my second chapter on belonging–could 
clearly  be identified as a Bamileke intellectual endeavor. In my discussion of this 
distinction, once could question the relevance of the parallel I drew between Antoine 
Socpa’s reprisal of John Lonsdale’s dichotomy on ethnicity  and tribalism, and Clifford 
Geertz’s opposition of civil politics with primordial controversies. Accordingly, I argued 
that beyond the context  and the content of these polarities I sought to draw attention to 
ethical questions that have found a letter of obedience in these polarities. While Geertz 
placed his hope in the momentum of civil politics, which would allegedly not happen 
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without an integrative revolution, the doom of parapolitics in the post-colony, Socpa set 
the question of national integration aside and sought redemption in the advent  of 
democracy  as the political stage that would end ethnic conflicts without regard to their 
association with territorial claims. We have seen, nonetheless, that Lonsdale’s suggestion 
would not sufficiently dampen Socpa’s enthrallment with the opposition of the Bamileke 
with the Beti and the Kotoko with the Suwa in his assessment of ethnic conflicts in 
Cameroon. 
The fact that Socpa’s angst does not appear clearly  in Maurice Kamto’s attempt at 
placing state politics at the level of individuals and citizenship  only, and the state 
protection of minorities and chieftaincies at the level of “sociocultural groups” might 
lead us to think that he is giving an answer to Socpa by intuitively  borrowing from 
Geertz’s doctrine and analogically replacing civil politics with republicanism. However, 
the ethical stumbling block of Kamto’s opposition of feudalism to republicanism, all 
things considered, is not to be sought in a theory of primordial attachment. Neither does 
it lend itself to an ultimate intellectual posture that seeks to articulate the cultural 
ambitions and social instrumentalities of an older political order with those of the current 
order. The ethical safety  valve of Kamto’s distinction between feudalism and 
republicanism must  be sought in the very constitutional arrangement to which he was 
hesitantly  responding in the first part of his short presentation during the colloquium of 
1996. Indeed Kamto’s casuistic distinction between republican rights and cultural 
entitlements is not limited to elections and skull rituals alone, it also brings the activities 
of the hesitantly acknowledged “minority communities” within its purview. The 
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distinction itself supported a dilemma which the then law professor at the University  of 
Ngaoundéré had personally raised in his insistence on the need for the Cameroonian 
state to define and punish tribalism, even though a few existing measures in the penal 
code and the General Statute of Civil Service could be said, in his mind, to go in this 
direction. Accordingly, Kamto’s worries were not to be found in these codes, but in the 
germs of tribalism he perceived in the current constitution. The constitution may have 
authorized political claims made in the name of membership in specific communities. 
While Kamto, in his presentation, does not specify either the germs of tribalism or the 
community-based claims that prompted his reexamination of the constitution, we can at 
least get a sense of his understanding of them in the following lines:
In the last few years, our country has made backward leaps in matters 
of national unity. It’s time we thought about it  seriously. To that end, we 
need to take measures against tribalism. We also need to make tribalism 
unconstitutional, or at least, that which ferments it; that is, any  aspect of 
our juridical apparatus that is liable to be interpreted as a norm that 
authorizes tribalism. (Kamto, 1996, p.37)
Depuis quelques années, notre pays a fait des bonds en arrière par 
rapport à l’unité nationale. Il est temps que nous réfléchissions 
sérieusement. Pour ce faire, il faut prévoir des sanctions contre le 
tribalisme. Il faut également déconstitutionnaliser le tribalisme ou les 
ferments du tribalisme, c’est-à-dire ce qui dans notre ordonnancement 
juridique pourrait être de nature à s’interpréter comme une norme 
accréditant le tribalisme.
 In light of his reference to the constitution we can see that Maurice Kamto’s 
dilemma lies not so much with the absence of a definition of tribalism, but with the very 
appearance of tribalism in the new constitution and with the use that can be made of it. It 
is in the motives that can be read, he says, in the background of “the demonstrations of 
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the so-called minority communities.” His shock comes with the realization that, “such 
behaviors are commanded not by republican principles or political convictions, but the 
mere membership in a community  as such” (Kamto, 1996, p.37). All things considered, 
we shall not read in Kamto’s reference to a minority the national position of the 
Bamileke, to which we have already been introduced in Chapter 3 with Lamberton’s 
suspicion about the likely postcolonial establishment of the Grand Bamileke, but the 
regional position of one specific community. Kamto does not hint at  any  specific 
demonstrations in his paper. Given the circumstances of the colloquium, however, one 
can infer that  the demonstrations at stake in Kamto’s presentation were none other than 
the demonstrations of the Sawa, mentioned above and also discussed in the previous 
chapter. The colloquium was held only  three months after the first multiparty  municipal 
elections and the constitutional amendment of 1996, as well as after people demonstrated 
Douala. Here is Peter Geschiere’s account of the demonstrations.
In spring 1996, I returned from Cameroon quite impressed by  the 
vivid images on Cameroon TV of the large demonstrations of the Sawa 
(“sea people”) in Douala, the country’s main port and economic hub. The 
local Sawa people were clearly enraged that in the municipal elections–
the first since democratization and the reinstatement of a multiparty 
system–Bamileke immigrants had been elected as mayors in four of the 
five municipalities of the city. The demonstrators’ language–in their 
songs, slogans, and posters–was clear: they  were the autochthons; these 
“strangers” (allogènes) should go back home and vote there, and not try 
to rule in the land of their hosts.” (Geschiere, 2009, p.4-5)
Geschiere, in these lines, not only strives to outline the various voices involved in 
the Douala demonstration of 1996, he brings forth his own interpretation of the situation. 
As a result, the spectacle of autochthon’s demands that he reads in the Cameroonian 
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media must first be outlined before confronting the situation in his accounts to Maurice 
Kamto’s dilemma. I noted in Chapter 2 that Geschiere, while acknowledging soil as the 
apparent substance of autochthony, argues that it is “an empty notion in 
practice” (Geschiere, 2009, p.28), and that its basis should be found in “efforts to 
exclude others from the new circuits of riches and power” (Geschiere, 2006, p.26). 
Accordingly, it can be said that a demonstration such as the one presented above, insofar 
as it falls within the broader drive to claims of autochthony, does indeed display an effort 
to exclude others, in this case the Bamileke, from the opportunities of multiparty 
elections. Following the description of the demonstration in Douala, Geschiere goes on 
to state that “the democratization wave of the early  1990s had the unexpected effect in 
Cameroon and in many other African countries of triggering fierce autochthony 
movements and often quite violent efforts to exclude ‘strangers’ (who are often citizens 
of the same nation-state)” (p.5). 
Whether the said autochthony  movements were unexpected is just a matter of point 
of view. Geschiere himself speaks of a reinstatement of the multiparty system. 
Accordingly, a look back at the late 1950s French Cameroun can indicate that these 
movements were not new in the 1990s. Even the national liberation movements could 
not escape an ethno-regional analysis. The newness, at least in terminology, is the 
confrontation between citizenship and autochthony. There was no room for such an 
opposition during the colonial period. Citizenship was locked in an evolutionary  trope, 
and could be opposed only to other statuses which were legibly defined by the colonial 
administration (subjects of the empire, and indigènes of the colony). On the other hand, 
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even though autochthony was not much the subject of controversy–at least beyond 
village policing–and would remain so until the 1990s, it could be ideologically contested 
only when it was opposed to the broader idea of the nation. As a result, becoming a 
citizen never meant ceasing to be an autochthon.
Geschiere’s reference to the nation-state assumes, on the contrary, that there has 
been a radical break between the colonial past  and today, and that independence has 
meant not only the automatic transformation of indigènes into citizens, but also the 
fulfillment of nationhood through citizenship. There was no question as to whether it 
was really  the absence of citizenship that made autochthony relevant in the past. The 
emergence of an opposition between citizenship and autochthony, which here parallels 
Kamto’s distinction between politics and culture, does not simply  tell us that  the scene of 
political competition is new–as a consequence of the end of colonial rule–it also tells us 
that the notion of citizenship is demanding a new articulation. Besides following the 
dominant interpretation of the new constitution as a post-one-party  rule strategy  of Paul 
Biya, Geschiere unwittingly joins Maurice Kamto’s ambivalent resort to republican 
rights against claims of autochthony, and cultural entitlements against feudalism. Kamto 
sees autochthony and feudalism as the results of the shortcomings of ethnic groups that 
prey on chieftainship  and infringe upon republican principles. Accordingly  he would 
only agree with Geschiere’s warning on the likely clash between autochthony and 
citizenship. However, would he also acknowledge Geschiere’s designation of the 
Bamileke as immigrants in Douala, the very locale of the voices that prompted the 
colloquium at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, be it for the sake of mere description? All 
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things considered, does not  Geschiere himself, with his unquestioned distinction 
between locals and immigrants, demonstrate if not the lack of appropriate terms to talk 
about the event at least the mere denial of the very consistency of autochthony? 
If the consistency of autochthony  is not acknowledged, or at least taken into 
consideration, will we not be at loss at explaining other manifestations of appeal to soil 
such as the “repatriation” of corpses and home-based cultural festivals, presented in the 
previous chapter or, more broadly, the relative success of an initiative such as The Road 
to Chiefdoms’ museum, insofar as they  all demonstrate that the Bamileke themselves are 
not exempt from displaying an attachment to soil as an ethnic marker? Moreover, does 
not the convergence between the Bamileke community  in Cameroon and the West 
Region as a single variable in the televised program introduced earlier tell us of an 
implicit equation of territory and ethnicity in Cameroon, an equation which does not 
leave the Bamileke unconcerned? Can it not be said that this tacit equation informs 
Geschiere’s identification of the Sawa as locals and the Bamileke as immigrants, or even 
more generally  his other analyses on rituals of belonging among the Maka in the East 
Region and the Bulu in the South Region (2009)? How would we otherwise understand 
the relative success of an ethnographic representation of the nation in Dschang, at the 
heart of the former Bamileke region, with the undoubtedly predominant visibility of the 
Bamileke on display, while the same scheme of national representation is contested in 
Yaoundé?
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Once the Bamileke are re-immersed into the field of ethnic territorialization in 
Cameroon against  the intellectual approach that makes them appear as the bastion of 
anti-autochthony, a series of questions appears. One would ask for instance whether, by 
means of the overbearing networks of home-based community chieftaincies and cultural 
associations spread nationwide and grounded in the former Bamileke region, the 
Bamileke are not giving reasons to other ethnic groups to assume that the Bamileke are 
equally excluding others from “their region,” be it not in the name of autochthony but of 
culture, whilst claiming at the same time their rights over other regions in the name of 
citizenship? Does this state of affair not appear clearly  when Jean-Louis Dongmo’s 
dissertation is read as Hubert Mono Ndjana does; with its explicit assertion that the 
Bamileke have painstakingly  conquered their home Region and are relentlessly engaging 
in occupying other regions, all written in a language reminiscent to others of the 
rhetorically rejected imperial past  (Chapter 1)? What else could have led the Bamileke 
historian Emmanuel Ghomsi to fear that the Bamileke are “exporting” their “traditional 
institutions” into other regions (Chapter 1), or Antoine Socpa to formulate the same 
concern in terms of a deterritorialization of chieftaincies (Chapter 5)? Would Geschiere 
argue, against Antoine Socpa who assured us that cultural associations and community 
chieftaincies were the hotbed of the Social Democratic Front in the 1990s, that the latter 
have no political portent or, more generally, that the political significance of rituals of 
belonging depends on the ethnic group or the region under consideration? How are we 
then to articulate Kamto’s dilemma if not by insisting on the denial of the consistency of 
autochthony, and bringing to the fore the series of entanglements that ties his voice in 
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Cameroon as a Bamileke scholar and henceforth as an active politician? The question 
can be asked in another way: If it  was not the statutory deficiency  of citizenship  that 
made autochthony relevant in the past, what was it? Can it  also be said that the 
postcolonial era shares the same predicament?
Instead of the political thought of Maurice Kamto, I might have chosen to 
introduce the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM)–the political party  Kamto 
launched after his resignation–particularly  with respect to its adoption of Kamto’s 
themes and leitmotivs on tribalism, and with the extent to which the CMR calls upon 
both chieftainship and cultural difference. Yet, doing so would not have help  confront his 
ideas to the various voices that  his career as a Bamileke scholar and politician allow to 
explore, even more so since the CRM is just a nascent political party, outspokenly 
concerned with the immanent force of ethnic background of party politics (CRM, 2014). 
Moreover, if the voice of Maurice Kamto can be identified as the voice of a Bamileke 
scholar and politician, such may not be the case for a political party  led by  a Bamileke. 
Nonetheless, the CRM, like Maurice Kamto, shares a common language with both the 
Musée National of Yaoundé and the Musée des Civilisations in Dschang, if only for their 
equal emphasis on cultural areas and the fears associated with their representation. The 
extent to which both the coherence and the denial of autochthony take shape within the 
new political party as the legal inscription of ethnic territorialization in Cameroon can be 
read in its online political project (CRM, 2014). After the first section, which 
unsuccessfully  endeavors to locate the ideology of the party  as either of the left or the 
right–awkwardly against the backdrop of European and American history–, the section 
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that comes next, which is titled “Political and Institutional Modernization,” brings into 
focus the question of unity in diversity and ultimately argues that “tribalism, no matter 
its form and nature, is an intellectual and mental handicap  that can be cured by  education 
in citizenship, the diversity of the population of the country, the endowments of its 
culture, and the extraordinary potential of development in its various communities if 
they are led to have faith in each other” (CRM, 2014, p.7-8).
The reduction of tribalism to an individual affair in the CRM’s treatment of 
diversity should not lead us to think that this political party  does not validate ethnic 
territorialization. In the same section, specifically in its subsection 2.6, which calls for 
“the redefinition of the status of traditional authorities,” we find both ethnic 
territorialization and Maurice Kamto’s ambivalent treatment of chieftainship. Speaking 
of traditional authorities, identified as “the consecrated custodians of the traditions and 
cultures of our lands (terroirs),” the party  argues that they  “have (...) diverse historical 
origins, a social status and a visibility that  vary according to cultural areas,” and that 
they  “should be respected in their specific identities,” for respecting them as such 
amounts to respecting the cultural diversity of the country (CRM, 2014, p.12). Ironically 
though, while it  is willing to dismiss the current legal treatment of chiefly authorities in 
the country, the party refers to the residual notion of “auxiliary of administration”–which 
as I discussed in Chapter 5 was read as the colonial background to the 1977 decree by  Fo 
Sokoudjou of Bamendjou–and seeks redefine their political function. “In order to allow 
them to fulfill their role in rallying people inside our respective communities,” the CRM 
argues, “the administrative authorities should refrain from demeaning or humiliating 
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them, from weakening them by multiplying traditional chieftaincies without historical 
roots, or by turning notables into traditional chiefs of such and such degree” (CRM, 
2014, p.13).
The critique embedded in the CRM’s statement about traditional authorities, in 
addition to highlighting the relationship between Kamto’s convictions and the CRM’s 
political aspirations, does bear witness to a situation that is much broader than the rise of 
the so-called rituals of belonging centered on home villages and cultural promotion as 
discussed in Chapter 5. No event better expresses both the political and cultural 
significance that chieftainship has gained today  in Cameroon than the consecration of 
Paul Biya as the supreme chief by the Assembly of Traditional Chiefs of the South 
Region during the Ebolowa Agro-Pastoral Show of 2011, and Biya’s sarcastic self-
proclamation as the “Fon of Fons” (traditional chief of traditional chiefs) on the 
occasion of his televised speech that year at the ceremony commemorating the 
Reunification of 1972 in Bamenda. The comprehensive exploration of the new meanings 
that chieftainship  seems to have gained over the last quarter century can only  lead us 
back to the heart of Maurice Kamto’s dilemma and the attendant call for handling 
differences. The notion of terroirs in Cameroon is synonymous with ethnic homelands, 
and the idea of “specific identity” in CRM’s propaganda emphasizes the ethnic 
heterogeneity of the country’s population. Both terroirs and identity are crucial for 
understanding not only  the CRM and Maurice Kamto’s discussion of chieftainship, but 
also the political demand that the separation of culture from politics formulates. Kamto’s 
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effort to separate culture from politics can be said to have a definite Bamileke character 
in Cameroon.
It is pointless to explore the ways in which the distinction between culture and 
politics is contested either teleologically, as is the case with Kamto’s linearization of 
feudalism and republicanism, or pragmatically via proposals such as a CRM’s call for 
the adoption of “a national language” in the face of the necessity to protect identities 
(CRM, 2014, p.12). The last is a protest  against the constitutional imposition of English 
and French as official languages. This position unwittingly highlights the political 
character of a feature such as language that would otherwise be categorized as cultural. 
What matters instead are the denial of autochthony that the theoretical distinction 
between culture and politics illuminates, and the undesirable clash of differences that 
replicates and masks ethnic territorialization. Thus, it can be said that a position such as 
Maurice Kamto’s only reveals the gradual intellectual rift in Cameroon between the 
Bamileke and other ethnic groups, as much as it helps reassert the coherence of ethnic 
territorialization and claims of autochthony. Ultimately, the separation of culture from 
politics is the form that the denial of ethnic territorialization has taken for the past 
quarter century. Claims of autochthony are the recourse the same ethnic territorialization 
has taken against efforts made to silence it in the name of citizenship. The fact that a few 
Bamileke intellectuals have been the first to articulate this distinction can only  lead us to 
ask why. The answer can only be found in the archetypal position taken by  the Sawa 
demonstration of 1996 ever since. This is precisely why the city of Douala, thanks to the 
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outcome of the municipal elections of 1996, has become the screen against which we can 
read the political significance of autochthony.
It can be said that the denial of autochthony has taken shape only  in areas where 
we find an overwhelming imbalance between autochthons and non-autochthons in 
politics. Maurice Kamto’s advocacy for the rights of minority communities as 
chieftaincies and cultural entities–despite his recognition of the West Region as his place 
of origin ethnically  speaking–addresses not the general situation in Cameroon, but only 
certain situations in which autochthony has resurfaced in politics such as in Douala. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 the current  Littoral Region, of which Douala is the administrative 
capital, was seen in the wake of independence as an increasingly Bamileke region. 
Moreover, despite the absence of official ethnic statistics in Cameroon, scholars such as 
the French geographer George Courade (1997) estimated the Bamileke percentage of the 
population of Douala to be 70% in the mid-1990s. Thus, it can be said retrospectively 
today  that the minority communities, whose negligently anti-republican actions was 
decried by Maurice Kamto at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of 1996, were none other 
than the Sawa who had recently voiced their dissatisfaction with the overwhelming 
triumph of the Bamileke in the municipal elections of the same year. Maurice Kamto’s 
indirect rejection of Sawa claims of autochthony in the city of Douala can be articulated 
as a general rejection of the political significance of autochthony if the theoretical 
background that ties his identification of them as a “minority community” is brought into 
relation with the broader definition of chieftaincies as immutable traditional 
collectivities whose putative home villages remain unshakeable no matter the flow of 
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time. It is not incidental that a Bamileke intellectual charge against autochthony, such as 
in the voice of Dieudonné Zognong (2002), always conjectures a legal foundation in the 
constitutional inscription of the right  of every citizen to settle anywhere in the country. 
Nevertheless a consideration of the difference between chieftaincy as a traditional 
collectivity and chieftaincy  as a neighborhood community has shown that one can settle 
anywhere in the country without necessarily becoming an autochthon of the place of 
settlement.
In the end, the resurfacing of autochthony as a political demand in the sensitive 
voice of the Bamileke, thanks to the municipal elections of 1996 in the Littoral region, 
highlights not only the peculiarity of chieftaincies as constituencies in Cameroon, but 
also the unswerving conviction that political success is unconditionally linked to ethnic 
background and ethnic demography. On the one hand, the situation in Douala has 
revealed a line of hierarchical and overlapping territorial continuity between chieftaincy 
(either village or neighborhood), municipality, region, and country. Whereas the last 
three are constitutionally presided over by a popularly elected “chief,” be it one that 
unknowingly claims to be traditional, as in the case of Biya’s rhetorical self-
identification as “Fon,” only the first does not formally  follow this convention. 
Moreover, the notion of tradition, on which the selection of chiefs in chieftaincies 
depends, theoretically defines two categories of inhabitants: autochthons and non-
autochthons. Accordingly, it  is the general character of chieftainship  as an institution in 
Cameroon that gave a foundation to the constitutional principle that only an indigenous 
person in any given region can become the president of the regional council. This 
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happened well before the adoption of the United Nations’ declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples. The situation as observed in Douala in 1996 demonstrates that 
municipalities, the middle ground between chieftaincy and region, do not escape the 
segregational power of a prescriptive conception of tradition. The Cameroonian 
government has managed to quench problematic situations such as in Douala by 
hypothesizing that all major cities in Cameroon are liable to turn into this sort of 
battleground between autochthons and non-autochthons. It has craftily  instituted a 
pyramidal system of municipal management which breaks cities into as many smaller 
municipalities as necessary and placea them under the direction of non-elected 
governmental officials called “government delegates.” These appointees are more often 
than not autochthons or indigenous people who stand in as mayors. However, in the 
language of the government, such delegates do not manage cities, but “urban 
communities.” All things considered, chieftaincies have come to lend their imprimatur to 
municipalities and the entire country.
Whereas Bamileke scholars such as Shanda Tonmè and Sindjoun Pokam–who 
have outspokenly focused their attention on government policies that counter Bamileke 
interests no matter where they  are–have persistently  decried as illegitimate the 
government’s use of delegates to gain control over a city like Douala (Shanda Tonmè, 
2008), they have remained silent about the intricate relationships between chieftaincies, 
municipalities, and regions. They have been equally reluctant to ponder the premise that 
autochthony is a non-Bamileke political maneuver to counter the demographic 
superiority of the Bamileke. Beneath Maurice Kamto’s apparently unrelated efforts to 
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separate culture from politics by  pitting democracy against tribalism, the opposition 
between Bamileke and Sawa intellectuals in the Littoral has instead found a definite 
parallel in the opposition of autochthony  with democracy; with James Mouangué Kobila 
and Shanda Tonmè representing each side respectively. 
It would be naive to assume that demographic speculation in the Region has 
nothing to do with this parallelism, but it  would also prove too simplistic to rely on 
demography alone. In the wake of the one-party rule era, there were expectations among 
the Bamileke and worries among the Sawa that universal plebiscite–the only façade that 
democracy  could display–would allow the Bamileke to take control of the city and the 
Sawa to lose it. As a result, autochthony appeared as the handicap for the Bamileke and 
the means for the Sawa, by which the Sawa would either prevent or facilitate the desired 
or the undesired situation. In either case, autochthony was real for each side. 
Nevertheless, the confrontation between democracy and autochthony dodges a series of 
questions that cannot be formalized unless the stakes on each side are examined 
critically. What makes an individual an autochthon? What do the rights of an autochthon 
entail? Why should an ethnic majority  incontrovertibly translate into a political 
majority? Why is any comparative ethnographic project, such as the national museum 
project of Yaoundé or the Musée des Civilisations of Dschang, politically  controversial? 
Limiting oneself to seeing a tension between primordial attachment and civic politics, or 
else between moral ethnicity  and political tribalism can only lead to an ethical dilemma 
such as Maurice Kamto’s. A tentative response to the series of questions just outlined 
may come with an exploration of the idea of nation that finds support not  in the statutory 
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designation of former indigènes or natives of as the citizens of the independent country–
with a transcendental power bestowed upon citizenship–but in the land ordinances of 
1974 which made of the state the substitute for the nation–a nation that cannot be 
conceived of otherwise than a conglomeration of traditional collectivities, and the ethnic 
control of which means the control of other ethnic groups.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: A NATION OF SQUATTERS AND FENCERS
August 31, 2012, we are in Momo, the village representing 
Bafoussam community  on the left bank of the Noun River. A group  of 
assailants, armed with machetes and clubs, launch a raid on women 
farming their land. The raid lasts for 30 minutes. About 15 people are 
wounded, all of them taken to Momo Health Center and Foumbot Health 
District. For those tuned to the news in the Noun and Foumbot, this raid 
is at least the fifth in which the victims are the Bamileke communities 
living on this part of the Noun Division; therefore on Bamoun lands. The 
administrative authorities of this Division endeavor by all means to 
minimize the repeated confrontations, which they usually  label as 
“isolated incidents.” The facts on the other hand, serious enough, speak to 
the inevitable eventuality of warfare between the Bamileke and the 
Bamoun in the event sub-divisional officers, divisional officers, and 
others continue to downplay information bulletins as they are wont to do.
Le vendredi 31 août 2012, dans le village Momo représentant la 
communauté Bafoussam sur la rive gauche du Noun, un groupe 
d'assaillants armés de machettes et gourdins attaque des femmes en plein 
labeur. L'attaque dure 30 minutes. Environ 15 blessés enregistrés. Tous 
évacués au centre de santé de Momo et au district de santé de Foumbot. 
Pour ceux qui suivent l'actualité dans le Noun et à Foumbot, il s'agit au 
moins de la 5e attaque dont sont victimes les communautés Bamiléké qui 
vivent sur cette partie du Noun, donc sur les terres Bamoun. Les autorités 
administratives de ce département veulent à tous les coups, minimiser ces 
affrontements à répétition qu’elles qualifient «d'incidents isolés». 
Pourtant les faits, suffisamment graves, laissent présager une véritable 
guerre entre Bamiléké et Bamoun si sous-préfets, préfets et autres 
continuent de sous estimer les bulletins de renseignements comme il est 
de coutume. 
Emmanuel Kouayep, La Météo, September 6, 2012
The Catholic University scandal of mid-2012, which brought the specter of ethnic 
territorialization to the forefront of public discussion in Cameroon, was not the only 
ethno-territorial event of the year. Emmanuel Kouayep’s puzzling invocation of state 
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power in the face of cyclic clashes between the Bamileke and the Bamoun less than two 
months later attests to this fact. Even though the scandal at the Catholic University 
gathered the most attention and public interest over time, it was certainly  not the most 
significant, especially since my discussion of Mgr Tonye Bakot’s insidious letter was 
merely intended to exemplify ethnic territorialization in Chapter 3. This second to the 
last chapter considers Emmanuel Kouayep’s call more closely, and examines the ways in 
which he, as did other from whom we have heard thus far, and in the most desperate 
tone, allows us to first formulate ethnic territorialization as the interconnectedness of 
ethnography, tribal homelands, political competition, and historical legitimacy. We will 
see that not only are the four grounds of Pompeo’s paradoxes convened in a single 
demand that conjures ethnic territorialization, the said ethnic territorialization is also 
made so that it cannot be understood as anything other than the general structure of the 
state born from the ashes of decolonization. In this regard, an emphasis will be placed on 
the way the state has become an umbrella for every aspiration to nationhood and the 
purveyor of all its contradictions. Moreover, the incident on the left bank of the Noun 
River will help us locate the special predicament of the Bamileke in the general 
treatment of ethno-territorial issues in Cameroon. First, I will reassess the observational 
and theoretical movement behind the notion of ethnic territorialization, which alone, in 
my opinion, leads us to find in Kouayep’s voice the locus of a structured demand worthy 
of analysis. This is in light of understandable from the perspective I established on 
cultural analysis at the end of the second chapter. I will come back again in a detailed 
fashion in the last chapter.
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From the outset, the aim of this dissertation has been to explore two paradoxes that 
took shape in Francesco Pompeo’s assessment of the challenges of exhibiting culture at 
the National Museum of Yaoundé in the early  1990s. Both Pompeo and Germain 
Loumpet, the Cameroonian archaeologist and director of the commission of the National 
Museum project, indicated that the idea of exhibiting cultures was in compliance with 
president Paul Biya’s call for a synthesis of “Cameroonian cultures.” Early  on I did not 
deem it important to track the origins of this obsession with cultural synthesis, even 
though my reading of Jean-François Bayart’s The State in Africa had me made aware of 
a statement made by  Paul Biya in a newspaper on his personal belief in a precolonial 
antecedent of a territorial distribution of harmonious and peaceful tribes (Bayart 1993, p.
53). The call for a cultural synthesis was advocated by Paul Biya in his most influential, 
ideological, and programmatic book, published in 1987 under the title Communal 
Liberalism, two years before it  was announced that the former presidential palace would 
be turned into the National Museum. Briefly, it  was Biya’s idea as a political theorist, 
and strategy  as a politician, that one could not speak of a Cameroonian nation, and put it 
on display without first accounting for the precolonial polities that had developed before 
colonization. Colonization is accordingly seen in his introductory  chapter as the great 
fall at the origin of “a problem” which “the Cameroonian state had voiced its desire to 
solve,” which has become the political goal of its second president (Biya, 1987, p.9). For 
Biya, the precolonial polities are independent and autonomous ethnic entities which 
were spread over the territory  of contemporary  Cameroon and which colonization forced 
into a single mold. A little further in the book, probably in the form of a safety valve 
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against any  reactionary  impulse on the part  of the population under state control, Biya 
argued that there would be no political future if one were to dwell on colonization and if 
one were not to foreclose or, in his own interpretation, if one were not to transcend the 
boundaries of those ethnic groups in a manner that would make Cameroonians “see 
themselves in cultures which were not initially their original culture,” but the summation 
of “universals” derived from them all taken individually (Biya, 1987, p.110). He called 
this process “cultural spiritualism,” and made it  into the cultural policy  of the newly 
reformed Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, previously  the Cameroon National 
Union under Ahmadou Ahidjo, of which he officially became the chairman in 1985. 
One can infer from Biya’s advocacy for cultural spiritualism that he had 
anticipated that the nation to be represented in the new National Museum would be one 
which did not yet exist  and which was to be supplemented by the state, but whose 
elements could already be identified as discreet ethnic groups, and in which an 
undefined set  of ethnic groups would be represented in a manner that would make them 
at once recognizable and unrecognizable. Put this way, however, the advent of such a 
nation would in itself jeopardize the very  foundation of the state, at least to the extent 
that the state’s whole function is to supplement something that does not yet exist. It is 
my understanding that this idea of a nation, ambivalently ethnic and non-ethnic, is 
central to understanding not only the paradoxes of national representation in Cameroon, 
and the current intellectual efforts to unmask Biya’s strategy  of divide and rule, but also 
the opposite intellectual effort and political nostalgia for national unity, and the 
mobilization against autochthony in the name of democracy. On one side, the precolonial 
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polities are reaffirmed in flesh and bone, on the other hand they are denounced out of 
hand as imaginary and illusory. Nevertheless, after examining the puzzles of ethnic 
origins and chieftainship  in the previous two chapters, in the present chapter, I would 
like to argue that the fear of the overrepresentation of the Bamileke in the Cameroonian 
nation–narrated to us by  both Pompeo and Loumpet (see Chapter 1)–and Biya’s 
obsession with cultural synthesis–a political double of Geertz’s conundrum on 
integrative revolution and the rise of civil politics (see Chapter 2)–would be best 
understood if they were grasped as the emotional undercurrent of the fictional instrument 
by which the relationship between the state and every other agency in the country is 
articulated. More dramatically, this is a fictional instrument by which the resources of 
the deferred nation are bound to the sole authority of the state that supplements it. These 
articulations and deferrals have consequences greater than the mere identification of the 
components of parapolitics and its teleological corollary: the anticipation of civil 
politics. To this effect, I would like to hypothesize that the notion of “national domain,” 
which in the legal apparatus of the Cameroonian state refers to the portion of its territory 
that is de jure the private property of neither individuals nor the state, and on which I 
will elaborate below, belies and questions the so-called fictional instrument. One can 
legitimately argue that the national domain is the very body the image of which takes 
shape in a fiction, and theatricalizes ethnicity in the early National Museum of Yaoundé 
project, and in the current permanent exhibition of the Musée des Civilisations in 
Dschang. The extent within which the predicament of Biya’s obsession can be found is 
not limited to the intellectual heritage of primordial attachment only. It thrusts Bayart’s 
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own effort to displace the notion of pre-colonial entities–be they harmonious and 
peaceful or not–with his more insidious notion of historical trajectories that 
painstakingly  hides his claim for historical mastery, and to which I will return in the last 
chapter.
As a rationale for the body-metaphor that I am giving to national representation 
and to national domain, the asymptotic undercurrent of national representation in 
Cameroon, the notion of a synthesis of Cameroonian cultures can be said to stand in for 
an ideal instrument through which a conglomerate of somewhat definite ethnic groups 
are assumed to be at the foundation of the country, and are called upon at once to 
disaggregate and merge with one another in order to give birth to a new ethnic entity 
with their residues. Whence the problem that handicapped the initial National Museum 
project? Put succinctly the problem with this political instrument, or more specifically its 
nature, is that the ethnic groups cannot be named, or outlined comprehensively  and 
legibly, without jeopardizing the ideal for which ethnic particularities must be 
transcended, and without shattering the very  basis the state was given during the early 
years of independence. Nor can they be done away  with completely without 
undermining the legitimacy  of the current political order. Beyond the fictionally 
organized triptych of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods, this political order is 
a postcolonial compromise among the French policy  of mise en valeur, the German and 
British-inspired policy of chieftainship-based containment, and the postcolonial policy 
of state-oriented social mobility. I would also argue that  this ambivalence, which makes 
colonization its centerpiece, is not the outcome of colonization as an external force, but 
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the value that colonization has come to be endowed with at  the moment of 
independence. But this ambivalence is not the ambivalence of colonization. It is the 
ambivalence of ethnicity in the double mirror of colonization, which is perceived as a 
traumatic event and yet valued as a unifier, and independence, which is perceived as a 
triumph yet experienced as a source of insecurity. This ambivalence can be said to stand 
between the fear of forgetting a once cherished self-image, and the desire to overcome 
its ghastly  power, even if by means of a complete destruction of that self-image. It is as 
if both the worshipped and the abhorred self-image were the prehistory of the current 
political status quo, from which one derives both pleasure and unpleasure. The centrality 
of this ambivalence is so that  it has been endowed with the power of condensing the 
whole and only legitimate history of the country, and providing to its continuity the most 
solid foundation–as witnessed in the writings of Paul Biya. 
If one were to see in Paul Biya the ultimate originator of the fictional instrument 
by the postcolonial state legitimates its existence, the background of the ethnic mapping 
that I presented in Chapter 3 would appear pointless. It is in fact more correct  to see in 
Biya one of its surrogates, without doubt the most vibrant of its mediums during those 
last years of one-party rule, whether for the sake of his position as head of state, or 
according to his desire as a self-willed political writer. This ambivalence can be traced a 
step further back to Ahmadou Ahidjo’s cultural policy of Renouveau culturel (Cultural 
Renewal), and more specifically to his obscure doctrine of réalités nationales (national 
realities), which he thought  ought to be subject  to national unity. This doctrine would 
eventually drive his Révolution verte (Green Revolution) and his Libéralisme planifié 
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(Planned Liberalism) program. On the occasion of his inaugural speech at the joint 
meeting in December 1974 of the newly created and now defunct Council of Higher 
Education and Scientific and Technical Research, and the Council of Cultural Affairs, 
Ahidjo defined the notion of national realities as “our soil and our sub-soil, our cultures 
and our fauna, our maritime and fluvial reserves, our thought and our history” (Bahoken 
& Atangana, 1976, p.30). Biya’s own ideas of universals and synthesis are based in part 
on Ahidjo’s national realities. More proximately, Biya’s ideas were an immediate 
renewal, if not literal appropriation, of an idea presented two years earlier in 1985 by 
François Sengat-Kuo, then Minister of Culture and Information, on the occasion of the 
most significant colloquium the country had held on issues of culture since 
independence (National Cultural Week, 1985). 
The same ambiguity would reappear unquestioned at the end of the one-party  rule 
system in 1991 during a national forum on culture. This was also the year in which the 
Institut des Sciences Humaines (ISH), the single public social research institution in the 
country, was dissolved. The forum gathered the most  influential scholars affiliated with 
the ISH in the hope of drafting the basic terms of future cultural policies in the country. 
It was named Les Etats généraux de la culture (Estates-general of culture), after the 
gatherings of the same name during the Ancien Régime in France, as if to imply  that the 
previous era of one-party rule was one of absolute monarchy. The two slogans “Africa in 
miniature” and “unity  in diversity” would constitute the major results of this forum, and 
would become the post-one party rule avatars of Ahidjo’s national unity and Biya’s 
national integration. The same fictional instrument would also inform the programs of 
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other parties that have been vying to take over from the ruling party since early  1990s. 
The effect of this legacy can be seen in Maurice Kamto’s recently  born CRM  with regard 
to his demand that the specificities of minorities, qua chieftaincies, be respected. 
In retrospect, Pompeo’s paradoxes illustrate the ways in which the ambivalence of 
ethnicity in Cameroon made inroads into public debate by means of an ethnographic 
exhibition scheme. We have seen in Chapter 4 that  the failure of this scheme in Yaoundé 
can be interpreted as an attempt by the government to suppress the insidious 
incongruities opened up  within a certain imaginary  region of the image of the nation that 
it seeks to embody. The safe transfer of the scheme to the museum of The Road to 
Chiefdoms in Dschang can be explained by Madeleine Ndobo’s awareness that the 
predominance of the Grassland in Dschang fits into the instrumental fiction of ethnic 
homelands in Cameroon. The displacement certainly  owes its impetus to the 
incongruence of the visual articulation of ethnic groups in the National Museum with the 
ethnic mapping of the country, the competition between the Bamileke and the Beti in 
national affairs, and lastly the dispute of accreditation over the benefits of the national 
liberation movement and political independence. On the other hand, the imposing 
ethnographic collections of the Grassland has found their fictionally legitimate home in 
Dschang. Thanks to Pompeo, what I called the paradox of national representation 
becomes the thwarted desire to honor the official memory of the precolonial era, and to 
take a distance from the horror of incongruities and imbalances that may be revealed at 
the heart of the celebrated idea of a nation beyond ethnicity  in spite of an ethnic 
foundation. I also argued that there is a second paradox which attaches itself to the first 
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and makes the task of the blind-sided ethnographer either a nightmare or a fantasy. This 
is the paradox of writing on ethnicity  in a context of its repressed ambivalence. The 
second paradox is so great that it creates for a Cameroonian scholar such as Antoine 
Socpa a deep-seated anxiety in the face of ethnic categories and their use in scholarship 
(see Chapter 2). Accordingly, I have managed to dismiss the presumption that one could 
totally  escape from such an anxiety either teleologically by distinguishing the stage of 
primordial attachment from the stage of civil politics, or axiologically by  separating 
ethnicity from tribalism; with either end representing the proper domain of emotions and 
politics respectively. Moreover, doing an exegesis of colonization, even for the sake of 
the traces of this ambivalence only, may  be at home with Biya’s apocalyptic vision of 
that era.
As I argued in the first chapter, rather than explaining the ways in which 
primordial attachments prevent the postcolonial state from building a civil polity, this 
dissertation asks why and how ethnicity has found its specific configuration within both 
the National Museum of Yaoundé and the Musée des Civilisations of Dschang; with the 
predominance of the Grassland appearing controversial in Yaoundé and benign in 
Dschang. One answer to this question–obviously  a tautological one–would be to argue 
that the ethnic composition of museum themes is just an avatar of the fiction at work 
within the idea of cultural synthesis; and the significant difference between Yaoundé and 
Dschang pays heed to the imaginary body of the nation, which I have chosen to call 
ethnic territorialization after the cognitive map of ethnicity explored in Chapter 3. Yet, I 
have already indicated above that the most consistent answer can be found in the 
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undercurrent of this fiction, at the heart of the notion of national domain as an existing 
nation that belies the deferred nation, assumed to be the eschatological stage of cultural 
spiritualism. Put succinctly, it  is the sustained existence of the national domain as a 
domain standing apart from both the public and private, and justifying the existence of 
the state as a supra-ethnic institution, i.e. an umbrella for the ethnic groups of the 
national domain, national cultures, national languages etc., that explains and determines 
the course that contested ethnographic exhibitions, asserted tribal homelands, subdued 
ethnic competition, and questioned legitimacies take in the country. In order to unravel 
the threads of this ambivalence, ethnicity  should not  be taken merely as an 
incontrovertible key to the concept of national domain. It must also be examined in its 
ramifications and associations such as we have done so far with the notions of 
collectivity and community, which are themselves–thanks to autochthony–in league with 
the notion of chieftaincy (see Chapter 5 and 6 respectively). 
A scrupulous test of ideas woven into the notion of nation bound to Pompeo’s 
paradoxes, and hidden in Ahidjo’s concern for national realities and Biya’s for cultural 
synthesis, demonstrates that the nation called forth by  the foreclosure of ethnicity is an 
ideational instrument for the post-independence state conceived of as a form of political 
existence consecutive to colonial rule. Moreover, this ideational instrument cannot allow 
the nation to be mapped onto the demographic configuration of the entire country  as a 
heterogenous whole, whether for the sake of imposition, allocation, legislation or 
delegation. It merely  stands for a structure of desire that generates the state as an 
impersonated nation, assumed to act on behalf of those held within the bounds of the 
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national domain. This domain, as stated above, excludes de jure both the private and the 
public. Moreover, the greater the size of the population that desires to become a nation, 
and the fate of which is bound to the national domain, the better it  is for the emergent 
state qua nation as an institution independent of their will and design.
In 2001, Ebenezer Njoh-Mouelle, the philosopher and former assemblyman and 
Minister of Communication, introduced in Chapter 5, unwittingly argued in a political 
essay that assemblymen in Cameroon do not represent the constituencies that elect  them 
alone. They also represent the nation as a whole (Njoh-Mouelle, 2001). In short, a 
deputy  or an assemblyman is not accountable to an electorate, but to the nation seen as a 
summation of all constituencies and as the aggregation of all citizens. Against Njoh-
Mouelle’s assumption and despite the fact that state laws have enabled an assemblyman 
to be seen as the “deputy  of the nation,” I would like to suggest that one cannot 
apprehend this national whole on the ground without being taken in by  Ahidjo’s worries 
about national realities, and by Biya’s later pronouncements on cultural spiritualism. 
Moreover, the comprehension of this national whole requires that the peculiar 
arrangement–found in the legal treatment of the ex-French and British occupied 
territories–that strategically  separates the national sphere from both the public and the 
private spheres be taken into account. Following Njoh-Mouelle’s convictions amounts to 
dismissing outright the question of autochthony, which is a resilient tetrahedral 
relationship  that ties state, chieftaincies, and individuals to “national realities” since 
1959. As discussed in Chapter 5, during a conversation I had with him in October 2011, 
Njoh-Mouelle personally located the imperative of regional equilibrium as a form of 
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ethnic balance in national affairs within the bounds of this tetrahedron. Moreover, the 
nation as a congregation of infra-ethnic groups, not an aggregation of homogenous 
citizens, is not just a matter of ideas. This type of nation is the logical outcome of a 
series of measures that began just  little before independence, which were meant to 
consolidate the authority of the nascent state over available resources. The desired 
resources would take the name of “national realities” in the language of Ahmadou 
Ahidjo. In this regard, “our cultures and fauna... our thought and our history” would all 
be aligned with “our soil and subsoil, maritime and fluvial reserves” (Bahoken and 
Atangana, 1975) They would be seen as resources to be either exploited, transformed, 
preserved or promoted by  state representatives, and according to the lines of cleavage of 
the nation-to-become. Needless to say, this idea of national realities as resources that 
must be treated in an ambiguous fashion is the same that  presides over the treatment of 
“cultural heritage” in The Road to Chiefdoms, which, unlike the National Museum of 
Yaoundé, is a self-professed non-governmental institution. Similarly, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Catholic University of Yaoundé, despite being an institution promoted by 
the Vatican state, found itself caught within the spell of an impulse that it unwittingly 
owed to this arrangement during the 2012 scandal.
To understand this turning point in the crystallization of the tetrahedron of national 
realities, one must not only admit that chieftainship was crucial, but also that its 
consideration must transcend the mere scope of the decree of 1977 regarding the 
reorganization of “traditional collectivities.” In this regard, granted the task of 
supervision bestowed onto “traditional chiefs,” and the fact that Maurice Kamto’s party 
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later celebrated the value of chieftaincies, the decree does not tell us how the 
postcolonial state could not do without its population being theoretically molded into 
traditional collectivities. Except for the surreptitious association with diversity  and the 
so-called “rights of indigenous populations” in the preamble, neither is the reason for the 
existence of a “traditional commandment” stipulated in the constitution of 1996. The 
schematic answer is this. The entire population is organized in that way so that, in the 
event it claims “national resources” for itself, it realizes its lines of cleavage sealed off 
by the surreptitious sacrality of competitive and often antagonistic ancestors, and 
acknowledges the theoretically supra-ethnic rights of the state to dispose of such 
resources; not in the name of any demographic or economic indicator, development 
projects, individual rights or whatsoever, but in the name of the ethnic lines of cleavage, 
held dearly as the promise of a nation to come (the term official as used in the 
constitution means non-national) and the indisputable foundation of the state. To that 
end, it is neither the already existing civil law nor market value, but the legion of chiefs 
under the direction of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization 
that is the guarantor of state oversight over “national realities” and their devolution. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the French colonial administration had launched a 
comprehensive survey of those chieftaincies in the 1950s, and a total count of 
approximately 6,500 chieftaincies of the third degree i.e. represented by village chiefs 
were recorded in French Cameroun alone by the end of the 1950s (see Chapter 5). While 
the scholarly  literature that denounces the invented character of some of the chieftaincies 
shows that the nascent independent state had inherited a structure devised by the 
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previous colonial administrations, it is often confused by the trope of colonization as it 
appears in Biya’s cataclysmic vision, and led astray in an effort to reach or retrieve 
genuine precolonial political relationships or pre-state political forms. In doing so, it 
fails to explore how chieftainship  as a general structure was appropriated by the nascent 
state, which would come to find in the existence of chieftaincies an excuse for its central 
hold over “national realities,” according to Ahidjo. The course of events that ran from 
1959 to 1974 ensured, in Cameroon, that the national domain be born, and that 
chieftaincies, as portions of the national domain, no matter how unintelligible to one 
another they  are, be bound to the fate of the national domain and legitimate state 
oversight over national realities. The more genuine the chieftaincies are, the better it is 
for the emergent state. An elaborate answer to why  and how ethnicity  found its specific 
configuration at the National Museum of Yaoundé and the Museum of Civilizations in 
Dschang, on the other hand, requires a progressive analysis of the state of affairs that 
generated, and that sustains the national domain. 
One should not take Emmanuel Kouayep’s lament at  the beginning of this chapter 
at face value. A comprehensive look at newspaper articles published the week after the 
events of August 31 reveals that Kouayep’s view was rather short-sighted. The clash was 
not between Bamileke farmers and presumed Bamoun assailants only: Bamileke and 
Bamoun could be found among both the farmers and the raiders. In this regard, the 
testimony of Arouna Mbouyom, a Bamoun victim, as published by Guy Modeste Dzudie 
in Le Messager four days after Kouayep’s rendition, gives us a relatively comprehensive 
look at the situation. “I was working on my plantation located on the Bamoun side 
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[when] an aggressor came from behind, attacked me with a machete and told me that I 
was on a plantation that had been given to him by  Fo Fongo” (Le Messager, September 
11, 2012). Fo Fongo, Le Messager tells us is the chief of a village called Momo. As we 
have learned from Kouayep, Momo is made up of mostly Bamileke from Bafoussam, 
which is located on the right of the Noun River, in the former Bamileke Region. This is 
now the West Region, which is the postcolonial administrative fusion of the defunct 
Bamoun and Bamileke regions. Instead of calling for an affidavit, necessary for 
arbitration, I would like to show how Kouayep’s report may allow us to unravel the 
threads of ethnic territorialization and the various sorts of demands that asymptotically 
touch upon it. This leap ahead is justified by  the mere observation I made in Chapter 6 
that most of the so-called ethnic conflicts in Cameroon, e.g. the Deido riot of 2011 that 
pitted autochthons and allochthons against one another, have at their core petty  conflicts 
that otherwise would have found solutions in civil courts. Despite the controversial 
nature of comparative ethnic analyses, in 2001, under the direction of Charly  Gabriel 
Mbock, an anthropologist  from the University of Yaoundé, the Catholic Church in 
Cameroon carried out a large-scale study of ethnic conflicts in the country. The survey’s 
conclusion holds that most of the conflicts perceived locally as ethnic in nature were a 
matter of land issues, and the rest were family related (Mbock, 2001). 
Despite the underlying land issues, the internally well-documented Bamileke-
Bamoun conflict on the left bank of the Noun River should not be trivialized, 
particularly given its cyclical nature. The cyclical clashes in the Noun are better 
described as the memory of legally unsolved or foreclosed dilemmas and their 
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symptomatic return as puns and puzzles intended for the powers-that-be. Accordingly, 
we can assess the extent to which Kouayep’s voice carries the so-called dilemmas. We 
can first ask for instance in whose name Kouayep makes it his task to remind state 
authorities or state representatives of the sorrows, not just of the women who have been 
the subject of the raid, but  of the whole Bamileke community living on the left bank of 
the Noun River. Indeed, if we were to remind ourselves of the extremely polarized 
question that I was asked by Sylvain Djache about my position at The Road to 
Chiefdoms during field work in Dschang (see Chapter 4), whether I was an insider or an 
outsider, we would be tempted to locate Kouayep’s voice within the conflictual scene he 
described. In consideration of his rather one-sided view of the situation, we may be 
inclined to think that Kouayep is identifying with the Bamileke, who he presented as the 
victims of Bamoun frequent raids. Paradoxically, Kouayep also gives us reason to 
consider the obverse situation, in which, by insinuation, the Bamileke are taken to be the 
initial perpetrators for having presumably  occupied “Bamoun lands,” as stated later on 
by Kouayep. There is third way  of looking at Kouayep’s involvement. For instance, we 
may seek the neutrality  of a reporter. In this regard, we may gratuitously make ours the 
materials of his reflection, and ponder after him–overwhelmed like a fish out of water–
about how to get out of the apparently helpless cyclical violence in the Noun Division. 
In the name of some abstract humanity, perhaps, we would solicit the powers-that-be to 
come to our rescue. After all, we should keep in mind all these three possibilities, 
especially since ambiguity  is part of the arrangement behind the violence. The reason for 
this will become apparent as we proceed.
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Kouayep’s language of representation is only part of the story. In Chapter 5, I 
carefully  explored the various ways in which communities are understood in Cameroon, 
especially when they are described with chieftainship in mind. Accordingly, we can ask 
whether the phrase “the village representing Bafoussam community on the left bank of 
the Noun River” should be taken to imply a community  of originaires or ressortissants 
who live apart from their putative home villages as allochthons. In that case, the Bamoun 
should be seen as the autochthons, and one might say that Kouayep unwillingly spilled 
the beans. Neither yes nor no would suffice as a response to this question. The situation 
of the Bamileke on the left bank of the Noun River is one the most delicate and 
challenging ethno-territorial dilemmas of the Republic of Cameroon. A short answer 
would be that Momo and the seven other Bamileke villages in that area are made up 
predominantly of a Bamileke population from the former Bamileke region. If we were to 
follow Athanase Mbarga’s classification (see Chapter 5) these villages are at once 
community  chieftaincies, traditional chieftaincies and neighborhood chieftaincies (or 
administrative chieftaincies). They are a community  chieftaincies in that they  are a 
community  of originaires that do not identify with the Bamoun, whom they consider as 
autochthons. They are traditional chieftaincies in that, by virtue of the 1977 decree, they 
have maintained the traditional titles and attributes of their chieftaincies of origin. They 
are neighborhood chieftaincies ore administrative chieftaincies in that they were formed 
administratively. It is their status as traditional chieftaincies that is the most 
controversial. It creates a climate of suspicion between the Bamileke and the Bamoun of 
the Bamoun chieftaincy of the first  degree, the remains of the former Bamoun Sultanate, 
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which has elected to maintain the same name by virtue of the decree of 1977. While the 
eight Bamileke villages are chieftaincies of the third order, they are not dependent 
“traditionally” on the Bamoun sultanate but appear to fall within the latter’s territory. In 
Chapter 5, I noted Fo’o Djoukeng of Fongo Tongo’s presumption that allochthons are 
tacitly assumed to abide by the “tradition” of autochthons in Cameroon. Yet the left  bank 
of the Noun River has become one of the problematic exceptions. 
In Le Dynamisme Bamiléké, Jean-Louis Dongmo explores at length the situation of 
the Bamileke on the left bank of the Noun River. The first volume carefully  documents 
how Bamileke villages have developed as the outcome of an extended multi-stage 
campaign of colonization organized in that area by the French colonial administration 
between 1925 and 1945. The campaign was part of a general scheme of mise en valeur 
(exploitation) of lands previously classified as “Crown Lands” by the then-expelled 
German Crown. Crown Lands were lands that were not occupied by  the “protected 
natives” at the time of conquest. It did not matter whether those natives were Bamoun or 
Bamileke, even though the area in question had been previously  under the control of the 
Bamoun Sultanate before its demise. All Crown Lands in the French Cameroun were 
gradually recategorized as lands vacant and without master after the Treaty of Versailles 
in 1919, and the left bank of the Noun River was no exception. In point of fact the 
conventional term Rive gauche du Noun (left bank of the Noun River), as Dongmo 
teaches us, goes back to the name given to the first campaign launched by  Ripert, 
Colonial Administrator and Regional Chief of Dschang, well before later ethnically-
bound Bamoun and Bamileke regions were established in 1941. This first campaign, 
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which ran from 1925 to 1930, was not only the beginning of subsequent efforts to 
consolidate Ripert’s initiative, especially at the end of the Second World War, but the 
source of the names of all the other French campaigns in the area. 
The campaigns were meant to provide the then expanding European coffee 
plantations on the left bank of the Noun River with labor reserves drawn from the 
inhabitants of villages with relatively higher population densities in what was to become 
the Bamileke region. Not only were the chiefs of the eight Bamileke villages, which 
would ultimately contribute and have extensions (prolongements) in that area, associated 
with the enterprise, they  were also guaranteed, Dongmo highlights, that they would 
maintain their customary rights in the newly created villages, which would then turn into 
their “traditional” subordinates. From this point  of view, not  only were the new 
chieftaincies of the third degree “invented,” “custom” was also exported and the new 
chieftaincies were made to maintain their “customary” link with their “chieftaincies of 
origin” by  means of an administrative segregation from the “customary” Bamoun 
Sultanate. Dongmo’s point is not to highlight the invented character of the new 
“customary chieftaincies” on the left bank of the Noun River, nor to profile or even 
question this peculiar character of mise en valeur, which consists in recustomarizing 
every  portion of all newly  occupied lands, once classified as lands vacant and without 
master. In these cases, the customs allegedly  adopted or the censored tradition in the new 
villages are the customs and traditions of its new inhabitants (whence the fear of the 
Bamileke, often seen as invaders in other regions–a fear that can be said to have 
transposed itself within the exhibition scheme of the National Museum of Yaoundé the 
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early 1990s). Indeed, the case of customarization cannot be sustained from Dongmo’s 
point of view, especially  on the left bank of the Noun River. As an opening to the section 
dedicated to the former Bamoun region, Dongmo argues: “The immigration of the 
Bamileke in that area is somehow a return, since it was from there that a great deal of 
this ethnic group had emigrated during the precolonial era” (Dongmo, 1981, p.347). In 
short, in Dongmo’s view, the Bamileke on the left bank of the Noun River have returned 
home from the highlands where they found refuge in 19th century. Thus for the 
Bamileke, it was not just a mise en valeur of “lands vacant and without master,” it  was 
the reconquest of lands they had lost to the Bamoun before European conquest. We 
would be driven adrift into the genesis not of Man but of ethnic groups by  such tales of 
incessant ethnic conquests and reconquests, and probably  end up ascribing ill-hopes to 
Dongmo if the theatricalization of ethnicity at the National Museum of Yaoundé and the 
Museum of Civilizations of Dschang did not prompt us to examine the workings of this 
kind of tale, especially  here in Kouayep’s helpless dilemma, and perhaps only 
incidentally  a little further back in the scholarly  assurance of Dongmo. To that end, I 
have emphatically argued that we do not need to go beyond Ahidjo and Biya’s disguised 
apprehension of the challenges of everything national. There is a last bridge to cross. The 
general sense of insecurity in Kouayep’s voice must be considered in the light of what I 
called above the tetrahedron of national realities.
Kouayep’s perception of an apparent indifference of state representatives in the 
Momo Division, or their inclination for downplaying the conflicts on the left bank of the 
Noun River, should not distract us from the riddle manifested in his report, which 
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presents the Bamileke as the victims of Bamoun raids on Bamoun lands. The short 
interview granted to the media by Bakary Midjiwaya, then governor of the West Region, 
the same day  Kouayep’s article was published, would likely  suggest that, instead of a 
total indifference, state representatives in the Division are probably powerless in the face 
of such conflicts. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the governor to take 
things in his own hands, and create a commission for a “peaceful solution.” Guy 
Modeste Dzudie, after summarizing the governor’s call to “order and serenity,” reports 
that “For the Sultan [of the Bamoun], an erudite of administration, there is a distinction 
to be made between what behooves ‘the Republic and what behooves the royal 
court.’” (Le Messager, September 11, 2012) Furthermore, we should not assume that 
previous governors or state representatives had not generally  intervened before, nor 
should we follow the presumption that the governor’s intervention this time put an end 
to the cyclical confrontation. In point of fact, less than a year later, in April 2013, another 
clash made the news. Again, Guy Modeste Dzudie reported a fatality.
The parallel established here between the Republic and the Royal court reminds us 
Maurice Kamto’s opposition of republicanism with feudalism and his effort to confine 
chieftaincies within the boundaries of culture, as opposed to those of politics (see 
Chapter 6). Yet the case of Bamileke customs being literally exported and implanted in 
the “customary” sphere of the Bamoun on the left bank of the Noun River constitutes no 
less of a challenge to Kamto’s call for the recognition of chieftaincies as communities of 
culture only. Nevertheless, the parallel between the Republic and the Royal court is not 
made here to discuss the relationship between tribalism and democracy, no matter how it 
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may end up being constricted within this boundary. For Cameroonian legal experts and 
administrators–we have been told that the Sultan is one of them–it is instead a matter 
concerning national lands as it  was inscribed in the land ordinances of the two year old 
unified former Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1974. I have already indicated above 
that the category  “national lands,” in French domaine national (national domain), is 
concealed by the fiction ruling over the deferred nation and lands that are so-categorized 
theoretically are neither private nor public lands. More specifically, Ahidjo’s land 
ordinances of 1974 defined national lands as the default  status of all unregistered lands 
and placed them under the control of the state and “customary collectivities.” One may 
consider the national domain, Cyprian Fisiy tells us, as a distant echo of the German 
colonial administration of “Crown lands” in their Kamerun protectorate from 1884 to 
1916, the French colonial administration of “lands vacant and without master” in the 
French Cameroun, under the League of Nations and the United Nations from 1916 to 
1959, and the British colonial administration of native lands by means of native 
authorities in the British Cameroons, also under the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, from 1916 to 1961 (Fisiy, 1992). Yet, the idea of national domain should be 
considered on its own, since none of these previous arrangements, including the 
interregnum of independence and federalism between 1959 and 1972, made use of the 
systematic character of nation to settle land issues, especially as counterposed to the 
public and the private in terms of ownership. The same goes for the contraposition of the 
nation, along the line of usage, with the state, as an otherwise unnamable person usually 
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assimilated to the administration in general but not reducible to it, and other persons, be 
they state institutions, corporations or physical persons. 
It should be added, however, that the Décrét-loi No 63-2 of January 1963 
organizing land tenure in East Cameroon, the French-speaking area of the newly formed 
Federal Republic, with its idea of patrimoine collectif national (collective national 
heritage) which was the default status of lands without certificates, was the direct 
precursor of the notion of national domain. In this regard, contrary  to what  scholars are 
willing to believe–including Cyprian Fisiy who certainly takes an extensive and critical 
look at the three ordinances issued by the newly formed United Republic in 1974–the 
major impulse behind the reorganization of land tenure in 1963 was not the reversal of a 
law enacted in 1959 by  the Assemblée Territorial Camerounais (Territorial Assembly of 
Cameroon). This law was enacted in anticipation of independence from the French 
administration. It  sought to appropriate lands previously controlled by the colonial 
administration by reaffirming “customary rights enjoyed collectively or individually 
over all lands with the exception of public and private properties” (Law No 59-47 of 
June 17, 1959, my translation). Scholars have thought subsequently  that this 
arrangement meant “the ‘surrender’ (as some called it) of land control to customary 
leaders” (Fisiy, 1992, p.36). If, for the nascent government, this margin of interpretation 
was benign, if not instrumental, at a moment when the colonial power yet endured, it 
could not be accepted indefinitely  after independence. Not only would the 1963 Décret-
Loi (Decree-Law) strike down such interpretations, but it  would also create a margin of 
interpretation that would lead to the direct stipulation of “traditional authorities” in the 
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1974 ordinances, as “customary rights” could not be confused with “customary leaders,” 
nor could customary leaders be reduced exclusively to appointed “traditional 
authorities.” Indeed, no mention of “customary leaders” can be found in said 1959 law, 
nor a clause of control imputed to them. Therefore, the possibility  for members of the 
nascent government to have seen themselves as customary or traditional leaders in 
opposition to French leaders should not be discounted.
The status of national lands, or domaine national, conferred upon all “lands which, 
at the date on which the present Ordinance enters into force [August 5, 1974], are not 
classed into the public or the private property of the state and other public bodies” in 
addition to “lands covered by  private property  rights” (Article 14 of Ordinance No 74-1 
of 6 July  1974) would not have been crucial for understanding ethnic territorialization 
first if, in nature and magnitude, it did not provide state control of more than 70% of 
what remained of the German protectorate’s territory (Tchapmegni, 2007a). Needless to 
say, the bulk of the country’s population would eventually  fall under this class. 
Exploring land tenure would also have been meaningless if, in character and duration, 
the institution of national lands had been a transitory measure for ensuring the safe 
registration of all existing lands and guaranteeing the security  of private ownership  to 
land owners. On the contrary, the category of national domain became a means to force 
the majority of the population into the dependency of the state and make them 
experience the uncertainties and insecurities of collective ownership. I should point out 
here that the rather marginal extent of landed property, in comparison to national lands, 
would even come to make landed property share the insecurities of national lands. In this 
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light, we may consider the background of the violent attempt to expulse the Bamileke 
from their landed property in Yaoundé, as explored by Antoine Socpa (Socpa, 2006). 
Paradoxically, it is the very transitory character of national lands, belied by 40 years of 
consistency, that appears to be promoted by the text of the first two ordinances ruling 
over landed property and state lands, with national lands left in their shadow with an 
ambiguous status. 
The first, Ordinance No 74-1 of 6 July  1974 on landed property, guarantees the 
undisrupted right to any title acquired during the colonial era, be it a title of property 
issued by the colonial administrations or a certificate of occupancy censored by 
customary courts, and shuts down any tentative effort toward reparation. To this end, 
demonstration of ownership was subject to a deadline to ensure registration with the new 
administration, of 6 years in urban areas and 15 years in rural areas. The section cited 
above, which defines national lands (Article 14), is the default setting for any land 
issues. It excludes, as per stipulation, lands that have been placed under the control of 
the state (state lands), either by  virtue of their character as lands that cannot be 
appropriated by individuals (public property), including sub-soils; or by virtue of an 
established title as lands that have been appropriated by the state as its own private 
domain (state private property). The private property of individuals, or landed property, 
is allowed to increase first by  tapping onto the administrative transformation of national 
lands into direct private property, without any  reversibility, that is without being able to 
be turned into national lands, and second through the force of purchase on state private 
lands. It  may decrease by being turned into public lands by means of an expropriation 
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censored by market standards. In any case, the mediation of state representatives is 
required at every moment of land transaction, for no national land is allowed to be 
transferred without first being registered (Article 8). State private property, on the other 
hand, increases with the market censored expropriation of private property, the mere 
reclassification of public lands, and the administrative attribution of national lands, 
without market intervention. The same state private property may decrease by the sole 
decision of the government to increase the private property of individuals or 
corporations in the name of public utility. A specious distinction is also made by the 
second ordinance, Ordinance No 74-2 of 6 July 1974), between state private property 
and the private property of “other public bodies.” This arrangement appears as a means 
to allow any  institution directly authorized by the government to increase their property 
by taking advantage of state prerogatives.
National lands, at last, are the underbelly of state property, the carrier of ethnic 
territorialization, the ethnic marker of most land disputes, especially the one brought to 
our attention by  Kouayep, and the body of the political fiction theatricalized by the 
exhibition of ethnographic collections in Yaoundé and Dschang. Neither design nor the 
lack thereof can be ascertained as to whether the category of national domain or national 
lands came into existence in support to what I called the tetrahedron of national realities, 
or it  was the failure of postcolonial reform to do away  with the tribal organization of the 
territory. Independent of the size of national lands, the land tenure system emerging from 
the 1974 ordinances makes room for the state to easily have access to, and even privatize 
any land. The more the desired portion of land falls within the categories of national 
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lands, the less expensive and less cumbersome it is for state representatives. In this way, 
and with respect to the relatively greater size of national lands in its control, the state 
may prevail over market standards everywhere. Accordingly, it can be said that the post-
independence lawmakers definitely had this in mind when they integrated “customary 
collectivities” into the “administration” of national lands, for they could, in so doing, 
deal easily with dependent local authorities, seen locally as customary institutions, 
usually  meaning institutions that existed before state institutions, instead of confronting 
the demands of a particular section of the nation, no matter the color of its banner: tribe, 
ethnic group, community, ressortissant, originaire, autochthony, democracy, etc. 
In point of fact, the first ordinance ruling on land tenure, like previous German and 
French administrations, first split national lands into two categories: occupied lands on 
one hand, and unoccupied lands on the other hand. Without the rigidity of the guarantees 
of landed property, and as a consequence of the lack of registration, the first ordinance 
emphasizes the type of use of national lands as a means for its categorization by 
stipulating that within the first category  of national lands falls all “lands occupied with 
houses, farms and plantations, and grazing lands, manifesting human presence and 
development” (Article 15, paragraph 1). All other remaining portions of national lands 
“free of effective occupation”–thus with no sign of “human presence”–were made into 
national lands of the second category (Article 15, paragraph 2); and, “subject  to the 
regulations in force, hunting and fruit picking shall be granted to them,” them referring 
to “customary communities members thereof, and any other person of Cameroonian 
nationality, peacefully occupying or using land in category 1.” (Article 17)
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Second, while public property, de facto part of “state lands” and subject to the 
second ordinance, was to be said “managed by the state,” national lands are said in the 
first ordinance to be “administered by the state” (Article 16). The difference between 
administration and management appears tremendously  significant if we keep in mind the 
sorrows of Fo Sokoudjou, the traditional chief of Bamendjou, who decried the reduction 
of traditional chiefs to receivers of orders from the Administration, as a separate body 
(see Chapter 5). In point of fact, for the purpose of the administration of national lands, 
the first  ordinance instituted “consultative boards presided over by the administrative 
authorities and necessarily  comprising representatives of the traditional 
authorities” (Article 16). The role of these consultative boards is assumed to consist of 
assuring a smooth registration of national lands or their secure attribution through state 
grants to nationals, state leases to foreign institutions or bodies, and assignments for the 
state’s own purpose. The modalities for the circulation of landed property and state lands 
have been described above. The category “national lands” is ambiguous and lands so-
categorized are often associated with state property in everyday language. This is likely 
because these lands are managed by the ministry in charge of state property. Although 
rarely discussed in scholarly literature, the insecurities of disputes over national lands 
have become the source of most ethnic conflict in rural and peri-urban areas (Mbock, 
2001; Socpa, 2003; Tchapmegni 2007a). 
Beside the lack of registration, usually  understood either as the result of its 
occupiers’ “lack of enthusiasm” or the consequence of the complicated procedure of 
registration only (Tchapmegni, 2007b), there is a considerable number of factors that 
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contribute to the implosive character of national lands. First of all, unlike owners of 
landed property, no deadline for registration was given to those whose land rights were 
once and for all classified as national lands, even though their rights to turn them into 
private property  with the oversight of boards was recognized. It  was as if the writers of 
the ordinance did not  care if the so-called national lands were to be turned into landed 
property  overnight. In consequence, Maurice Kamto’s CMR can leisurely  call for a 
“campaign of registration” without measuring the resistance internal to its own 
advocated policy of “appropriate land tenure taking into account the cultural realities of 
our tribal homelands [terroirs], but guaranteeing to the state land resources necessary for 
collective projects and providing necessary securities for market transactions” (CRM, 
2014, p.17, my translation). It follows from my earlier discussion of land circulation that 
the longer national lands remain unchanged in their status the better it is for the state, its 
guardian, which would not in return have to confront market speculation and standards 
in its timely  appropriation of them. Second, a measure was taken later in 1976 to prevent 
further occupation of unoccupied national lands without state approval by  stipulating 
that a portion of national lands can be registered only if occupation was effective before 
August 5, 1974, the date of enforcement of the two ordinances (Decree No 76-165 of 
April 27, 1976, establishing the conditions for obtaining land certificates).
Third, no occupied land can be legally sold without  first being registered (Article 8 
of the first ordinance). While this has remained the general principle thus far, most land 
transactions within the national domain do not meet the requirements for receivership  in 
courts of justice. Moreover, the mediation of traditional authorities is required only  in 
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case the newly acquired or the intended to be ceded portion of national lands has to go 
through registration. In which case, the individual character of the property  under 
consideration must first be established against communal or family ownership, by virtue 
of the presumed customary principle of inheritance. In most  cases involving the 
registration of national lands, transactions have already occurred in the form of social 
obligations, with the example of land being used as security for a loan to pay  for the 
medical fees of a family  member. In such cases, argues Socpa, most land transactions 
appear as monetary  assistance that creates moral obligations and inflate the value of land 
transfers (Socpa, 2006). 
Fourth, while “customary collectivities” are habilitated by the decree of 1976 to 
turn national lands into landed property, they can do so, unlike “their members and other 
persons of Cameroonian nationality,” only  with state approval and in the name of their 
collectivity. As a preventive measure against individual appropriation by traditional 
authorities of portions of the national domain, the second ordinance of July  1974, ruling 
on state lands, made sure to categorize as public property “the concession of traditional 
chiefdoms and property relating thereto and more specifically  in the provinces where the 
concession of chiefdoms is considered as the joint property  of the community, the chief 
having only the enjoyment thereof” (Article 4). It  might be inferred from this principle 
that, if they  are not national, in contraposition to their tribal character, the ethnographic 
collections of the chieftaincies involved in The Road to Chiefdoms are to be categorized 
as public property. 
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We should not be led astray by the ambiguous specification that seems to suggest a 
territorial discrimination between provinces with and without joint communal property. 
Article 10 of the decree of 1976 enunciates that “the trustees of an inheritance may not 
obtain land certificates for its property in their own name.” Thus, whether it  is a matter 
of communal or family inheritance, no land title can be granted in the name of those 
who, in the name of custom or family conventions, may altogether dispose of them 
without title. For example, if we were to consider the case of Athanase Mbarga, whom I 
introduced as the successor to his Father, in a family  of 26 siblings, he may decide on the 
use of any assets inherited but not seek to register them in his name. Here we can 
estimate the effect of registration on the actual resources available to the successor. We 
should not confine succession or inheritance within the boundary of family relations 
only. In this regard, the succession to the position of “Family Chief” should not be 
categorically distinguished from the succession to the position of traditional chief or to 
the position of “Fon of Fons,” or Head of State (see Chapter 6). The title of successor, if 
we still follow the rationale supplied by  Athanase Mbarga, independently of him 
understanding it as a matter of “Bamileke culture” only, bestows also the title of Father 
onto the person selected on the occasion of the funerals of the deceased father. Fifth, the 
recognition of “traditional authorities” as the guarantors of the undisrupted occupation of 
national lands by “their members and other persons of Cameroonian nationality” gives to 
the national domain a definitely  tribal character (Tchapmegni, 2007b). Sixth, the 
apparently  benevolent tutelage of the state, coupled with the exemption from land 
ownership taxation guaranteeing the status of farmers and herders on occupied national 
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lands, and hunter-gatherers on unoccupied national lands, ties their fate and voice to the 
will of the state, and foremost to the will of the Head of State, who is in turn urged to 
intervene as an impartial father would in the conflicts of his children: Hence Kouayep’s 
plea to state representatives.
Perhaps I was not unlike Kouayep when I turned towards the Ministry of State 
Property, Surveys and Land Tenure in the hope of getting hold of an official and updated 
analysis of the relative proportion of national lands in comparison to landed property and 
state lands during my field work in June 2011. In any  case, I had come to the conclusion 
that ethnic territorialization could not be understood appropriately if one were to dwell 
on its metaphorical inscription in ethnographic exhibition schemes only. Furthermore, I 
wanted to follow Jacques Lacan’s idea that enunciating that a symptom is a metaphor 
makes of it  something more than the mere reflection of something other–in which case a 
chain of signifiers endowed with both meaning and value. Accordingly, I could be asked 
what I meant by arguing that the cultural synthesis intended to be put on display  in the 
National Museum of Yaoundé could be taken for a metaphor of ethnic territorialization 
in Cameroon. Indeed, for a museum display, as well as the principle of regional balance, 
to be likened to a symptom, not only must the emotionally charged representation–for 
which the exhibition scheme is a disguise–be uncovered, but the subject articulated in 
the organization of its constituents and the desire insisting in their arrangements must 
also be indicated. In the case of a symptom, the demand whereby it reaches the analyst–
both at an institutional and an individual level–and analysis as a institutionalized 
therapeutic process hold the key for the specific value that a symptom and its reading are 
220
imbued with, beyond the mere association of the constituents of discourse. Accordingly, 
I had to articulate my inquiries to the records of state institutions and representatives. 
Had I received a conclusive report from the Ministry  of State Property, Surveys 
and Land Tenure, I would have already outlined the relative proportion of the country’s 
approximately 20 millions people who directly and indirectly depend on the state by 
virtue of the collective rights that delimit their position as occupiers or hunter-gatherers 
on national lands. This would have of course combined the population census of 2010, 
and the actual status of land registration in the records of that ministry. Instead, I 
received a report prepared by  the Minister in response to a request made by the 
President’s Chief of Cabinet, which was meant to give a panoramic view of progress 
made within the ministry  since 2004, the year Paul Biya was reelected for the third time 
after the so-called democratic transition with the first presidential elections held in 1992. 
The report provides a list  of national lands assigned to various government and 
development projects, and dwells heavily on praising a recent amendment of 1976 
decree ensuring land registration; an amendment introduced in 2005 in lieu of land 
reform. For the ministry, the major outcome of this amendment consists “in decreasing 
the completion period of land titles from more than two years to as little as a year, even 
six or three months in some cases” (MINDAF, 2011, p.5). Thanks to the new procedure, 
the report says, 22,125 land titles were established from 2006 to 2009, against 12,000 
from 2000 to 2005. Of course, these numbers cannot give us an idea of the proportion of 
the country’s 475,650 kilometer square area currently in the records of the National 
Institute of Statistics that actually  corresponds to national lands. Nor can they help us 
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distinguish between landed property, public property, state private property, and the 
private property  of “other public bodies.” Therefore, they fail to give an idea of the size 
of the population de facto squatting on state land preserves. Accordingly, we can say that 
without conclusive data on the relationship between population census and land tenure, it 
is nearly impossible to get a sense of the size of the population held in check by the state 
qua nation for fear of subversion, or the fear of letting the population claim the resources 
of the nation for itself. It  is a fear that in itself demonstrates how he who claims the right 
of administering the resources of the nation, had it snatched away from another: the real 
and foreclosed nation.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RELUCTANTLY STRUCTURALIST?
My first contact was established through a network of personal 
relations which allowed me to live the experience of adoption by  a 
polygamous family somehow representative of the Bamileke “ethos of 
notability.”
Mon premier contact fut établi par le biais d’un réseau de relations 
personnelles qui me permit de vivre l’expérience de l’adoption par une 
famille polygamique représentant en quelque sorte l‘« ethos de la 
notabilité » bamiléké.
Francesco Pompeo, Un ethnologue ‘gênant’: les vicissitudes 
du projet de création d’un musée national, 
Cahiers d’Etudes Africain,1999. p.815
I was 16 years-old when I first  heard of Claude Lévi-Strauss. It was in the mid 
1990s, the moment Francesco Pompeo predicted the uncertain future awaiting the 
project of the National Museum in Yaoundé. At that time, the State of Cameroon, which 
had been thrust into economic and political crises, was about to finally come to grips 
with the ethno-territorial background that had until then been the repressed foundation of 
its government. This foundation would be inscribed in its amended constitution of 1996 
via a clause on the protection of the “rights of the indigenous populations” (populations 
autochtones) and the provision that  the newly created regional councils would be headed 
by a person “indigenous” to their respective region. However, I would not begin to 
familiarize myself with Lévi-Strauss’s work until a decade later. I owe my first 
encounter to Leonard Carmichael’s foreword to an issue of National Geographic 
Magazine, from 1973, titled Primitive Worlds: People Lost In Time. 1973 was also the 
year the Afo-A-Kom, or “Thing of Kom,” a statuette which had previously disappeared 
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from the treasury house of the Kom chiefdom, in the North-West Region, returned to 
Cameroon from New York, launching the major postcolonial controversy over tribal 
recognition and national adjudication. It did not matter whether I knew of this incident 
when I came across the 1978 French version of Primitive Worlds at the library  of the 
Aumônerie des Lycées et Collèges of Mokolo, my hometown in the Mandara Mountains 
of northern Cameroon. The providence of media-content transfer between the United 
States, France, and Cameroon had determined that I could thereby learn of ethnology as 
a discipline, and ethnic groups as its object of study. No matter how indirect my first 
encounter with the works of Lévi-Strauss was, it instilled in me the most enduring 
impression, and probably an indestructible resistance against the objectification of 
ethnicity. The uneasiness, but also the seduction and challenge, that I felt at  my first 
attempt at making sense of the project of ethnology has haunted my reading of 
ethnographic literature ever since. Whether, it was about the geographically  closest 
Somba of Benin and the distant Mbotgate of Vanuatu Islands, as the case was with 
Primitive Worlds, or it was about familiar names of ethnic groups in northern Cameroon 
I would always be reminded of my first steps in ethnology. 
Leonard Carmichael was not unscrupulous when he indicated to the readers of 
National Geographic Magazine the ways in which the categories of “primitive” and 
“time” could be thought of–against the rather romantic and exotic consonance of the 
issue’s title–and, more importantly, the ways in which the often dissonant stories told at 
home by anthropologists, usually drawn on their experience in countries relatively 
distant and unfamiliar, could benefit their readers. It  was definitely not an interest in 
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concepts, but in the benefits of ethnology that made me build my most lasting memory 
of the image of Lévi-Strauss. “The distinguished anthropologist of the Collège de 
France,” Carmichael tells us, “suggests that the myths of primitive worlds may give us a 
deep  and new way of understanding some of the most puzzling aspects of our own inner 
life.” (National Geographic Society, 1973, p.5) I am not certain whether my current 
understanding of the crisis that I was thrust into by  Carmichael’s introduction is a 
retrospective reading of what I could not formulate at  the time or, on the contrary, I had a 
precise idea of the cause of the crisis but I could not dare confront it. I certainly  felt both 
connection and disconnection with the various people described in the magazine, as well 
as with the twisted plots of the stories told, and the subtlety  of the narrators’ voices. Both 
connection and disconnection were not only a response to the stories, they were also a 
response to the magnificent pictures that illustrated them. All things considered, the 
figure of Lévi-Strauss, as a consequence of Carmichael’s invocation, became a reminder 
of this first encounter with ethnology. My  uneasiness was due to the fact that, somehow 
in response to Lévi-Strauss’s suggestion, I attempted a story of my own by bringing into 
focus the appealing worlds of the primitives and that of their anthropologists. I can say 
retrospectively that I was somehow seeking to know myself, but went awry. 
Instead of myself I ended up seeking my-place. It was as if my endeavor to 
appropriate Lévi-Strauss’s project of “know thyself through others” was brought to a 
standstill: a stumbling-block of my own. Was I to locate myself on the side of the subject 
seeking to know itself or on the side of the instrumental object? On the side of the 
subject engaged in literary  practice or on the side of the object narrativized? It is not that 
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a third way could not be thought of or imagined, which could then be translated into the 
non-aesthetic position of a universal subject of a sort, with a universal creed: the Kantian 
reader’s creed of equating know thyself through others to everyone know thyself through 
thy others. It  is that, this third way was lacking, in the flesh, that is, as if by  the force of 
an order of things independent of my  cognizance and in response to some sort of 
urgency that appeared to have obliterated my imagination. This apparently 
unsophisticated dilemma must have owed its impetus to an investment on my part, the 
memory of which I must have purposefully lost. I can tentatively and retrospectively 
substitute for that investment the desire of a high school student, who could have 
anticipated in ethnology a corpus of knowledge, perhaps the promise of a future 
vocation, or else the curiosity  of a teenager accustomed to both the systematic 
classification of people in his country  into as many ethnic groups and the body  of 
literature existing nearly on each of them. I still miss the ground, if not the reason, the 
cause, the law, or the lack thereof, that made me seek an identification with either the 
subjects of ethnology, whose worlds were made to appear somewhat opaque from the 
outset, and Lévi-Strauss, whose world included within the uncertainty of its transparency 
that of the subjects of his exploration. Now that I look back, I wonder whether the 
uneasiness, and even my resistance were not the effect of the implicit notion, acquired 
before this encounter, that I was the member of an ethnic group, which could then be 
compared to the groups presented in the magazine, as much as to any other group 
identifiable in my environment, or it was instead the authority  of the field of knowledge 
under consideration, and the medium through which it  spoke to me. Both ethnic 
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membership and ethnology as a science were endowed with the force of truth, to the 
extent that I was convened, even urged, not only  to discover my ethnic group, but to 
somehow comply with it or fight against it, praise it  or denigrate it, by making of it a 
thing in itself, that can be compared to others.
Things in the background of my identity quest came under a different spotlight 
with my exploration of not the possible meanings of ethnographic disaffection at the 
heart of the project of National Museum of Yaoundé, but Antoine Socpa’s posture in the 
face of ethnic tensions in Cameroon, in the field of which I was already implicated 
somehow. I can now confidently argue that  the uneasiness that I first felt in my attempt 
at appropriating the project of ethnology was not  unlike Antoine Socpa’s idea of being 
enthralled by ethnic categories in his own endeavor to use them as “scientific 
categories” (see Chapter 2). Accordingly, I insisted in my review of the literature on 
ethnicity in Cameroon that Socpa, like me insofar as my entrapment by the promise of 
ethnology is concerned, equally  failed to tell us where he stood in the field of ethnic 
conflicts described by him, as much as to give us the reason for which ethnic categories 
could be said to be enthralling. My point here is not, once again, to demand of Socpa 
that he indicate to us the way  in which he could investigate a conflict, for instance, 
between the Bamileke and the Beti, if he could have identified with one or the other 
group; but to review the tensions that rendered ethnicity unpalatable to his scientific 
gaze, and to ask, as an afterthought, whether the said tensions equally explain my  early 
uneasiness with ethnographic description. If this is the case, I also have to explain where 
the confidence came from that allowed me to explore, under the banner of ethnic 
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territorialization, the structures of ethnic claims in Cameroon. Between those two 
moments was my encounter with Francesco Pompeo’s review of the project of National 
Museum in Yaoundé. I thus reckoned with the fact that my  early  concession to Pompeo’s 
paradox of national representation was instrumental, inasmuch as it could lead me on the 
tracks of ethnic territorialization in Cameroon. By structure I mean Lacan’s notion of a 
series of “relations articulated by  their order in such a way that taking a part in it is done 
at one’s expense: of life and death, that’s a secondary  entailment; of benefit (jouissance), 
that’s the primary entailment.” (Lacan, 1988, Fifth Response, my translation)
I first took an interest in Pompeo upon the realization that his article was 
polarizing political issues in Cameroon in such a way  that I was being forced as a 
Cameroonian to either sympathize with the Bamileke or stand indifferent to them, or 
even hold a defensive position as a non-Bamileke, all within a triangular and seemingly 
total relationship: Cameroonian-Bamileke/Cameroonian-non-Bamileke. Therefore the 
question, in my view, was whether there was a way in which the iron wall of ethnicity, 
and the totality within which ethnic difference was inscribed, could make room for a 
transversal understanding of the four ethnic stakes Pompeo brought to my attention: 
ethnographic collections, ethnic homelands, political competition, and legitimacy. It was 
from this standpoint that the idea of ethnic territorialization imposed itself, and put me 
on the tracks of said stakes, and the mobilization of ethnic markers in ethnographic 
exhibitions, in the documentation of state institutions, in everyday conversations, and in 
scholarly debates. In the end, I had to investigate the ways in which the position of the 
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Bamileke, articulated in ethnographic literature as much as in ethnographic exhibitions, 
both engaged and challenged my understanding of ethnic territorialization in Cameroon. 
Retrospectively, the idea of ethnic territorialization was born as an answer that I 
formulated to address the pervasive suggestion that the Bamileke were the victim of their 
zeal and their exceptional character–be it  framed in the popular language of culture, or 
the more savant idea of ethos–as much as the target of a political system often conceived 
of as a regime external to them and hampering their efforts. In a rather tortuous fashion, 
it occurred to me that the Bamileke were part and parcel of the system–hence my 
suggestion that they are uncanny autochthons–as much as they have reached a point 
where their position from within the system was no longer secure, and was pushing them 
towards a heroic yet  hesitant effort to challenge its foundations. It was from this vantage 
point that I endeavored to understand why  there was no radical push among the 
Bamileke intelligentsia to bring to the fore, or even seek to undermine the institution of 
chieftainship, which appears to provide a foundation to the rights of the already said 
indigenous populations in areas where the Bamileke have long settled and established 
themselves as leading entrepreneurs, and where they are increasingly perceived as a 
threatening foreign force. Nevertheless, the realization that  chieftainship  in Cameroon 
ensures people’s access to the resources appropriated by the postcolonial state over the 
course of its recent foundation, and guarantees in return the state’s full control over the 
country’s population, only  came gradually  as I was painstakingly confronting the vague 
notion that I already had on ethnic difference and entitlement in Cameroon to the 
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knowledge or else to the index of ethnic difference imparted to me by the literature on 
the Bamileke.
In my review of Peter Geschiere’s treatment of issues of belonging in Chapter 2, 
I argue that  the alluring power of ethnic categories, especially  insofar as Antoine Socpa 
was concerned–given that he carried out his research under the supervision of 
Geschiere–is tied on the one hand to the denial of autochthony  and the reduction of the 
political force of ethnicity to its mere instrumentalization by the ruling party, and on the 
other hand to a lack which I did not specifically name, but could be anticipated behind 
my joint idea of an ethical conundrum and ethical support at  the heart of the study of 
ethnicity in the postcolonial world. We have seen that both denial and reductionism leave 
their objects untouched, and even well tucked away in a safe corner: Hence Socpa’s 
effort to safeguard ethnicity from politics by summoning John Lonsdale’s dichotomy. 
Fortunately, I could locate in that protected area the “informal means such as 
‘associations of originaires’ of one or another village or region, friendship networks, 
ethnic stigmatization, and door-to-door enrollment” (Socpa, 2003, p.297), which were 
said to have been used by the Social Democratic Front, before the Cameroon People’s 
Democratic Movement, the ruling party, followed suit. Futhermore, my discussion of the 
various interpretations of chieftainship in everyday  conversation with Athanase Mbarga, 
and intellectual elaborations on them with Maurice Kamto, respectively in Chapter 5 and 
6, gave us an ample understanding of the possible reasons for which that area is 
protected: community benefits and investments both in areas of main residency and in 
home villages on one side; state and partisan politics on the other. Insofar as the denial is 
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concerned, I find myself on the side of he for whom autochthony makes sense, except 
when the ideal of a nation with no internal cleavage stands in the way, no matter how 
spurious the promise of such nation appears in the form of proclaimed citizenship. I am 
often emboldened in this position by  my realization that the categories of indigenous 
populations or autochthons are benign when a comparison with Europe is drawn in 
ethnographic literature, or when the effect of colonial history in the country is under 
consideration.
As far as the polarization Bamileke/non-Bamileke is concerned, the overall 
question I raised throughout this text draws attention first to the overwhelmingly 
Bamileke interpretation of the inscription of indigeneity in the constitution as an anti-
Bamileke measure, and second to the apparently unrelated yet obverse effort by 
Bamileke scholars to place chieftainship and the networks for which chieftaincies are 
hubs outside of consideration in their discussion of the protection of the rights of 
indigenous populations. My introduction to the works of Jean-Louis Dongmo in the first 
chapter gives a first clue to the reason behind Maurice Kamto’s separation of politics and 
culture. Unlike any other ethnic group in the country, the Bamileke are assumed to be if 
not in greater, at least in a significant number, located in regions with which they  may 
not identify  as their putative homeland. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the function of 
putative homelands for the Bamileke is fulfilled by the former Bamileke region, now 
part of the West Region; and the distribution of all ethnic homelands obeys an ethnic 
mapping described in Chapter 3. Chieftainship under the Ministry  of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralization, and national lands under the Ministry of State 
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Property, Surveys and Land Tenure are the institutions that determine the changes 
affecting the ethnic map  and the distribution of ethnic homelands in Cameroon. The 
internal structure and the prerogatives of these institutions may indirectly give us a sense 
of what may befall an ethnic group whose members have come to be perceived as 
greater in number by autochthons, or merely  as a foreign menace (see Chapters 5 and 7). 
Hence the posture in which we have seen James Mouangué Kobila, in Chapter 6, in his 
endeavor to use all means possible within the frameworks of both national and 
international institutions to ensure the position of the Douala as the autochthons of the 
Littoral Region in contraposition to the Bamileke as the autochthons of the West Region. 
The case of the Bamileke on the left bank of the Noun River, which pits them 
against the Bamoun in the putative home area of the Bamoun, has shown a little further 
the reactionary  impulse internal to the management of national lands (see Chapter 7). I 
have argued that the category of national lands is informed by an idea of state-planned 
mise en valeur (land development), legitimates state direct and unilateral access to 
unregistered lands, and may require, when state representatives see fit, their 
recustomarization for the purpose of administrative control. In this light, there is a 
possible but not yet definite or explosive split on the subject  of autochthony and its 
institutions (national lands and chieftainship) between the Bamileke of the interior and 
the Bamileke of the exterior, or the Bamileke “at home” and the Bamileke of the 
Diaspora, as one finds in the work of Bamileke scholar Jean-Philippe Guiffo (2003, 
2009). I found a readily informed opinion in this regard with Emmanuel Ghomsi, the 
Bamileke historian, who expressed a concern about the proliferation, in his view, of 
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Bamileke traditional institutions in other regions (see Chapter 1). Maurice Kamto’s 
effort to reduce chieftainship to a mere community  of culture (see Chapter 6) seeks to 
temper the political interpretation of the so-called traditional institutions and translates 
the position of the Bamileke of the exterior at large, while it stands in stark contrast with 
the regret expressed by Fo’o Sokoudjou, the traditional chief of Bamendjou and chief of 
the Bamendjou, in response to the 1977 decree on chieftainship, which reduced chiefs to 
receivers of orders from the Administration (see Chapter 5).
In the end, insofar as land issues are concerned, the stake of autochthony breaks 
down into the modalities through which national lands are either directly used by  a 
community  of kin-differentiated “customary collectivities,” or classed as state lands and 
used by  the state, or else turned into landed property  by the members of said customary 
collectivities and “all other persons of Cameroon nationality,” or the state, again, for its 
own purpose as a private proprietor (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, insofar as access 
to state power and political competition are concerned, autochthony  turns into a matter 
of who belongs and who does not. However, at an infra-level, it comes down to who 
benefits from state power and the revenues of both state lands and national lands. 
Because national lands require traditional authorities as guarantors of their use and 
transformation into landed property, the question of who benefits from state power is 
most often articulated in terms of autochthony, often reduced to ethnic membership. I 
gave enough indication in Chapter 5 about the quasi synonymous character of 
chieftaincy, ethnic affiliation, and putative home village. Put in these terms, nevertheless, 
the assumption that autochthons, or those preying on the rights of indigenous 
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populations, have been created recently by the ruling party and have been made the sole 
benefactors of state power, especially  in its effort to inscribe the rights of indigenous 
populations in the constitution, fades away gradually to make room for the consideration 
of state institutions and state power at large, independently  of the diversity of its 
population. In this regard, Antoine Socpa has shown in a later essay dedicated to state-
enforced expulsions in the suburbs of Yaoundé, typically carried out with the knowledge 
of traditional chiefs, that the Beti autochthons tend to perceive a collusion between state 
power and allochthonous capital, often predominantly assimilated to Bamileke economic 
power (Socpa, 2010).
Yet chieftainship and land tenure, except when they  involve securing land 
certificates, have become the least  urgent political issues for the Bamileke for another 
reason that I introduced in the form of a joke told to me by Jean-Louis Dongmo during 
my conversation with him in Yaoundé at  the time of field work (see Chapter 1). Unlike 
that of any other ethnic group  in Cameroon, the position of the Bamileke from within the 
structure that guarantees state control of national lands, and everything else national, 
with its ambiguous character of always coming in a binary form (ethnic/national, 
national/official, tribal homeland or terroir/territory), has reached a point of insecurity 
which, though related to chieftainship and land tenure, can be examined better within the 
more palpable framework known as regional equilibrium or regional balance. The latter, 
in my view, is no more important than the quasi assimilation of chieftaincy-based 
national lands by the state, and must be considered as the iceberg of a broader situation 
that affects state finance in general. I have discussed the question of origins extensively 
234
in Chapter 5. In that chapter, I argue that citizenship and residency, from their inception 
with the code of nationality of 1968 in Oriental Cameroon that gave its landmarks to the 
later united Republic of Cameroon, have been rendered practically  irrelevant for 
government purpose. The core of the code of nationality reads, I said: either you are an 
autochthon, or you have become a citizen of Cameroon by  virtue of some accident in 
your genealogy. 
It follows that the mere fact of being an autochthon or member of an ethnic group 
tacitly assumed as “naturally” territorialized in Cameroon (Bamileke or non-Bamileke) 
bestows citizenship. The criterion of regional origin that is commonly used to allocate 
positions in state institutions, including Higher Education institutions, has turned into a 
mere mask of ethnic affiliation. In this way, regional quotas exclude “persons of 
Cameroonian nationality” who do not belong ethnically  to the Region under 
consideration. Leopold Donfack Sokeng, among many other Bamileke scholars who 
shared their opinions on the subject with me, was the first to articulate clearly that 
regional balance, allegedly based on population size and the relative needs of each 
region, remains blind to the fact that most Bamileke candidates for civil or military 
service, or service in higher state institutions, are usually  residents of the Littoral 
Region, which is the first region that received the excess population of the Grassland 
during the 19th and 20th century (Warnier, 1993). For this reason, over the past quarter 
century, Bamileke scholars have consistently  decried the practice of attributing quotas to 
regions, and basing recruitment by  state institutions on ethnic membership. However, 
they  have been generally hesitant to link regional balance to a form of the state which 
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depends heavily on “traditional collectivities” as kinship-based organizations of both its 
territory and population, for the purpose of both securing its prerogatives over the 
management of national lands and state lands, and ensuring its own security as an 
independent and umbrella institution.
The movement opposed to regional balance, beyond Bamileke intellectual 
circles, has crystallized around the opposition of merit and quotas. This crystallization 
suggests that it is not the form of the state born with decolonization that is rejected but 
the right of he who wields state power. It was one of James Mouangué Kobila’s goals, in 
his essay on the protection of minorities and indigenous populations (2009), to argue that 
merit cannot be reduced to the mere test of intellectual and professional ability, but must 
include other factors such as the background and distribution of civil servants, and the 
redistribution of the fruits of national lands throughout the ten regions of the country. 
Beyond this cleavage internal to the state, we can see that the debate over regional 
balance touches on the redistribution of the resources of the state, more than on the 
process whereby  state resources have come, or come into existence, and whereby it 
could be controlled. It is no wonder Jean-François Bayart’s Cameroon-inspired essay on 
the state in Africa could generalize redistribution as one of its characteristics, and argue 
that the latter owes its course to colonial statecraft as much as to native practices; hence 
his cherished idea of multiple “political trajectories.” Nevertheless, this question of 
trajectories and origins, which aims at  claiming mastery over sources, leaves aside the 
actual measure of state power, and repeats the parallelism between the state and 
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chieftaincies as forms mirroring one another, an working hand in hand to generate 
something typically African.
I have shown in the previous chapter that the parallelism between the state and 
chieftaincies fails to address the processes whereby a state like the State of Cameroon 
consolidates itself by turning the opposition into a productive parallelism. In a detailed 
fashion, the parallelism leaves untouched the two other endpoints of what I called the 
tetrahedron of national realities in Chapter 7: national and state lands as the resources of 
the deferred nation on one hand, and individuals capable of appropriating them as 
private proprietors in the name of “public utility” on the other hand. Ahidjo’s emphasis 
on national realities and national unity to temper any sign of dissidence, and Paul Biya’s 
1980s elaborations on cultural synthesis as the precondition to the emergence of a nation 
in Cameroon, both bear witness to the typically postcolonial arrangement which 
inscribes ethnic diversity  as a pending threat to a nation, imagined to be composed of 
socially substitutable ethnicities, while tapping into ethnic diversity and antagonism for 
administrative control. Additionally, the same arrangement consecrates the preeminence 
of state representatives over the once-declared resources of the yet to be a nation, and 
makes of the state the unilateral gateway through which national lands, by  means of 
registration, and state lands through declassification are turned into landed property or 
land grants. Taking note of the state’s margin of maneuver in appropriating, 
independently of taxation, the resources of the nation at  large, or “national realities” in 
Ahidjo’s terms, I outlined the reasons for which chieftainship and land tenure cannot be 
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left in the shadow of a discussion on either regional balance or autochthony  (see Chapter 
7).
The personal position of Leopold Donfack Sokeng within the structure of ethnic 
homelands and state attributions and privileges by means of regional balance is not the 
least meaningful. With a different goal in mind, and with a view toward providing an 
example that shattered the premises of regional balance, Sokeng brought to my attention 
that he was born and grew up in Douala, in the Littoral Region, that he was working at 
the Ministry of Higher Education and at the second national university in Yaoundé, in 
the Center region, and that he was holding office as a traditional chief of third order in 
Fongo Tongo, his home village, nearby Dschang, in the West Region, where I had the 
chance to speak to Fo’o Clément Djoukeng, his traditional superior in the order of chiefs 
(see Chapter 5). I leave aside the tendency among the Bamileke chiefs of first and 
second order to refuse the title of Fo’o or “traditional chief” to neighborhood chiefs 
(chefs de quartier), commonly designated by them yet  standing for chiefs of the third 
degree within the administrative hierarchy. I must indicate instead that he owes his office 
as a traditional chief both to inheritance and designation. Like Athanase Mbarga, whom I 
considered in Chapter 5, Sokeng, at the death of his father, was ultimately claimed by his 
home village for having, so to speak, displayed social success as an originaire of the 
village, and the capacity to benefit the local community in Fongo-Tongo. It was not until 
I took this process into account that I measured the significance of Fo’o Clément 
Djoukeng’s gesture when he took me, at the time of my visit, to the chiefdom’s backyard 
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parking lot  to show me a brand new SUV the chieftaincy had recently  received as a gift 
from the ressortissants of Fongo-Tongo in Douala.
I also argued in Chapter 2 that Socpa’s doubts on the use of ethnic categories 
could be explained by the fact  that he lacked the structure that enabled Clifford Geertz to 
contain his “indifference or contempt” in the face of what was seen as some sort of 
“government immobilism” in the New States. In the case of the opposition of primordial 
ties to civil politics, I have shown that the theorization of parapolitics provided a 
structure within which the once-declared primordial controversies in the New States 
could be located in a world-historical perspective, tolerated, or acted upon; even by the 
means of a prescriptive gesture that did not pay much scrutiny to the frailty of its own 
foundations. Hence, with Geertz, the gradual disenchantment and erosion of the 
underlying opposition of cosmopolitanism to parochialism, and the later residual 
distinction between primordial ties and civil politics. Lonsdale’s polarization of ethnicity 
and politics could even less provide such an ethical support to Socpa, at least  not one 
that could provide the confidence to analyze ethnic tensions. The reason is that 
polarization alone lacked the structural conditions of the theory of primordial 
attachment. I already spelled them out  in Chapter 2. They are the spatialization, 
linearization and specularization of being or becoming: of being or becoming a state or a 
nation in the case in point. The distinction between ethnicity  and politics, under the 
pretense that the first is instinctual and the second instrumental, makes of them two 
separate worlds that may come together only  in the form of a sort of alliance or complete 
domination of one by another.
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In other words, at Lonsdale’s suggestion, tribalism and ethnicity, like the ensuing 
opposition of politics and morality, are conceived of as worlds unto themselves, alike 
with those in whose hands they are held, no matter if the dividing line is either elitism or 
identity. Accordingly, the polarization, in itself reminiscent of Geertz’s axiological 
opposition of cosmopolitanism to parochialism, was needed to identify  and crystallize 
the main obstacle: that which constitutes a danger for the protected object. Once this 
objective is set, there is no need to reconsider the inconsistencies of the process whereby 
both object and danger have come into being: Hence Socpa’s surrender to the established 
blindness which consists in attributing the rise of autochthony  the early 1990s to the 
recent maneuvers of the ruling party  alone. Accordingly, the ruling party’s differential 
and paradoxical treatment of ethnic groups in southern and northern Cameroon had to be 
depicted. In doing so, however, the earlier impetus for the use of “informal means” by 
another party was downplayed. Chapters 3, 5, and 6 help us see that behind the 
polarization of ethnicity  and politics is hidden the abrasive polarization between a party 
vying for rule and the ruling party, the Bamileke and the non-Bamileke, but more 
specifically the Bamileke and the Beti. The stakes are clearly defined. The line of 
demarcation ushers in autochthony and regional equilibrium directly, and only indirectly 
brings into focus the four aspects of Pompeo’s paradox of national representation. 
I have shown in Chapter 4 that the Museum of Civilizations of Dschang, by 
virtue of its coherence with the repressed ethnic territorialization, prevailed over the 
National Museum of Yaoundé in giving form to the controversial representation of ethnic 
groups. This was accompanied by its inevitable ethnic imbalances against Pompeo’s 
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assumption and in agreement with Madeleine Ndobo’s suggestion on regionally 
variegated ethnographic museums. The rationale is as simple as this: The ethnographic 
predominance of the Grassfields at large, and the Bamileke to a minor extent, can be 
legitimately put  on display in its putative home turf. Dschang, where the museum was 
erected, was the center of the Bamileke Region (région Bamiléké) when the Region was 
created as such in 1941. The city ceded its position to Bafoussam in the wake of the 
independence of French Cameroun, at which time the Bamileke Region was merged 
with the Bamoun Region (région Bamoun) and turned into the West Division 
(départment de l’Ouest), nowadays West Region (région de l’Ouest). Nevertheless both 
Dschang and Bafoussam are integral to the once Bamileke Region, which stands today 
in contraposition to the other greater part and putative homeland of the Bamoun, where 
the left bank of the Noun River is the subject  of dispute. While the success of the 
Museum of Civilizations in representing the entire nation ethnographically tells us about 
the political geography of identification in Cameroon, what I called the imaginary  body 
of the nation in Chapter 7, it  also substitutes for Socpa’s lack of a structure for enabling 
the study  of ethnicity the existence of a structure within which ethnic categories and 
their comparison have their place, and where their future can be anticipated, be it in the 
form of Ahidjo’s “national unity” or Paul Biya’s “national integration.” 
Moreover, the structure that accommodates ethnic imbalances in Cameroon, 
thanks to the lesson of The Road to Chiefdoms and its museum project, brings into 
existence a three-tiered superposition of institutions. The first  represents the state and 
officialdom at  the upper level, the second the inhabitants of the state’s territory in the 
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middle, and the third the guardians of tradition or custodians of national cultures at the 
lower level. My analysis of the constitution and other legal instruments in Chapter 5 
shows that the categories of “public collectivities,” “territorial collectivities,” and 
“traditional collectivities,” which each indicate the way in which a specific relationship 
is established between the population of the country and the authorities under which they 
are placed, tend to reproduce these three levels. I can now say that Ahidjo and Biya’s 
consecutive conditional insertions of the Cameroonian nation within a framework that 
requires national unity with the first, and national integration with the second, both 
parallel Geertz’s expectation of integrative revolution in the New States. Accordingly, it 
can be said that both Ahidjo and Biya were at home with Geertz’s elaborations, and both 
could find in his idea of parapolitics the fodder for consolidating their appearance as the 
promoters of a state qua nation, or the present incarnations of a future-nation-without-
cleavage, no matter how the formalization of indigenous rights and the principle of 
regional balance, both premised on a real cleavage, have to pay  the price. Now, what 
does Socpa’s rejection of Geertz in favor of Lonsdale tell us about the specific 
predicament in which the confrontation between the Bamileke and the Beti is placed in 
Cameroon? Does it mean that the rejection also applies to ethnic territorialization and its 
institutions (national realities, traditional collectivities, state qua nation, private 
proprietors)? Or does it  apply just to what I have seen as their fictional character with 
Ahidjo and Biya’s political propaganda?
Measuring the scope of the demand formulated by  the opposition of the 
Bamileke to the Beti implies that the position of Antoine Socpa within a broader set of 
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discussions and debates be specified further. The enthralling character of ethnic 
categories for Socpa is not just the indicator of a lack, it  is the indicator also of doubt and 
uneasiness. More precisely, Socpa found himself in the position of he who could not 
reject the principles of national unity or national integration even if he could suspect that 
they  stood in the way  to the cohabitation of ethnicity  and democracy: the two terms 
within which the set  of two confrontations under consideration in his thesis was placed. 
In short, for Socpa, if it was not for the ruling party’s misuse of autochthony  by  means of 
its semblance of ensuring equilibrium. “Witness the paradoxical support of autochthons 
in the South and allochthons in the North,” his thesis says. In his view, there would have 
never been any confrontation, in the wake of multiparty  electoral system between the 
Bamileke and the Beti, or the Kotoko and the Suwa if it were not for the impartial 
treatment of ethnic groups by the government. I have already presented the early 
scholarly dispute between Beti and Bamileke scholars in late 1980s, more specifically 
between the philosophers Hubert Mono Ndjana and Sindjoun Pokam (see Chapter 1). 
Socpa’s appraisal of the post-one party rule conflict in Yaoundé somehow responded to 
this dispute. However, the confrontation did not  pit Bamileke scholars against Beti 
scholars only. I would rather argue that this confrontation was a substitute for the 
broader critique of the state qua nation. The critique of the state had become necessary 
not so much because of the one-party rule system–another façade of the call for national 
unity  and integration–but for the sake of the economic crisis at the time. In fact it was 
undistinguishable from a political crisis given that the state held the reigns of the 
economy.
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The same economic crisis emerges Peter Geschiere’s introduction to the 1993 
proceedings, or its sequel, as he preferred to put it, to the colloquium organized four 
years earlier by the Afrika-Studiecentrum in Leiden, Holland, on the political economy 
of Cameroon. The text indicates nevertheless that the crisis could be taken as an example 
of “the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa” as reported by the World Bank in 1989, the critique 
of which brings into focus the so-called failure of the state to modernize in Africa 
(Geschiere & Könings, 1993, p.23). With this picture in the background, Dutch, French, 
British and Cameroonian scholars were convened around two centers of interests: the 
role that the state played as a pathway  to accumulation, and regional variations in 
accumulation. In Geschiere’s view, the notion of accumulation imposed itself on the 
Leiden project because it allowed it to “avoid analyzing the fluid African social 
structures in rigid class terms” (p.26). On the other hand, the idea of regional variations 
was “more enlightening than the simplistic analyses in tribal terms” (p.23). It never 
occurred to Geschiere to ask one central question: What if the move from class to 
accumulation means first the refusal to confront the premise of class versus kinship 
relations, which has long played the double role of facilitating a differential analysis of 
theoretically distinguished industrialized and non-industrialized societies–hence the 
indication of African social structures–and constituting an obstacle to the critical reading 
of Marx’s idea of “historical process” at the origin of the “modern state” more generally 
(Marx, 2001)? Second, what if the same move results in the ironic and farcical 
resumption of the terms of Marx’s critique of the bourgeois solution of “primitive 
accumulation,” formulated by the bourgeois political economists, in Marx’s view, in 
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order to polarize the market  for commodities, and legitimate the wealth of the few 
against the poverty of the masses? In other words, what if the consideration of otherwise 
called “alternative modes of accumulation” and “comparative research into the regional 
variations within Cameroon” (p.21) were both mere displacements of the instrumental 
dichotomy between class and kinship, and the reification and universalization of an 
industrialist bourgeois fiction premised on a theory of capital as accumulated labor only, 
with the producer as its sublime subject? 
Above all, how not to read behind the scenes of the deus ex machina that the idea 
of accumulation had to play  in the predicament of the State of Cameroon the mere 
translation of the Bamileke-Beti scholarly confrontation? Geschiere was not unaware of 
this entailment. He made sure, in his introduction, to locate the “simplistic analyses in 
tribal terms” at the heart of scholarly  debates in Cameroon. “Of late,” Geschiere tells us 
in the introduction to Pathways to Accumulation, “political debates are more and more 
marked by a tendency to oppose the West (Bamiléké; Grassfielders) to the Center-South 
(Beti). And the ideological construction of such oppositions is dominated by fluent, but 
tenacious notions on the different forms of access of these groups to the state and 
market.” (p.22) We may have thus gotten a glimpse of the background to Socpa’s later 
exploration of conflicts in Yaoundé and Kousseri, as much as to Francesco Pompeo’s 
rendition of the impasses at the heart of the project of National Museum in Yaoundé. All 
things considered, the different forms of access to the state and the market enunciated in 
the introduction were rather the overall conclusion of the various contributions of the 
proceedings. At the forefront of this venture was the already mentioned alternative 
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modes of accumulation and the very  contrast observed, not  regionally as such, but 
comparatively  along ethnic lines among the Bamileke and small entrepreneurs from the 
Grassland on one side, and the members of other ethnic groups (the cardinal designation 
can hardly hide the Fulani and assimilated ethnic groups, originaires of the North, and 
the Beti, originaires of the Center and South) on the other side. The term Region in 1993 
did not correspond exactly to nowadays regions, which were then provinces. Region 
then simply meant an ethnographic mapping of the country, as much as a tacit ethnic 
profiling of access to state privileges. In other words, we have herein confirmed the lines 
of cleavage of autochthony and regional balance.
On all accounts, it is a curious turn of events that a contrast  between the 
Bamileke and the Beti, itself predicated on an apparently marginal and ambivalent 
pathway to accumulation, has come to summarize and even explain the crisis in 
Cameroon. Geschiere tells us that the “neo-traditional savings associations such as 
tontines and njangis” have been “successful in the West and North West Provinces,” and 
“less effective in other regions, even in the North where Islamic traders were strongly 
supported by  the Ahidjo regime in the sixties and the seventies” (p.22). We are in this 
way reminded of the contrast that motivated Jean-Louis Dongmo’s state doctoral thesis 
on Bamileke dynamism in the 1970s (see Chapter 1). If the Northern traders were not 
much of an issue at the time of crisis, it was because they were assumed to have been 
replaced by  the Beti in their position as primary  benefactors of the state machine of 
accumulation; thanks to Paul Biya whose “regime made a determined effort to promote 
entrepreneurship  among the Beti groups in the Center and the South Provinces” (p.22). I 
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have already given a broad perspective on what to expect from the traditional or neo-
traditional character of the associations touched upon here in Chapter 5. We should not, 
as yet, go beyond assuming that these savings associations have been developed over 
time by the ressortissants of certain chieftaincies i.e. the members of certain customary 
collectivities (in regard to national lands) or traditional collectivities (in regard to 
chieftainship). It  is true, however, that these savings associations, independently of their 
putative origin in the Grassland, do not generally  discriminate their members along 
ethnic lines, and even less along kinship. Antoine Socpa’s idea of “informal means,” 
which includes friendship, is a much closer description. Hubert Mono Ndjana, who had 
seen in those associations the fief of the Bamileke and the reason for which state treasury 
was in a bind–for fiscal evasion, that is–devoted a booklet  to the subject the same year 
Geschiere and Könings’s edited book was published and described their rather eclectic 
and multifaceted character (Mono Ndjana, 1993).
Even for Geschiere, the modes of accumulation thus under consideration have 
something of a perversion and an innovation at the same time. Whereas their resilience 
and formidable expansion are said to pose a “serious threat to the official banking 
circuit,” their effect is not the least to praise since they  have led to “the emergence of a 
group of entrepreneurs of regional and even national significance” (p.22). There is no 
doubt that  the group thus considered are the originaires of nowadays West  and North 
West Regions. The idea that Grassland entrepreneurship  relies on neo-traditional savings 
associations which have demonstrated a certain resilience and have taken a national 
significance suggests that these associations are both unwelcome, especially insofar as 
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the official banking system is concerned, and welcome insofar as the search for 
alternative to this system is concerned. Does this mean that there was something wrong 
with officialdom? Here the term “alternative” finds its full meaning. One wonders 
whether Bamileke and Grassfielders’ tontines and njangis may not be a salutary solution 
to the crisis in Cameroon. If so, in what ways? Would it  not be at the price of a docile 
confidence in the tradition that made of them a success? We thus have here brought into 
confrontation the upper and lower strata of our three-tiered superposition of institutions 
in a rather systematic way. 
The confrontation between officialdom and tradition does not aim at unraveling 
the underlying tetrahedron of national realities, and ask questions such as: How to 
define, assess, and articulate the proper spheres of the public, the national, the private, 
and the state (as private proprietor), and the relative participation of each therefore in the 
dazzling effects of said economic crisis? Against  this, the confrontation focuses on the 
redistributive machine that the state qua nation has come to play. Even from this 
standpoint, not all national realities (soil, subsoil, cultures, history, thought, etc.) are 
under scrutiny. On the contrary, the munificence of the Head of State is pit against the 
maneuvers of “other persons of Cameroonian nationality” to secure, from the bottom-up, 
untapped sectors of national realities. Accordingly, each side is given the color of the 
most apparent ethnic group: the Beti entrepreneurs with the Head of State, and the 
Bamileke entrepreneurs with savings associations. I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
an example given to us by  Socpa, which involved a Beti gentleman, in the suburb of 
Yaoundé, who had to mortgage an unregistered family plot to provide medical assistance 
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to a family member. Socpa made it clear for us that the money was provided by another 
gentleman, a Bamileke this time, who had to secure money from his savings association. 
This example illustrates further the extent in which said neo-traditional savings 
associations have developed to supplement the “official banking circuits” in areas where 
regular financial institutions may not intervene in due form since the securities are drawn 
on national lands, with the total indifference of state representatives, be they Beti or not, 
and the benevolent assurance of traditional authorities. With this in mind, the neo-
traditional character of these savings associations, as much as the idea of informal 
means, both relate to the management of national lands, and highlights not only  its 
configuration into as many ethnic or traditional homelands and families, whose lands are 
dependencies of the national lands, but also the sort of transactions characteristic to 
them, but not independent from state institutions. At a broader level, it indicates the ways 
in which heads of state may regard themselves as heads of a gigantic family  of 
traditional collectivities: hence Ahidjo’s title of Father of the Nation, and Biya’s 
innuendo in 2011 that he was the Fon of Fons (see Chapter 5). I argued in Chapter 7 that 
the head of state appears, at the heart  of ethnic territorialization, as the father of squatters 
on national lands and the tutelary incarnation of a nation without cleavage.
The family was brought up by the scholars of alternative modes of accumulation 
from an end other than the predicament that it constitutes for either the management or 
the registration of national lands, and their ripple effect on the management of national 
realities at large. A central role was attributed to the family by  these scholars in 
distinguishing the Bamileke and the Beti, if not all other ethnic groups in the country, 
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and conceived of against the backdrop  in favor of which the notion of class was 
dismissed: the so-called African social structures. The latter makes room for an inroad 
into the literal traditions that may have fostered or hampered accumulation within each 
groups. Cyprian Fisiy  and Peter Geschiere explored the “leveling effects” of “sorcery 
and witchcraft” understood as an idiom thanks to which demands for redistribution are 
formulated within the family, and solidarity  is maintained. On the other hand, Dieudonné 
Miaffo and Jean-Pierre Warnier argued that “the Bamileke society have succeeded to 
mend the bottomless pit of family  solidarity” (p.52). How was this tour de force 
accomplished? Miaffo and Warnier tell us it was thanks to the “Bamileke ethos of 
notability.” This trait of “civilization,” in Warnier’s opinion (Warnier, 1993), is an 
exception to Bayart’s idea of an “ethos of munificence” characterizing state power in 
Africa generally, and promotes savings as much as it fosters a different kind of solidarity 
in the family: merit-based solidarity. Does it mean that Bamileke accumulation is 
independent from positions inside the state machinery  of accumulation, or else 
independent from the privatization of national lands and national realities at large? This 
seems to be the case even for Michael Rowlands who, in a nod to Miaffo and Warnier, 
emphasizes the Bamileke “pursuit of money, their ascetic lifestyle and independence 
from political-administrative state elite” (p.74).
Jean-François Bayart, for whom the notion of straddling was crucial for the 
analysis of the postcolonial African state, was hesitant to follow the steps of the forum, 
but ended up helpless. He avoided taking on the question directly and concluded the 
proceedings ambiguously  by stating: “It is not a question, hence, of who are the best 
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accumulators among the Bamileke, the Bassa and the Beti [...], but to identify  the 
institutions and practices in favor of which actors accumulate” (p.337). Accordingly, in 
addition to savings associations, commodity networks, ethnicity, kinship, tontines, 
chieftaincies, schools, administration, companies are all cited alongside marriage, 
sexuality, Islam, new religious movements, institutional churches, migration, 
delinquency, etc. It all comes down, the list says, to who is whom, and who does what. 
In whose eyes if not in the distant Master’s gaze, which Socpa thought was hard to attain 
once lured by the enthralling power of ethnic categories, and for which ethnic categories 
are the mere indicators of sub-categories of humanity and history? (see Chapter 2) All 
things considered, Bayart’s list sends us back to the point of departure. Why  did 
Geschiere’s introduction not directly  address Achille Mbembe’s objection to both the 
telos of “capitalist accumulation” and to the ensuing assumption that in Africa there are 
“local procedures aborting capitalism” in addition to “the cupidity of the native 
elites” (Mbembe, 1990, p.12)? An answer to this question is not hard to find, especially 
because Mbembe himself, in the epilogue he wrote to the proceedings, does not directly 
object to the apparent consensus among the scholars of pathways to accumulation, and 
prefers instead to elaborate on the various factions that have taken shape since the late 
colonial era–whose delineation either overlaps or crosscuts ethnicity, regions, political 
parties, intellectual and anti-colonial movement, etc.–and have each been vying to gain 
control over state power, thus the right to be in charge of national realities in my view. A 
more decisive answer nonetheless is that Mbembe, with his 1990’s assumption that 
capitalist accumulation is already present in Cameroon, does not indicate the ways in 
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which the notion of governmentality, which binds power, violence, and accumulation in 
his view, engages the contrast between the Bamileke and the Beti, except indirectly  with 
his reprisal of Bayart’s notion of “historicity proper” (historicité propre): a contrast 
central to the idea of alternative modes of accumulation. The consensus could thus ask: 
If there is already an accumulation, why would it not  correspond, be it to a minor extent, 
to Bamileke accumulation? In the end what is the role that the Bamileke ethos of 
notability plays, not in the theory  of capital as accumulated labor, but in the theory of 
national realities? I would like to suggest further that it  is not to be excluded that it may 
play  the same role the Bourgeois theory  of primitive accumulation, in Marx and Engels’ 
view, played in explaining the theoretical impasse between capital and surplus-value.
Before Marx and Engels translated the theory of primitive accumulation into 
their own language of historical process, they introduced it  in the guise of a fiction, an 
equivalent of which can only be found in the biblical tales of origins; and a fiction 
exactly  of the same character as Biya’s cultural spiritualism, which legitimates the 
postcolonial state qua nation (see Chapter 7). “In times long gone-by  there were two 
sorts of people; one the diligent, intelligent, and, above all frugal elite, the other rascals, 
spending their substance, and more, in riotous living.” Accordingly, a little further on 
Marx and Engels write, “it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the 
latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own skin” (Marx & Engels, 1908, p.
784). We should not be led astray by the striking resemblance between the two 
categories of people delineated in this story with the contrasting portraits which have 
taken shape in the literature on comparative accumulation among the Bamileke and the 
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Beti in Cameroon. It  will amount first to putting the cart before the horse, and second to 
letting oneself be taken in by  the alluring effect of the first moment of the tale–which 
consists in fostering identification with either of the two sorts of people–and missing the 
second moment, consisting in making appear natural what, in Marx and Engels’ view, is 
the result of the working conditions that characterize their intercourse. Of course, the 
terms of the comparison are slightly displaced. With the Bamileke and the Beti, we are 
urged to compare two different ethnic groups, or two sorts of traditional collectivities, 
not directly two categories of individuals. Moreover their differentiated ethos have taken 
the place of their relative endowment in wealth. 
One last and crucial axis is the problem for which the tale is an answer. With 
Marx and Engels, there were two problems, or more precisely  one problem expressed in 
two different forms; one of explicitly ethical character and the other reduced in all 
likelihood to a mere process of historical character in our authors’ point of view. The 
first form, not in order of exposition but clarity, appears as a problem immediately 
answered by  the distinction between the two categories of individuals. “The legend of 
theological original sin tells us of how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the 
sweat of his brow, the history of economical original sin reveals that there are people to 
whom this is by  no means essential” (p.784). The second form of our problem must have 
already been foreseen in the authors’ reluctance to carry  their comparison thoroughly, 
and consequently  talk of a legend (Legende) instead of a history (Historie) in regard to 
their rendition of the bourgeois theory of primitive accumulation as another tale of 
original sin. We can say that this caution seems motivated by  the desire of Marx and 
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Engels to concede a certain analytical ground to the political economist so as to 
substitute a history for another history, and thereby preclude the interpretation of their 
own revisionary rationalization as just another legend. Indeed Marx and Engels 
introduce us to the secret of primitive accumulation as a historical process by  leading us 
first onto the grounds of a “defective circle” without origin or end; except through Adam 
Smith’s notion of a “previous accumulation,” independent from capitalistic production 
and whereby the latter becomes an end in itself. “[T]he accumulation of capital 
presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic 
production presupposes the preexistence of considerable masses of capital and labor-
power in the hands of producers of commodities” (p.784). For the bourgeois political 
economist, the fact narrated by the tale is the past, constitutes both the cause and 
justification of the present situation (the rift between the owners of means of production 
and wage-laborers), and operates both as a safety  valve and ethical support in the same 
fashion Geertz’s theory  of primordial ties provided a certain assurance against the 
government immobilism observed in the so-called New States. The same goes with 
Biya’s theory  of cultural spiritualism, which creates an order in favor of which ethnicity, 
with everything else associated, must give way to a supra-ethnic entity: the state. In 
likening the theory of primitive accumulation to the tale of original sin, Marx and Engels 
do not seek to undermine its ethical character of accumulation. On the contrary, they 
endeavor relentlessly  to reaffirm accumulation in its processual aspect, and property in 
its legal aspect, as a labor-relation which may develop “naturally,” as the case is, in their 
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opinion, with the family, or “voluntarily” as the case is, at the end of their historical 
process, with capitalistic production.
The contraposition of the Bamileke with the Beti, on the other hand, does not 
exactly  place us inside the defective circle of capitalistic production, but at a single 
entry: the moment at which the “producers of commodities” come into existence, and 
arrive at the scene of capitalistic production. Marx and Engels understand this stage as 
the result  not of a sin, but of a process. The process is assumed to generates not two 
species of humans (sinners) nor families (ethos-bearers) but “two very different kinds of 
commodity-possessors.” Moreover, once inside the capitalistic production, commodities 
become the binding force. At the heart of this “world of commodities,” money itself is 
reduced to mere commodity, like any other means required by capitalistic production, 
including labor-power. Whether this process must have wholly taken place before the 
stage of capitalistic production–Marx and Engels seemed to believe it is the case–is not 
as much important for them as the need for the system to sustain the difference between 
the two categories of commodity possessors needed: “on the one hand, the owners of 
money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of 
values they possess, by buying other people’s labor-power; on the other hand, free-
laborers, the sellers of their own labor-power, and therefore the sellers of labor” (p.785). 
It is from this vantage point that Marx and Engels have read in the theory of primitive 
accumulation not so much the past therein narrated, but  its actual outcome in the present, 
and have envisioned in it “the process which takes away  from the laborer the possession 
of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means 
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of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into 
wage-laborers.” Hence the idea: the “so-called primitive accumulation (...) is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of 
production” (p.785). How does the divorce take place if not in and through the language 
of “right” and “labor” which, “in the tender annals of Political Economy,” are “the sole 
means of enrichment” (p.785)? Answering this question may lure us into the 
revolutionary  predicament of Marx’s notion of historical process and revised labor 
theory, and make us miss the underlying argument both writers had developed earlier, in 
The German Ideology, according to which capitalist production puts us onto the stage of 
“big industry” and “universal competition,” and a stage where private property  “has cast 
off all semblance of communal institution and has shut out the state from any influence 
on the development of property” (Marx & Engels, 2001, p.113, my emphasis). 
Indeed, the Bamileke/Beti contrast does not put us onto a stage where “the social 
means of subsistence and of production” appear to have been entirely turned into capital 
as accumulated labor. Neither does it inform us of a context in which the state form has 
been legibly  dispossessed of any influence on the development of property. On the 
contrary, we are placed in a situation–I have provided enough description in the previous 
chapter–where the predominance of the state in the development of property is visibly 
unquestionable. Against this, the jubilant acclamation of accumulation through savings 
associations seems to anticipate a situation in which not only the majority of the 
country’s population will appear as “free-laborers,” and the economy will be literally in 
the hands of, not the state, but of a few owners of capital, who would have, perhaps 
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thanks to these savings associations, appropriated the privileges of the state qua nation. 
A situation is therefore anticipated, in which the visibility of the state as a “communal 
institution” will have completely disappeared. Hence the presumption of a failure to 
modernize, accordingly attributed to an ethos of munificence that characterizes not the 
state but those assumed to be wielding the state qua nation, against the prowess of agents 
of neo-traditional savings association. Nevertheless, if we limit ourselves to the actual 
existence of the state form in Cameroon as a legal private proprietor, custodian and 
developer of not-yet-registered lands, or national lands, and managers of state lands, we 
will miss the point of the critique that Marx and Engels endeavored to make of the state 
as a communal institution in the very “capitalistic system,” conceivable only as a tension 
between the “universal” or “world-historical” scale of big industry  and the national 
scope of its instrumentalization by particular interests. We will equally lose track of the 
insecurity that accompanies the appropriation of the “social means of subsistence and of 
production” this time not directly by  big industry, but by a state readily preying on their 
investments. 
On all accounts, the current state qua nation in Cameroon will not pass Marx and 
Engels’ test of a capitalistic system. It may be said to have been “purchased gradually by 
the owners of capital,” and to have “fallen entirely into their hands” only if the level of 
analysis is universal or world-historical (2001, p.113). In consequence, the real 
competition will not be so much between the Beti and the Bamileke as it will be between 
Bamileke capital and foreign capital. Insofar as the form of the state is concerned 
nonetheless, the state qua nation in Cameroon will correspond, for Marx and Engels, to a 
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sort of vestige of the “ancient communal and state ownership” (p.64), not so much 
unlike the place the savage mind occupies in the civilized world for Claude Lévi-Strauss. 
It does not follow, however, that the actual state qua nation stands outside, nor is it 
independent from the world of big industry and universal competition. On the contrary, 
like the subjects of ethnology in the world of the anthropologist, it occupies a certain 
Region of the world of commodities. I have long sought for reasons, apart from 
immediate community benefits and political mobilization, that would account for the 
tremendous literary  emphasis on Bamileke “ethos of notability” in a context where the 
considerably greater section of the Bamileke population is assumed, such can be seen 
with Warnier (1993), to be exposed to the poor living conditions of urban areas. What if 
the effect sought by this literature is to both consolidate and naturalize the tetrahedron of 
national realities, with its multifaceted cleavages, and to draw attention at the same time 
away from the assessment of its actual beneficiaries?
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